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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation comprises three papers on spatial features of labor markets and links to the 
housing market. The first two papers look at how a local parental leave policy and the 
neighborhood in which one resides can influence women’s decision to work. One paper shows 
that New Jersey’s 2009 family leave insurance program induces women to remain employed 
following childbirth. The other reveals that, for women, having other women with similar aged 
children to yours among your closest neighbors makes you emulate their work behavior. The 
final paper analyzes how seasonality in occupational employment via either monthly or business-
cycle induced fluctuations to labor demand increases the likelihood of holding a home equity line 
of credit. This finding is consistent with individuals drawing on these credit lines to access stored 
home equity in order to smooth consumption in the face of short-term breaks to employment. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Spatial Features of Labor Markets and Links to the Housing Market 
 
The overarching theme of this dissertation is that spatial features of labor markets and in 
particular their links to what is happening in the housing market impact individuals’ labor market 
outcomes. Two of the papers, presented in chapters 2 and 3, analyze how such spatial features 
impact women’s decision to work. One looks at how a state-specific parental leave policy can 
impact women’s decision to remain in the labor force following childbirth. The other directly ties 
the conditions in women’s residential neighborhood to their work decision, via the influence of 
neighboring peers. The third paper, in chapter 4, further highlights the link between the housing 
market and labor market outcomes by showing how individuals can draw upon stored home 
equity when facing uncertainty in employment. 
Childbearing and rearing contribute to women experiencing greater working career 
interruptions than men, impacting future employment outcomes. The paper in the second chapter 
uses New Jersey’s 2009 mandate requiring firms to provide workers paid leave during their 
child’s first year of life to assess how it affects subsequent employment. A spatial differencing 
method is carried out using American Community Survey from 2005 to 2012. The method 
compares difference-in-differences estimates of how the policy impacts potentially eligible 
women’s employment in New Jersey to those same estimates for women living further away 
from New Jersey. A woman is deemed potentially eligible if she had a child in 2009 or later. 
This differencing strategy allied to the use of state by year fixed effects seeks to capture 
heterogeneity in local economic conditions that may bias estimated policy impacts. I find the 
policy increases married women’s employment probability by approximately 3 percentage points 
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in the year of potential leave take-up and this effect persists in the three subsequent years. No 
significant policy effects on employment are found for men or single women. 
The third chapter is joint work with Eleonora Patacchini and Stuart Rosenthal. This paper 
examines the influence of neighborhood peer effects on the decision of women to work using 
1985-1993 American Housing Survey data that follows clusters of adjacent homes over time. 
Modeling assumptions imply rank order restrictions on the effect of nearby working and non- 
working peers and non-peers that guide the analysis. Estimates indicate that female labor supply 
is sensitive to peer effects and at least in part because women emulate the work behavior of 
nearby women with similar age children. For men, peer effects are present in simply specified 
models but disappear in more robust specifications, consistent with inelastic work decisions. 
Findings confirm the value of geographically concentrated panel data and other modeling 
features when attempting to identify peer effects. 
The last paper analyzes how the frequency and predictability of facing spells of 
unemployment impacts households’ demand for home equity loans or lines of credit (HELOC). 
These devices represent a low transactions cost way of extracting stored home equity. Using 
American Community Survey 2003-2013 data, I find working age household heads whose 
occupational unemployment rates are significantly impacted by changes in GDP, or business 
cycle effects, are more likely to secure access to a HELOC. Estimated effects are strongest for 
younger individuals. For this group facing monthly seasonality in employment further increases 
their tendency to hold a HELOC. Evidence of these impacts on younger households’ probability 
of holding a HELOC is most robust when coupled with house price appreciation that likely lifts 
credit supply restrictions they may face. Results are consistent with consumption smoothing 
motives impacting the demand for HELOCs. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
 
Local Parental Leave Assistance and Long-Term Effects on Female Labor Supply 
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2.1 Introduction 
Previous research has found that temporary breaks from the labor force contribute to 
worse labor market outcomes later in life (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1997, 2006; and Kim and 
Polachek, 1994). One such break in employment occurs for women who decide to drop out of the 
labor force during childbearing years. This paper makes use of the enaction of a paid leave 
policy in New Jersey in 2009 that directly reduces the likelihood of such a break occurring to 
assess its impact on women’s employment probabilities in the years following childbirth.  
Using American Community Survey data from 2005 to 2012, I employ a spatial 
differencing strategy consisting of two steps. First, difference-in-differences estimates of the paid 
leave policy’s impact on the employment probability of women potentially eligible for the policy 
is computed for different geographic areas. Mothers are potentially eligible if they had a child 
born in 2009 or later. In these regressions, women with no child or whose child was born before 
the policy was enacted are the control group. In the second step, estimated impacts for 
potentially eligible women in the New Jersey sample are compared to those for samples at 
various distances from New Jersey. This differencing across geographic areas as well as the use 
of state by year fixed effects in estimating regressions enables a more precise identification of 
policy impacts.  
Given this estimation strategy, the most credible estimate of the paid leave policy’s 
impact on employment shows a 3.1 percentage point increase in the employment probability of 
married women in the year they are potentially eligible to receive paid leave benefits. 
Furthermore, estimates show this increase in employment relative to policy-ineligible women 
persists for a further 3 years. The estimated policy impact on married women’s employment 1 to 
3 years after potential leave take-up occurs is of 2.7 percentage points. These estimates are 
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obtained by comparing the New Jersey sample’s coefficients to those for the sample of women 
living in Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) just outside the New Jersey border in the New 
York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. As would be expected given the lower labor supply 
elasticities of single women and men, little evidence of policy effects are found for their 
employment probabilities. 
The persistent positive effect on employment probability that is found in this analysis is 
novel in the literature. Other authors have analyzed the effect on women’s employment of a 
similar paid family leave policy enacted in California in 2004 (e.g. Baum and Ruhm, 2013; 
Rossin-Slater et al, 2013; Das and Polachek, 2014; and Espinola-Arredondo and Mondal, 2010) 
but failed to find such a persistent effect on employment. The spatial differencing strategy in this 
paper more effectively captures differences in local economic conditions that may bias estimated 
policy impacts, thus revealing this persistent effect. This finding is particularly interesting since 
it shows how a modest financial incentive for mothers to maintain their attachment to the labor 
force during the year after childbirth can have a significant impact on subsequent employment 
outcomes.  
As the comparison sample’s geographic distance to New Jersey increases so do the 
policy’s estimated impacts on employment. This is to be expected for two reasons. As distance to 
New Jersey increases, local economic conditions are likely to become increasingly different and 
by enough to affect the employment rates of potentially eligible women unrelated to the policy. 
Secondly, women living closer to New Jersey may be able to seek employment in New Jersey to 
take advantage of the policy. Therefore a clear trade-off in identification exists between being 
closer, diminishing bias from differences in local economic conditions, versus being further 
away thus reducing bias due to women in the comparison sample actually taking up the policy. 
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The New Jersey paid family leave policy, officially called “Family Leave Insurance”, 
follows a similar policy enacted in California in 2004, making these the first states to explicitly 
have a paid leave policy in place for both male and female workers 0F1. Previously, workers with no 
paid leave schemes through employers only had access to federal unpaid job-protected leave 
through the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 1F2 New Jersey’s policy provides 
workers with up to 6 weeks of paid leave in order to bond with a newborn or adopted child in the 
year following the child’s birth or adoption, but has no job protection provision. 2F3  
During the paid leave weeks workers earn a benefit level equal to 67% of their average 
weekly pay up to a cap of $584; this is calculated based on the wage earnings in the 8 base weeks 
preceding take-up.3F4 To be eligible workers must either have earned $7,300 in the past year or 
worked a minimum of 20 weeks, earning at least $145 a week, in covered New Jersey 
employment during that time period. The program is financed through employee payroll 
deductions equal to 0.1% of the first $31,500 of covered wages in 2014. Although the policy 
could be used to take care of a sick family member, approximately 80% of policy claims are for 
bonding with a newborn or adopted child. 4F5 As with disability insurance, firms may self-insure 
this paid family leave program so long as their private paid leave plan is at least as generous as 
the state plan in both leave duration and benefit level. 
Given these policy specifications, a theoretical model is developed which helps identify 
which individuals are more likely to be impacted by the policy. The model predicts married 
women whose spouses earn higher wages are more likely to be impacted and this is borne out in 
                                                          
1 Rhode Island has since enacted a similar policy, effective in January 2014. While Washington signed a similar 
policy in 2007 but is yet to enact it, due to budget considerations. 
2 FMLA provides up to 12 weeks of job-protected unpaid leave for workers in firms that employ at least 50 workers 
living within a 75 mile radius. 
3 With employer approval, the 6 week total leave-taking period may be taken intermittently, in 7 day increments. 
4 The California paid family leave program has a lower replacement rate (55%) and higher maximum cap ($959). 
5 For more information on policy visit: http://lwd.state.nj.us/labor/fli/fliindex.html  
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the empirical results. The model further predicts that low-wage earners may not be able to afford 
program take-up due to one-third pay cut it entails. Results show policy impacts on employment 
are largest for married women with a bachelor’s degree or higher suggesting these are women 
whose future employment outcomes are most penalized when exiting the labor force for 
childbearing. 
As previously indicated, the finding of improved employment outcomes for women as a 
result of the policy is in line with some previous literature addressing employment impacts of 
California’s paid leave policy, detailed below. 5F6 Baum and Ruhm (2013) use NLSY-1997 wave 
data and find California policy had an impact on both male and female workers’ leave taking 
behavior. However they only find positive policy effects on mothers’ employment probability 
nine-to-twelve months after a child’s birth as well as a positive effect on hours and weeks 
worked that lasted into the child’s second year of life. Rossin-Slater et al (2013) have similar 
findings of increases in weekly work hours of 10% to 17% and average maternity leave duration 
increasing from 3 to 6 weeks, using CPS data. Moreover they find evidence of wage increases 
associated with the policy but stress these results are not as strong. This suggests some of the 
perceived policy benefits may be capitalized into lower wages. 
A contrasting result is found by Das and Polachek (2014) who analyze what they refer to 
as "unintended consequences” of California’s paid leave program. They compare labor market 
outcomes for young versus old and men versus women in California and other states pre- and 
post-policy enaction. These authors confirm previous research’s finding of increased labor force 
participation for young women, yet also find the policy increased the unemployment rate and 
duration of unemployment for this group of workers. They attribute these findings to policy 
                                                          
6 Related work by Patnaik (2015) finds a Quebec reform to parental leave that increases fathers’ leave-taking 
(inducing greater equity in leave-taking across parents) has persistent positive effects on mothers’ labor market 
outcomes. This further highlights the role of parental leave provision on women’s labor market outcomes. 
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induced changes in labor demand that favor men and older workers over younger women. Such 
demand changes may also contribute to the Espinola-Arredondo and Mondal (2010) results that 
showed no significant changes in female employment in California resulting from this policy. 
Work analyzing New Jersey’s paid leave policy has focused on its impact on leave-taking 
behavior, not on employment outcomes per se. Byker (2013) assesses how New Jersey and 
California’s maternity leave legislation changes affect women’s breaks in employment, by using 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data that allow her to track a woman’s time 
off from work on a month-to-month basis for the 2 years before and after childbirth. She finds 
that these policies only have an impact on reducing the number of labor market exits lasting six 
months or less for women with less than a college degree. Byker (2013) suggests that this change 
in the pattern of labor market interruptions for less educated women may improve their 
employment outcomes, approximating them to those of more educated women. Sarna (2013) 
uses CPS data and finds evidence of an increase in leave-taking activity post-policy enaction for 
young women with a child under 1 years old when compared to older women, women whose 
young child is older, and women in other states. 
Finding impacts on employment outcomes for paid family leave policies contrasts with 
earlier work analyzing the impact of the 1993 FMLA on leave-taking and employment outcomes 
including: Baum, 2003; Berger and Waldfogel, 2004; and Waldfogel, 1999. These studies 
conclude that the FMLA had little impact on employment and wages, claiming this is due to a 
combination of the FMLA being unpaid, having a short duration, and affecting a large number of 
employees who already had some form of privately provided maternity leave policy in place.  
Paid family leave policies fall into the category of what Blau and Kahn (2013) recently 
called “family friendly” policies, i.e. policies that increase mothers’ attachment to the labor force 
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during childbearing years. These authors report that up to 28% of the U.S.’s relative decline in 
female labor force participation in comparison to other developed countries since 1990 may be 
attributable to such policies. Similar results are found by Cipollone, Patacchini, and Vallanti 
(2014) in assessing differences in female employment outcomes across 15 European Union 
countries. Their work indicates family oriented policy changes may explain up to 25% of young 
women’s increased labor force participation in these countries in the last 20 years. 
The findings in this paper also contribute to the literature that seeks to explain regional 
differences in women’s labor force participation due to other factors affecting childrearing 
arrangements (e.g. Black et al, 2014; Compton and Pollack, 2013; and Graves, 2013). A related 
strand of research has analyzed the impact of paid leave legislation on outcomes for children of 
leave-taking parents (e.g. Baker and Milligan, 2008; Carneiro et al, 2010; Rasmussen, 2010; 
Rossin, 2011; and Ruhm, 2000) and fertility decisions (Lalive and Zweimuller, 2009; Malkova, 
2014). While this paper does no such analysis, it is important to keep these impacts in mind 
when considering the policy’s welfare implications. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II presents the household labor 
supply model that provides the theoretical framework for the analysis; Section III describes the 
data used in the analysis; Section IV details the identification and econometric methods used; 
Section V discusses the empirical results; and Section VI provides a conclusion. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Model of Two-Period Household Labor Supply 
In order to assess how individuals will react to the enaction of paid family leave 
legislation this paper makes use of a two-period household labor supply model where individuals 
maximize utility over: leisure (L); a consumption good (X); and the choice of having a child (C). 
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In the first period, the leave take-up period, the individual decides whether or not to have a child 
as well as whether to take-up paid family leave. In the second period, which represents the rest of 
their lives, utility function and earnings will therefore reflect whether they: had a child; decided 
to take-up the policy; and decided to return to work. Therefore person i will maximize the 
following two-period utility function, where r is the discount rate and t denotes the time period: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖,𝑡, 𝐿𝑖,𝑡, 𝐶𝑖) = 𝑈𝑖,1(𝑋𝑖,1, 𝐿𝑖,1, 𝐶𝑖) +
𝑈𝑖(𝑋𝑖,2,𝐿𝑖,2,𝐶𝑖)
1+𝑟
     (1) 
Utility maximization is subject to time, income, and child sustenance budget constraints 
that are a function of the decisions to have a child and take-up the policy. If the individual 
chooses not to take-up paid family leave the two-period full-income budget constraints take the 
following usual form, where 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 is the wage rate for individual i in time period t ; T is the total 
time units available in each period; and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is individuals i’s non-labor income, which includes 
spousal income transfers6F7: 𝑇𝑤𝑖,1 + 𝑦𝑖,1 ≥ 𝑤𝑖,1𝐿𝑖,1 + 𝑋𝑖,1; and 𝑇𝑤𝑖,2 + 𝑦𝑖,2 ≥ 𝑤𝑖,2𝐿𝑖,2 + 𝑋𝑖,2.  
By contrast, if said person chooses to take-up paid family leave then the two-period full-
income budget constraints become: 𝑇 ≥ 𝐿𝑖,1; 𝑦𝑖,1 + (
2
3⁄ )ℎ𝑤
̅̅ ̅̅ ≥ 𝑋𝑖,1; and 𝑇𝑤𝑖,2 + 𝑦𝑖,2 ≥
𝑤𝑖,2𝐿𝑖,2 + 𝑋𝑖,2. This reflects the fact that in the first period the individual now earns two-thirds of 
their average wage income (ℎ𝑤̅̅ ̅̅ ) and works zero hours 7F8. Whenever someone chooses to have a 
child the following child sustenance budget constraint must also be satisfied: 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶. 
Figure 2.1 shows the first period budget constraints that the individual faces when 
making their choices. The first thing to notice in Figure 2.1 is that paid leave policy take-up 
                                                          
7 Following the method of Black et al (2014) and Chiappori (1992) this paper assumes the household will a priori 
decide on a sharing rule such that each individual will receive income from their spouse in each period. Although 
Black et al (2014) use this method in a setting where the household is actually only making their choices in one 
period, for simplicity I assume such a sharing rule choice can be repeated at the beginning of each period in the two-
period model.  
8 Recall that the paid leave benefit amount is calculated based on the average earnings in the 8 base weeks preceding 
leave take-up. A base week is a week in which someone earns at least 20 times New Jersey’s minimum hourly wage. 
This means that both the wage rate and the hours worked in those 8 weeks impact the paid leave benefit level. 
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introduces a kink into the budget constraint, leading people to consume the bundle         
(𝑦 + (2 3⁄ )ℎ𝑤
̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑇) if they take-up the policy. Secondly, the existence of the child sustenance 
constraint implies that anyone whose average wage income is such that ℎ𝑤̅̅ ̅̅ < 3 2⁄ (𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶 − 𝑦𝑖,1) 
cannot afford to take-up the program since they will not have a consumption level above the 
minimum required for child sustenance (𝑋𝑚𝑖𝑛𝐶). This means that, all else equal, lower-wage 
workers are less likely to take-up the program. It is however important to highlight public 
assistance programs may add to the non-labor income of lower wage workers and help them 
meet the child sustenance constraint, thus allowing them to take-up the program. Such programs 
include Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP). Similarly, the higher the level of spousal income transfers 
(captured in 𝑦𝑖,1) the more likely someone can afford to take-up paid family leave. 
As noted earlier, a complementarity exists between the two periods that can arise through 
the direct effect on second period utility of having a child (Ci), wage (𝑤𝑖,2) and non-labor income 
(𝑦𝑖,2) changes in the second period, and changes in preferences. All these factors are potentially 
impacted by the decision to take-up paid leave and hours worked in the first period.  
Wage in the second period is assumed to be an increasing and concave function of hours 
worked in the first period. Therefore people who leave the labor force for childbearing, without 
any leave take-up, will suffer a wage penalty when returning to work. This wage penalty is 
probably higher the more specialized the human capital required to carry out the job, particularly 
so in employment with fast-changing production processes. Second-period non-labor income is 
similarly impacted when mothers decide to leave employment for childbearing because of the 
search costs associated with finding a new job when returning to work. New mothers may face 
particularly high job search costs when returning to employment since there could be 
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discrimination from employers reluctant to hire someone who has a young child to take care of. 
If instead the worker maintains their tie to the first-period employer through leave take-up, no 
job search costs are accrued in the second period.  
Second-period wage and non-labor income impacts of paid leave take-up described in the 
preceding paragraph represent income and substitution effects of the policy. These can contribute 
towards the policy having a long-lasting positive effect on employment for women who would 
otherwise be likely to leave employment for childbearing. Note that if these workers were 
otherwise able to make use of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, it is unlikely such income 
effects would be significantly different once the paid leave policy is in place. This is because 
FMLA guarantees 12 weeks of job-protected unpaid leave, meaning workers can return to their 
previous employment after such unpaid leave periods. However, due to different eligibility 
requirements fewer workers can use FMLA than the New Jersey paid leave policy. 
Preference changes associated with policy take-up may also arise in multiple forms. 
Mothers who drop out of the labor force for childbearing may change their preferences in such a 
way that it decreases their likelihood of working in the future; e.g. getting used to being near 
their child and thus being reluctant to return to work. Analogously, mothers who do take-up paid 
leave may get a better gauge on how to balance work and childrearing requirements; thus making 
them more likely to remain employed in the first years of their child’s life.  
An alternate mechanism through which preferences may be impacted is via an emotional 
tie generated between the employer and employee. This could arise if the paid leave taker feels 
an obligation to return to work due to the fact that they were being paid during the time they took 
off, and therefore may feel guilty if they leave employment after making use of the policy. 
Expectations regarding leave-taking behavior may also be changed due to the availability of this 
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public paid leave policy. Whereas previously workers with access to private leave schemes 
through their employers may have felt negatively stigmatized by their employers for taking paid 
leave; the widespread availability of paid leave may reduce that stigma since the majority of 
workers in the state now have the ability to use it. This would results in greater use of paid leave 
schemes in general. Although these mechanisms cannot be identified using this paper’s 
estimation strategy, they may be strong drivers of the long-lasting effect on women’s 
employment that the paid leave policy is found to have. 
Overall, the differential implications of the model based on own wage rate and levels of 
non-labor income point towards analyzing heterogeneous impacts based on marital status as well 
as both own and spouse education levels. Own education will be positively correlated with own 
wage level. While spouse’s education, through its correlation with spouse’s wage level, will be 
correlated with spousal income transfers thus affecting non-labor income. The paid leave policy 
enaction is likely to have the highest impact on the probability of employment of someone who 
absent the policy has a low likelihood of being employed when having a child. 
 
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
Data for the analysis is obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS) from 
2005 to 2012, via the IPUMS-USA website (Ruggles et al, 2010). This dataset contains 
information on a series of socio-demographic characteristics of surveyed individuals as well as 
detailing where they live and work. The advantage of using ACS data is that the sample is large 
enough to enable spatial differencing across fairly small geographic areas, detailed below. 
The analysis is carried out for six different samples at varying distance ranges from the 
New Jersey border. The samples contain individuals residing in four broad geographic areas, 
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these being: New Jersey; the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas; neighbor states, 
outside the previously detailed metropolitan areas; and in all other states. 8F9  
The neighbor states sample includes people residing in the states of Delaware, New York, 
and Pennsylvania and is broken down into two estimating samples depending on how close to 
the New Jersey border the particular Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) are. People living in 
PUMAs within 60 miles of the New Jersey border are in one estimation sample; those in PUMAs 
further away from this border are in another.9F10 For the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan 
areas the estimation sample is similarly broken down based on distance to the New Jersey 
border. One sample contains people living in PUMAs within these metropolitan areas that share 
a border with New Jersey but are outside the state of New Jersey10F11. While the other sample only 
contains people living in PUMAs further away from the New Jersey border. This breaking up of 
areas by distance to the New Jersey border is done in order to reflect different likelihoods of 
being able to take advantage of the policy by seeking employment in New Jersey. 
In all estimating samples the analysis is restricted to individuals aged between 18 and 40 
years old in order to focus on workers of childbearing age. The socio-demographic variables 
included in the analysis are: educational attainment; ethnic group; marital status; and age. Table 
2.1 displays summary statistics for these variables for women living in the four broad geographic 
areas in the analysis. Statistics are reported separately for all women and for those that are 
potentially eligible for the paid family leave policy. A person is deemed potentially eligible if 
they had a child born after the legislation enaction, concretely in 2009 or later 11F12. It is important 
                                                          
9 All other states excludes New Jersey and its bordering states (DE, NY, and PA), while California is excluded due 
to it having a paid family leave policy of its own. 
10 All PUMAs in Delaware are within 60 miles of the New Jersey border, hence are not included in this last sample. 
11 These PUMAs are typically within 10 miles of the New Jersey border. 
12 No restriction is placed on where the individual may have been living when they gave birth. As a robustness check 
regressions are also run on a restricted sample which only includes individuals who moved into their home 5 or 
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to emphasize the analysis can only identify intent-to-treat effects, since we cannot observe 
whether or not someone actually took-up the paid family leave policy. 
By assessing the difference in these variables across geographic areas one can conclude 
that women living in New Jersey and in New York and Philadelphia have on average higher 
education and are more ethnically diverse, than those in the other two areas. Looking at the 
differences between panels A and B further reveals that potentially treated women have, on 
average: lower employment rates; higher education levels; are more likely to be married; and are 
slightly older than the women in the sample as a whole.  
As previously mentioned, results will be compared across geographic areas. One concern 
for identification would arise if the differences between potentially treated and untreated women 
was markedly dissimilar across geographic areas; thus making such cross-geographic areas 
comparisons inadvisable. Table 2.1 allows us to see this is not the case, indicating these 
comparisons will be useful for identification. 
Evidence in support of the geographic differencing strategy employed is provided by the 
evolution of employment rates across these areas in the years of analysis. Figure 2.2 shows the 
trends in the employment rate for women who are potentially eligible, those with a youngest 
child 3 years old or younger, and ineligible, those with no child or a youngest child older than 3, 
for three of the estimation samples. One can observe the employment rate of potentially treated 
women trended upward in the years before 2009 while for the control group the upward trend is 
slightly less pronounced. This may constitute a violation of the parallel trends assumption 
required for a typical difference-in-differences setup. However Figure 2.2 also reveals that the 
trends for treatment and control groups display similar patterns across geographic areas. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
more years ago; thus indicating they probably gave birth in the same state they currently reside in. Results do not 
change significantly although there is smaller power due to the reduced number of observations (see Table A1-1). 
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Concretely, across these areas the employment rate of potentially treated women grew at a faster 
rate in the years leading up to the policy than that of the control group.  
Furthermore, Figure 2.2 shows that the trend in women’s employment in the sample that 
is closest to New Jersey (PUMAs inside New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas that 
border New Jersey) is most similar to that for New Jersey. This highlights the importance of 
comparing results across geographic areas in order to accurately account for local economic 
conditions that may bias a typical difference-in-differences estimate of the policy’s impact on 
employment. It also indicates that the areas closest to New Jersey are likely to be the preferred 
comparison groups due to conditions being most similar within close geographic proximity. 
 Figure 2.2 provides no indication of the policy increasing employment for potentially 
eligible women in New Jersey. However, this unconditional distribution of employment masks 
the effects of the policy on employment which are evident in the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
2.4 Identification and econometric method 
In order to identify the effects of the paid family leave policy on the employment 
outcome of workers, this paper employs a spatial differencing strategy consisting of two steps. 
Initially a series of difference-in-differences estimates of the policy’s impact on employment are 
computed for all six estimating samples. These difference-in-differences estimates are calculated 
using the regression specifications described in estimating equations (2) and (3). The difference 
in these estimates relative to the estimate obtained from the New Jersey sample is then calculated 
and a one-sided test of whether the New Jersey estimated coefficient is larger than those for other 
samples is carried out; thus indicating significant policy effects on employment. 
The analysis is carried out using a linear probability model where the outcome is whether 
or not a person was employed in the week preceding the survey. The estimating equation is:  
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𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜕1 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕2𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 1 𝑡𝑜 3 𝑌𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑜𝑖,𝑡 
 +𝜕3 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2009 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                      (2) 
The first two variables in equation (2) capture the impact of the paid family leave 
legislation on employment for person i, in state s and year t. 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 indicates 
whether a person is currently potentially affected by the paid family leave policy. It is computed 
as the interaction of an indicator for having a child the under age of 1 and an indicator for the 
year being 2009 or later. While 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 1 𝑡𝑜 3 𝑌𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑜𝑖,𝑡 indicates whether a person could 
potentially have been affected by the paid family leave policy in a previous year, based on the 
age of their youngest child. 12F13 While the first variable aims to capture the policy’s immediate 
impact on employment, the second attempts to capture any longer-lasting effects. Therefore 
𝜕1 and 𝜕2 are the primary coefficients of interest in assessing policy impacts on employment. 
The vector of own attributes (𝑋𝑖,𝑡) in equation (2) includes all the variables presented in 
Table 2.1 in addition to the education level of spouses for married individuals. Therefore the 
variable indicating whether someone is married also indicates being married to a spouse that has 
less than a high-school degree. The inclusion of these variables is critical since spouse’s 
education level is highly correlated with their wages and therefore will serve as a proxy for the 
amount of intra-household income transfers that occur, thus affecting employment probability. 
As highlighted in the model in Section II, the larger the amount of income received from a 
spouse the more likely one would be able to drop out of the labor force for childbearing since the 
spouse would be able to cover the consumption costs associated with having a child. Therefore 
indicating the paid leave policy may bring these people back into employment, since they can 
take advantage of the extra income during the paid leave period. 
                                                          
13 For example, a women with a 2 year old child in 2011 is classified as being potentially treated since that child 
would have been born in 2009. 
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The remaining variables in the regression are youngest own child age indicators (𝛾𝑖,𝑡) and 
state by year fixed effects (𝜆𝑠,𝑡). The former are included since the age of a woman’s youngest 
child significantly impacts their employment probability and, since the policy variables are a 
function of youngest child age, their omission would likely bias the results 13F14. The latter are 
included to capture variation in employment rates across states and time, the omission of which 
would likely bias results. Ideally individual fixed effects would also be used however the ACS 
data is a repeated cross-section, so these are unavailable. 
In order to identify how persistent the effects on employment are, a model is run which 
captures differential impacts by youngest child age.  Equivalently, this also assesses differential 
impacts based on how many years have elapsed since potential leave take-up. This specification 
is shown below: 
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜕1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2009 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒 1𝑖,𝑡 
 +𝜕2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2010 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒 1 𝑡𝑜 2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2011 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒 2 𝑡𝑜 3𝑖,𝑡        
  + 𝜕4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 2012 ∗ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑔𝑒 3 𝑡𝑜 4𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜕𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑛
2012
𝑛=2009  
  +𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                    (3) 
The medium-term impact of the policy is split into three different variables based on 
whether a person was potentially impacted one, two, or three years ago. The analysis stops at 
three years since the last year of data is 2012. 
Throughout the analysis, standard errors are clustered at the PUMA level in order to 
account for potential serial correlation in outcomes within a geographic area that may bias the 
                                                          
14 Youngest own child age indicators are split in the following manner: under age 1; age 1; age 2; age 3; age 4 to 10; 
age 11 to 14; and age 15 to 18. 
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precision of estimated policy impacts. 14F15 Regressions are run separately for men and women and 
for women the analysis is further split by marital status. This is done in order to reflect the 
differing likelihoods of being impacted by the policy. In the same spirit, subsequent analysis 
interacts the policy eligibility variables with own and spouse education level. This captures the 
heterogeneity in impact for these groups suggested by the theoretical model.  
Previous research analyzing labor market effects of paid leave policies has tended to 
compare the outcomes of younger women to older women, reflecting their differing likelihoods 
of making use of the policy (e.g. Das and Polacheck, 2014). While this sort of comparison is 
informative, it cannot identify whether the employment impacts are all occurring at the time the 
paid leave policy is used or whether they arise in the years following policy usage. However, the 
advantage of such a method is that it does not rely on using the age of an individual’s youngest 
child as an indicator of whether or not they were policy eligible. The analysis in this paper does 
determine potential eligibility based on youngest child age, and so can assess how persistent 
employment effects may be. Identification therefore relies on the assumption that the decision of 
when to have a child is exogenous to the policy enaction. The validity of this assumption is 
assessed in a robustness check where predicted youngest child age instead of actual youngest 
child age is used to indicate potential policy eligibility. 15F16 
The analysis concludes with a final robustness check analyzing whether some other New 
Jersey specific factor affecting maternal employment rates post-2009 may be driving the results. 
This is done by comparing the post-2009 employment outcomes of women whose youngest child 
was born in 2008, thus policy ineligible by one year, versus having that child be born in 2009. 
                                                          
15 The specifications in equations (1) and (2) are also run for all samples in a single estimation; thus allowing for the 
state level clustering of standard errors. Results are available upon request and confirm the findings detailed later on. 
16 An analysis similar to that of Das and Polacheck (2014) is also carried out. It shows that positive effects on 
employment are evident for young married women (18 to 40), particularly those married to spouses with a BA 
degree or higher, when compared to similar women of older age (41 to 60). See Table A1-2 for the results. 
20 
 
 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Baseline model  
 Table 2.2 presents the full results from estimating equation (2). The remaining tables only 
report the variables pertaining to the impacts of the paid family leave legislation since these are 
the primary variables of interest and the remaining coefficients do not change significantly 
across model specifications. 
 The most salient feature in Table 2.2’s results is that both the coefficients associated with 
the paid family leave policy are positive and generally significant across different samples. This 
highlights the importance of analyzing the difference in the coefficients across geographic 
samples since the economic conditions at the time, namely the “Great Recession”, are likely to 
have important impacts on employment across the samples. Concretely, those that would have 
typically been out of the labor force, namely mothers of newborns, could be drawn into work due 
to the economic hardship households faced. 
 One can observe that for the coefficient indicating current potential policy eligibility 
(Currently Eligible) the magnitude of the difference between the New Jersey sample coefficient 
and those from other samples tends to increase as that sample’s distance to New Jersey increases. 
This is to be expected for two reasons. The first is that the further away from New Jersey the 
sample is, the more likely it is that other factors may be differentially affecting the employment 
rates of potentially eligible women, thus potentially contributing to greater differences in the 
coefficients that may not reflect true policy impacts. Secondly, women living closer to New 
Jersey may be able to seek employment in New Jersey to take advantage of the policy. This 
makes estimated policy coefficients for areas closer to the New Jersey border become closer to 
the ones for the New Jersey sample. 
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 The estimated policy impacts on employment in the year one is currently eligible for the 
policy range from a 0.6 to 2.8 percentage points increase, depending on the control sample used. 
These are seen in the square brackets underneath the estimated coefficients. These effects are 
generally not statistically significant though, reflecting the fact that single women may not be 
heavily impacted by the policy. This will come through in the analysis which splits the women 
sample by marital status, shown in Table 2.4. 
 The variable indicating a person was potentially eligible for paid family leave between 1 
and 3 years ago shows significant estimated policy impacts across all comparison samples. The 
estimated impacts range from a 1.9 to 4.4 percentage point increase in employment probabilities, 
or 2.8% and 6.6% respectively relative to the mean employment rate for women in New Jersey 
during this period. This is indicative of the policy having long lasting effects on women’s 
employment, which will be further investigated in subsequent analysis. 
 Table 2.2 shows the remaining control variables’ coefficients have the signs labor theory 
would predict and are similar across samples. Unsurprisingly, higher educational attainment 
increases employment probability and own age has a positive and concave relationship with 
employment. The racial breakdown shows minorities generally have lower employment rates 
than the excluded white race category. Marital status is shown to adversely affect women’s 
likelihood of being employed while having a spouse with a BA degree or higher educational 
attainment tends to further decrease that likelihood. Interestingly, having a spouse with a high 
school degree or some college makes a woman more likely to work than if her spouse has less 
than a high-school degree. It is possible that being married to an individual with less than a high-
school degree indicates both you and your spouse have a low attachment to the labor force, thus 
leading to this negative effect on employment relative to higher spouse education levels.  
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 Youngest child age is shown to play an important role in determining employment 
probability. Having a youngest child under the age of 10 is consistently associated with lower 
employment, while having a youngest child between the ages of 11 and 18 means you are more 
likely to be employed than women with either no children or a youngest child that is older. These 
results highlight the importance of controlling for youngest child age in estimating equations. 
 By comparing results for women to those for men, shown in the Table 2.3, one obtains 
further evidence supporting the view that the impacts for women are credibly due to the paid 
family leave policy enaction. For men there are no significant differences between the New 
Jersey sample’s estimated policy coefficients and those for all but one of the geographic areas in 
the analysis. The exception occurs when comparing the outcomes for men in New Jersey to those 
living in the Philadelphia and New York metropolitan areas in non-border PUMAs. For this 
comparison the results suggest a positive policy impact on men’s employment. However, since 
all the other estimates show no such significant impacts, this may indicate some other factor 
unrelated to the policy at hand is likely driving this result. This therefore impacts the credibility 
of policy estimates obtained when comparing the New Jersey coefficients to those from the 
sample in column (3).  
 Finding no credible paid leave policy impacts on male employment is in line with what 
one would expect given the stronger labor force attachment and lower extensive margin (i.e. 
work or not) labor supply elasticity men typically exhibit. These results support the conclusion 
that it is not some other New Jersey specific shock to employment that is driving the state’s 
increase in employment for mothers with a child born after 2009. 
 As predicted by the household labor supply model, Table 2.4 shows that married women 
are the ones significantly affected by the paid leave policy, and no significant effects are seen for 
23 
 
 
 
single women. Since single women have less flexibility in their labor supply decision, they are 
less affected than married women by a policy that induces women to remain in the labor force 
during their child’s first year of life. For married women we can observe the Currently Eligible 
variable coefficient is significantly different between the New Jersey sample and all other 
samples except the one in column (3); whereas the Eligible 1 to 3 years ago variable coefficient 
is significantly different between the New Jersey sample and all other samples. These estimated 
policy impacts tend to be larger than for the all women sample shown in Table 2.2. 
 If one assesses the impact of the policy on New Jersey married women’s employment 
relative to those living in border PUMAs within the NYC and PHL MSAs, we can see being 
currently eligible increases employment probability by 3.1 percentage points and previous 
eligibility increases it by 2.7 points. This shows that even when comparing across areas that are 
very close together one obtains evidence of a significant policy impact on employment.  
 The sample in column 2 is likely to have the most similar economic conditions to those in 
New Jersey, thus providing the preferred control group. However it is possible women in this 
sample may seek employment in New Jersey to take advantage of the policy, thus leading to 
smaller estimated policy impacts. Estimated impacts in column 3 are slightly smaller, though not 
significantly so. However, given that for this sample there is a significant difference in post-
policy enaction employment for men relative to New Jersey, one becomes sceptic regarding the 
credibility of policy estimates obtained using this sample. 
 As the distance of the comparison sample to New Jersey increases, the likelihood of 
women seeking jobs in New Jersey in order to take-up the policy decreases. Accordingly, 
estimated policy impacts on employment when comparing New Jersey to the three remaining 
samples (columns 4,5, and 6) are larger than the ones obtained when using column  2 as the 
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comparison group. However, as previously highlighted, if the comparison group becomes too 
distant from New Jersey the local economic conditions may differ enough that they can bias 
estimated policy impacts. Given this, of the estimates presented in columns 4 to 6, the one for 
column 4 is preferred since it is closest to New Jersey. For this comparison sample the estimated 
policy impacts are of 3.8 and 5.0 percentage point increases in employment in the year of 
eligibility and in the three years after potential take-up, respectively. These estimated effects are 
slightly larger than the ones obtained when comparing New Jersey outcomes to those for 
individuals in column 2’s sample, though not in a statistically significant manner. For the 
remaining columns both the currently eligible and eligible 1-3 years ago, estimated policy 
impacts on employment are also positively significant. 
 Overall, the findings for married women suggest there is a significant policy impact on 
employment in the year one is currently eligible for policy take-up of between 3.1 and 4.1 
percentage points. A similar magnitude effect is found 1 to 3 years after potential policy take-up, 
although the range of estimates is wider, showing an estimated impact between 2.7 and 5.0 
percentage points.  
 
2.5.2 Duration of paid family leave policy’s impact on employment 
Having found persistent effects on married women’s employment probability associated 
with the policy, the results in Table 2.5 show the breakdown of the policy’s impact by years 
since possible take-up may have occurred. These are obtained using the model in estimating 
equation (3). If one looks at column 2, the sample for women living in PUMAs that border New 
Jersey, inside the NYC and PHL MSAs, one observes that the policy has a significant policy 
impact on employment in the year of potential eligibility and 3 years after being potentially 
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eligible. Across the years since potential take-up the estimates are not different in a statistically 
significant manner, but they do range from 1.8 to 7.1 percentage points. These results are 
suggestive of real policy impacts on employment up to three years after policy take-up.  
When analyzing the results for the next best comparison group, the one containing 
married women living in DE, NY, and PA PUMAs that are within 60 miles of the border but 
outside the NYC and PHL MSAs, shown in column 4, the policy has significant positive impacts 
on employment in the year of potential take-up and 1 year after. The estimated magnitudes of the 
policy impacts across years since potential take-up have a smaller range than those in column 2, 
ranging from 3.8 to 5.4 percentage points. Estimated impacts are similar in columns 5 and 6 and 
are again significant in the year of potential take-up and one year after. 
The estimated impacts for individual years after potential take-up are not all statistically 
significant but the magnitudes of the effects suggest this is due to larger standard errors not 
smaller coefficient estimates. In contrast, when lumping all the years after take-up into a single 
variable (eligible 1-3 years ago) the estimated policy impact is statistically significant. Overall, 
the analysis shows these policy impacts on employment may persist for up to three years after 
potential leave take-up. This is a novel finding and points towards the importance of temporary 
financial incentives for mothers to remain in the labor force during their child’s first year of life 
having significant impacts on subsequent employment outcomes. 
 
2.5.3 Heterogeneous policy impacts by own and spouse educational attainment 
 The household labor supply model presented in section II indicated there are likely to be 
differential policy impacts based on own and spouse educational attainment. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 
present results from model specifications that seek to identify this heterogeneity in impacts. 
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 Table 2.6 shows the immediate employment impact of the policy is stronger among 
married women with some college experience or higher educational attainment. When 
comparing the outcomes for women in New Jersey to those in column 2, the estimated impact on 
mother’s employment in the year they are eligible for paid leave is of 6.5 and 5.9 percentage 
points for those with some college or a BA degree, respectively. The estimate for subsequent 
employment is again strongest for women with a BA degree or higher educational attainment, 
showing a 5.2 percentage point increase in employment probability in the three years after leave-
taking. Results from other comparison samples generally follow this pattern.  
 These findings are consistent with the theoretical model that showed lower-wage workers 
(typically lower education levels) were less likely to take-up the policy due to not being able to 
afford the one-third pay cut in those 6 weeks of paid leave. They are also in line with those of 
Cipollone et al (2014) that showed family oriented policy changes, such as maternity leave, had 
a higher impact on the labor force participation of women with medium-to-high education levels. 
Furthermore, they may indicate that less educated workers have lower stores of wealth, making it 
again less likely that they could afford to drop out of the labor force when having a child. 
 Previous authors found these paid leave policies tend to have a larger impact on leave-
taking of lower educated and minority workers (Byker, 2013; Rossin-Slater et al, 2013). In 
contrast, results here indicate long-lasting employment impacts are evident for women with 
higher education levels. This suggests these are women whose subsequent employment outcomes 
are most penalized for dropping out of the labor force for childbearing, which may reflect higher 
job search costs and wage penalties associated with returning to work. Although more educated 
women are generally more likely to have a paid leave scheme through their employers and 
therefore less likely to be impacted by the policy enaction; the legislation may have forced 
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employers to improve their leave schemes in order to meet the standards of the state plan. This 
may drive more mothers to take advantage of employer provided paid maternity leave schemes 
after the policy enaction. Thus driving the effects found for higher-education women. 
 For the policy impact breakdown by spouse education level, shown in Table 2.7, results 
are in line with the household labor supply model’s prediction. They generally show that higher 
spouse education levels are matched with larger policy impacts. This likely comes about because 
spouses with higher education will typically have higher wages and therefore impact subsequent 
income transfers between spouses. That being said, there is evidence of a significant policy 
impact in the year a women is potentially eligible for paid family leave for women married to 
spouses who have less than a high-school degree. This effect however is not present in the years 
after potential leave policy take-up. This may indicate women in this group are likely to take 
advantage of the policy but after benefits expire they revert back to their lower level of 
attachment to the labor force, while more educated women remain employed. 16F17 
  
2.5.4 Robustness checks 
 One concern with the results found thus far is that the increase in employment found for 
married women in New Jersey post-paid family leave policy enaction could be due to some other 
factor that differentially affected the labor supply of mothers in New Jersey versus other areas. 
As a robustness check, Table 2.8 presents results from an analysis which compares the outcomes 
post-2009 for women with a child born in 2009, hence eligible, to those with a child born in 
2008, hence ineligible by one year.  
                                                          
17 As a robustness check, the model used in Table 7 was also ran on a sample consisting only of women with some 
college experience. This was done so as to guarantee the differential impact by spousal education level was not 
simply a reflection of assortative mating based on education level, thus leading to erroneous conclusions regarding 
spousal education level’s influence on outcomes. The findings confirm that higher spousal education levels increase 
employment impacts of the policy even among women with similar education levels. (available upon request) 
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 Results show no significant impact on the employment of married women with a child 
born in 2008, but do show significant impacts for those with a child born in 2009. The estimated 
impact for those with a child born in 2009 is of 4.6 percentage point increase in employment 
probability when compared to women in column 2’s sample, the preferred comparison group. 
The estimated impacts for women with a child born in 2009 are significant when comparing New 
Jersey results to those in columns 2, 4, 5, and 6; as was the case in the previous analysis. Finding 
no significant policy effects for married women with a child born in 2008 shows the results 
obtained thus far are not due to some other factor affecting the employment rate of mothers in 
New Jersey post-2009. 
 The final robustness check addresses the possibility individuals may endogenously 
choose when they have a child in response to the paid leave policy’s enaction. Although this is 
certainly possible, given the relatively small amount of compensation that individuals get for 
making use of the policy (up to 6 weeks at two thirds their pay rate), the policy may not be a 
strong driver of this decision. 
 The model in Table 2.9 analyzes this endogenous child fertility decision due to the paid 
leave policy by obtaining the predicted probability that someone has a youngest child under the 
age of 4 and interacting this with a post-2009 indicator. Having a child under the age of 4 
indicates being potentially eligible for the policy at some point during the sample periods and is 
estimated by the average probability of having a child under the age of 4 in the year 2000 Census 
for individuals with specific combinations of: age; gender; marital status; education; and white 
race status. Given endogeneity concerns, no youngest child age indicators are used in this model. 
 Panel A in Table 2.9 shows the results from a model that uses the actual youngest child 
status and the results are similar to the original model shown in Table 2.2. Panel B uses the 
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predicted youngest child status and one can observe that the predicted youngest child status has a 
similar impact to the actual status in Panel A, namely a significant negative impact on 
employment probability. This is encouraging since it indicates the predicted child status is a 
good proxy for actual child status. In comparing estimated policy impacts in Panel A versus 
Panel B for column 2, our preferred comparison group, one observes the estimated impact is 
larger using predicted child status than when using actual status. In neither of these is the 
estimated impact significant. In a sample where estimated impacts are significant, such as in 
column 6, the estimated impact in Panel B is 4 percentage points larger than the one in Panel A.  
 Estimates from the model in Panel B are typically larger than those in Panel A, 
suggesting there may be a downward bias in the estimated impacts from the model. This would 
occur if the women who endogenously choose to have a child due to the policy’s enaction are 
generally less likely to be in the labor force, thus driving down the estimated impacts on 
employment. 17F18 This makes sense if these are women who are marginally attached to the labor 
force but decide to take advantage of the policy in order to obtain the financial compensation it 
entails. Overall the results in Panel B are similar to those in Panel A but with larger standard 
errors given the imperfect ability to predict women’s youngest child status. This suggests 
estimated policy impacts are valid and not simply a result of endogenous fertility decisions.  
 
  
                                                          
18 Alternatively, estimated impacts using the predicted child status could be biased upward if the instruments for 
actual child status and potential policy eligibility were weak. Two-stage least squares estimations show this is not 
the case. The first-stage F statistics for the instruments are large (F-stats all above 100), indicating the instruments 
are good predictors of actual child status and potential policy eligibility. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This paper sheds new light on how increasing mothers’ attachment to the labor force 
immediately after child birth can have a significant effect on subsequent labor market outcomes. 
It does so by making use of New Jersey’s 2009 paid family leave legislation enaction and 
employing a spatial differencing strategy that captures its impact on the employment probability 
of women. The preferred specification shows an estimated policy impact of a 3.1 percentage 
point increase in the employment probability of married women in the year they are potentially 
eligible for policy take-up. A similar magnitude increase of 2.7 percentage points is also evident 
in the three years after potential leave take-up. Such estimates respectively represent a 4.1% and 
4.7% increase relative to married women’s employment rate in the state.  
This shows how a relatively small financial incentive for maintaining a mother’s tie to the 
labor force during the year immediately following childbirth can have an enduring effect on their 
labor market outcomes. This persistent effect is novel in the literature and suggests expanding 
such a policy to other states may lead to improvements in employment outcomes for women in 
the years following childbirth.  
The estimates detailed above are obtained by comparing the New Jersey sample to that of 
married women living in Public Use Microdata Areas just outside the New Jersey border inside 
the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. Estimated impacts obtained by comparing 
New Jersey to samples at a greater distance to New Jersey are generally larger, but may reflect 
differing local economic conditions thus not providing as strong an evidence of policy impacts. 
As would be expected given their lower flexibility regarding the decision to participate in the 
labor force, little evidence of policy effects is found for single women and men. 
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Finding positive family leave policy impacts on employment is in line with some 
previous research addressing this issue, e.g. Byker (2013), Baum and Ruhm (2013), Rossin-
Slater et al (2013). However the results contrast with those of Das and Polachek (2014) and 
Espinola-Arredondo and Mondal (2010) who find that a similar legislation in California had no 
effects or actually worsened employment outcomes of young women in the state. This difference 
may arise due to the spatial differencing method employed in my analysis. 
Further work shows estimated policy impacts are larger for married women with higher 
education levels or married to husbands with higher education levels. While the latter is 
expected, given these are women who would have previously been likely to leave the labor force 
to have a child since their spouse would be able to aid them financially during this time. The 
former suggests women with higher education levels suffer greater shocks to their future 
employment probability when dropping out of the labor force for childbirth. 
The findings here confirm the importance of “family friendly” policies in enhancing 
women’s labor force attachment during childbearing years, similar to findings in Blau and Kahn 
(1997 and 2006); Kim and Polachek (1994); and Cipollone et al (2014). It also highlights how 
childbearing arrangements impact regional differences in women’s employment, consistent with 
Graves (2013); Black et al (2014); and Compton and Pollack (2013). 
Future research would benefit from concentrating on identifying the mechanisms which 
drive the persistent effect on mothers’ employment that is found here. Of particular interest is 
whether these long-lasting employment effects are coming about through income or substitution 
effects of the program, i.e. impacts on wage and job search costs, or changes in preferences over 
work and leisure that drive mothers to stay in the workforce following childbearing.
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Figure 2.1 
First period budget constraint with and without paid family leave take-up 
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Figure 2.2 
Employment rates for women aged 18 to 40 by youngest child age (2005-2012) 
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Table 2.1  
Summary statistics by residential location 2005-2012 
 
 
Panel A: All women Aged 18 to 40 
 
New Jersey NYC and PHL MSAsb DE, NY, and PAc All Other Statesd 
 
Mean (S. D.) Mean (S. D.) Mean (S. D.) Mean (S. D.) 
Personal Attributes 
        High School Degree 0.241 (0.428) 0.216 (0.411) 0.269 (0.444) 0.250 (0.433) 
Some College 0.312 (0.463) 0.293 (0.455) 0.375 (0.484) 0.373 (0.484) 
BA Degree or More 0.355 (0.478) 0.372 (0.483) 0.265 (0.441) 0.259 (0.438) 
Hispanic 0.206 (0.405) 0.222 (0.416) 0.053 (0.224) 0.146 (0.353) 
Black 0.158 (0.365) 0.223 (0.416) 0.076 (0.265) 0.151 (0.358) 
Asian 0.099 (0.299) 0.106 (0.308) 0.028 (0.165) 0.041 (0.198) 
Mixed Race 0.109 (0.311) 0.141 (0.348) 0.039 (0.194) 0.077 (0.266) 
Married 0.412 (0.492) 0.348 (0.5) 0.392 (0.5) 0.426 (0.495) 
Age 29.5 (6.8) 29.2 (6.7) 28.6 (6.9) 29.0 (6.7) 
Employment Rate         
All Women 0.668 (0.471) 0.639 (0.480) 0.682 (0.466) 0.668 (0.471) 
Married Women 0.654 (0.476) 0.631 (0.482) 0.704 (0.456) 0.666 (0.472) 
Single Women 0.677 (0.467) 0.643 (0.479) 0.668 (0.471) 0.670 (0.470) 
   
      
Observations 94,216 164,663 180,793 2,470,392 
          
Panel B: Women potentially eligible for paid family leave policy take-upa 
 
New Jersey NYC and PHL MSAsb DE, NY, and PAc All Other Statesd 
 
Mean (S. D.) Mean (S. D.) Mean (S. D.) Mean (S. D.) 
Personal Attributes 
        High School Degree 0.203 (0.402) 0.207 (0.405) 0.228 (0.420) 0.220 (0.414) 
Some College 0.242 (0.428) 0.238 (0.426) 0.313 (0.464) 0.338 (0.473) 
BA Degree or More 0.471 (0.499) 0.429 (0.495) 0.350 (0.477) 0.318 (0.466) 
Hispanic 0.232 (0.422) 0.238 (0.426) 0.065 (0.247) 0.180 (0.385) 
Black 0.129 (0.335) 0.194 (0.395) 0.078 (0.268) 0.139 (0.346) 
Asian 0.123 (0.329) 0.105 (0.306) 0.029 (0.168) 0.045 (0.208) 
Mixed Race 0.111 (0.314) 0.144 (0.351) 0.042 (0.201) 0.079 (0.269) 
Married 0.769 (0.421) 0.728 (0.4) 0.703 (0.5) 0.712 (0.453) 
Age 31.4 (5.0) 31.2 (5.3) 29.7 (5.2) 29.4 (5.4) 
Employment Rate         
All Women 0.595 (0.491) 0.561 (0.496) 0.604 (0.489) 0.572 (0.495) 
Married Women 0.600 (0.490) 0.572 (0.495) 0.616 (0.486) 0.572 (0.495) 
Single Women 0.576 (0.494) 0.531 (0.499) 0.575 (0.494) 0.571 (0.495) 
 
        
Observations 6,665 1,954 12,198 182,685 
a Eligibility is determined based on whether individual had a child in 2009 or later, the year of policy enaction. 
b Includes people living in these MSAs in the states of New York and Pennsylvania. 
c Includes people living in Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania outside of the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
d Includes people living in all states other than: California; Delaware; New Jersey; New York; and Pennsylvania. 
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Table 2.2 
Linear probability model of employed last week – all women aged 18 to 40 
 (Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New 
Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Eligibility       
Currently Eligible:  0.0710*** 0.0601*** 0.0651*** 0.0490** 0.0535*** 0.0431*** 
Post 2009 x child under age 1 (0.0125) (0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0220) (0.0115) (0.00275) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.011] [0.006] [0.022] [0.018] [0.028**] 
       
Eligible 1-3 years ago: 0.0684*** 0.0397*** 0.0491*** 0.0249 0.0332*** 0.0339*** 
Post 2009 x qualifying aged (0.00999) (0.0147) (0.0101) (0.0175) (0.00845) (0.00232) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.029**] [0.019*] [0.044**] [0.035***] [0.035***] 
       
Post 2009  -0.0285*** -0.0167 -0.0311* -0.0855*** -0.0170*** -0.0736*** 
 (0.00585) (0.0175) (0.0183) (0.0225) (0.00599) (0.02585) 
Age of Youngest Child       
Under Age 1 -0.195*** -0.170*** -0.197*** -0.179*** -0.185*** -0.183*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0131) (0.0115) (0.0202) (0.00819) (0.00236) 
Age 1  -0.199*** -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.164*** -0.151*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0164) (0.00954) (0.0161) (0.00810) (0.00261) 
Age 2  -0.176*** -0.137*** -0.158*** -0.149*** -0.129*** -0.118*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0173) (0.0116) (0.0162) (0.00745) (0.00243) 
Age 3  -0.147*** -0.116*** -0.133*** -0.108*** -0.102*** -0.0958*** 
 (0.00917) (0.0163) (0.0108) (0.0180) (0.00844) (0.00228) 
Age 4 to 10 -0.0709*** -0.0487*** -0.0627*** -0.0373*** -0.0383*** -0.0307*** 
 (0.00738) (0.0111) (0.00885) (0.0103) (0.00446) (0.00176) 
Age 11 to 14 0.0138 0.0344*** 0.0290*** 0.0321** 0.0249*** 0.0404*** 
 (0.00890) (0.00972) (0.00842) (0.0137) (0.00682) (0.00184) 
Age 15 to 18 0.0267* 0.0537*** 0.0689*** 0.0397** 0.0555*** 0.0645*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0177) (0.0121) (0.0171) (0.00819) (0.00227) 
Other Controls       
High School Degree 0.139*** 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.190*** 0.175*** 
 (0.00771) (0.0123) (0.00788) (0.0113) (0.00644) (0.00172) 
Some College 0.207*** 0.230*** 0.217*** 0.219*** 0.256*** 0.253*** 
 (0.00965) (0.0134) (0.00839) (0.0101) (0.00815) (0.00227) 
BA Degree 0.309*** 0.378*** 0.347*** 0.326*** 0.377*** 0.371*** 
 (0.00879) (0.0147) (0.00964) (0.0112) (0.00850) (0.00266) 
Hispanic -0.00930 -0.0237*** -0.00661 -0.0408*** -0.0543*** -0.0079*** 
 (0.00575) (0.00885) (0.00715) (0.0116) (0.00801) (0.00237) 
Black -0.0342*** -0.0249** -0.00647 -0.0309** -0.0691*** -0.0294*** 
 (0.00742) (0.00957) (0.00909) (0.0147) (0.00687) (0.00205) 
Asian -0.124*** -0.0941*** -0.0920*** -0.164*** -0.192*** -0.0973*** 
 (0.00921) (0.0115) (0.00898) (0.0191) (0.0106) (0.00320) 
(Continues on next page…) 
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Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Linear probability model of employed last week – all women aged 18 to 40 
 (Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Mixed Race -0.00597 -0.00857 0.00179 -0.0318*** -0.0688*** -0.0272*** 
 (0.00653) (0.00849) (0.00697) (0.00964) (0.00946) (0.00345) 
Age 0.0879*** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.0766*** 0.0677*** 0.0694*** 
 (0.00427) (0.00435) (0.00367) (0.00681) (0.00375) (0.00140) 
Age Squared -0.0013*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0012*** -0.0010*** -0.0011*** 
 (6.74e-05) (6.82e-05) (5.95e-05) (0.000109) (6.11e-05) (0.00002) 
Married -0.0621*** -0.0679*** -0.0701*** -0.0587*** -0.0609*** -0.0681*** 
 (0.00707) (0.00677) (0.00617) (0.0102) (0.00468) (0.00163) 
Married to Spouse With 0.0397*** 0.0576*** 0.0132* 0.0726*** 0.0763*** 0.0639*** 
High School Degree (0.00644) (0.00924) (0.00726) (0.0109) (0.00467) (0.00133) 
Married to Spouse With 0.0395*** 0.0601*** 0.0300*** 0.0848*** 0.0904*** 0.0700*** 
Some College (0.00624) (0.00862) (0.00589) (0.0111) (0.00525) (0.00148) 
Married to Spouse With -0.0437*** -0.0193*** -0.0272*** 0.00995 0.0269*** -0.0163*** 
BA Degree (0.00692) (0.00657) (0.00770) (0.0108) (0.00559) (0.00164) 
       
Constant -0.788*** -1.089*** -1.108*** -0.603*** -0.544*** -0.524*** 
 (0.0636) (0.0673) (0.0539) (0.0940) (0.0537) (0.0283) 
       
State by Year Fixed Effects 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 94,216 59,026 105,637 37,412 143,381 2,470,392 
R-squared 0.091 0.141 0.134 0.096 0.103 0.103 
Employment Rate 66.8% 65.9% 62.9% 68.5% 68.1% 66.8% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level.  
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs  
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
d Qualifying age means a child between 1 and 3 years old, born in 2009 or later. 
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Table 2.3 
Linear probability model of employed last week – all men aged 18 to 40 
(Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Currently Eligible:  0.0414*** 0.0362*** 0.0256*** 0.0263 0.0570*** 0.0444*** 
Post 2009 x child under age 1 (0.00970) (0.0106) (0.00937) (0.0165) (0.00843) (0.00211) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.005] [0.016] [0.015] [-0.016] [-0.003] 
       
Eligible 1-3 years ago: 0.0422*** 0.0511*** 0.0148* 0.0414** 0.0466*** 0.0483*** 
Post 2009 x qualifying aged (0.00892) (0.0110) (0.00867) (0.0156) (0.00708) (0.00197) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.009] [0.027**] [0.001] [-0.004] [-0.006] 
       
Post 2009  -0.0357*** -0.0461*** -0.0390 -0.0851*** -0.0604*** -0.0261*** 
 (0.00607) (0.0123) (0.0274) (0.0128) (0.00819) (0.00627) 
       
State by Year Fixed Effects 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 91,079 53,697 99,368 37,105 145,293 2,399,305 
R-squared 0.201 0.231 0.213 0.203 0.214 0.192 
Employment Rate 75.2% 71.5% 72.5% 74.0% 71.4% 74.7% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes (education, 
race, age); spouse education level and youngest child age indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
d Qualifying age means a child between 1 and 3 years old, born in 2009 or later. 
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Table 2.4 
Differential policy effects for women by marital status 
 (Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
 
 
Panel A: Single Women 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Currently Eligible:  -0.0327 0.0512 -0.00202 0.00662 0.0561** 0.0128** 
Post 2009 x child under age 1 (0.0334) (0.0337) (0.0253) (0.0424) (0.0227) (0.00512) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.084] [-0.031] [-0.039] [-0.089] [-0.046] 
       
Eligible 1-3 years ago: 0.0159 -0.00606 0.0255 -0.000301 0.0189 0.00936** 
Post 2009 x qualifying aged (0.0201) (0.0228) (0.0217) (0.0333) (0.0162) (0.00376) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.022] [-0.010] [0.016] [-0.003] [0.007] 
       
Post 2009  -0.0157** -0.0245 -0.0373 -0.0932*** -0.0398*** -0.0253 
 (0.00771) (0.0200) (0.0328) (0.0279) (0.00884) (3.54) 
       
State by Year Fixed Effects 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 52,350 38,785 64,171 21,260 81,656 1,325,369 
R-squared 0.120 0.177 0.169 0.101 0.110 0.120 
Employment Rate 67.7% 66.1% 63.5% 66.8% 65.9% 67.0% 
 
 
Panel B: Married Women 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Currently Eligible:  0.0678*** 0.0373** 0.0559*** 0.0295 0.0265** 0.0306*** 
Post 2009 x child under age 1 (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.0164) (0.0236) (0.0124) (0.00292) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.031*] [0.012] [0.038*] [0.041**] [0.037***] 
       
Eligible 1-3 years ago: 0.0525*** 0.0259 0.0283** 0.00276 0.0117 0.0182*** 
Post 2009 x qualifying aged (0.0104) (0.0163) (0.0116) (0.0215) (0.00916) (0.00236) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.027*] [0.024*] [0.050**] [0.041***] [0.034***] 
       
Post 2009  -0.0357*** -0.0111*** -0.00757** 0.0295*** -0.00826** 0.0373 
 (0.00414) (0.00241) (0.00312) (0.00676) (0.00281) (0.0356) 
       
State by Year Fixed Effects 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 20,241 41,466 16,152 61,725 1,145,023 
R-squared 0.071 0.094 0.102 0.102 0.100 0.100 
Employment Rate 65.4% 65.5% 61.9% 70.7% 71.0% 66.6% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes (education, 
race, age); spouse education level and youngest child age indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
d Qualifying age means a child between 1 and 3 years old, born in 2009 or later. 
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Table 2.5 
Persistence of policy effect on married women’s employment 
(Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New 
Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 2009 x  0.0680*** 0.0378** 0.0558*** 0.0297 0.0263** 0.0306*** 
Child under age 1 (0.0144) (0.0172) (0.0164) (0.0236) (0.0124) (0.00292) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.030*] [0.012] [0.038*] [0.042**] [0.037***] 
Post 2010 x  0.0658*** 0.0477** 0.0188 0.0120 -0.00180 0.0160*** 
Youngest child age 1 (0.0141) (0.0223) (0.0165) (0.0325) (0.0118) (0.00297) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.018] [0.047**] [0.054**] [0.068***] [0.050***] 
Post 2011 x  0.0362* 0.0149 0.0480*** -0.00708 0.0188 0.0226*** 
Youngest child age 2 (0.0186) (0.0315) (0.0165) (0.0306) (0.0148) (0.00371) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.021] [-0.012] [0.043] [0.017] [0.014] 
Post 2012 x 0.0403* -0.0309 0.0178 -0.00749 0.0446** 0.0167*** 
Youngest child age 3 (0.0236) (0.0387) (0.0214) (0.0522) (0.0226) (0.00515) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.071**] [0.023] [0.048] [-0.004] [0.024] 
Age of Youngest Child       
Under age 1 -0.241*** -0.195*** -0.237*** -0.236*** -0.231*** -0.243*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0226) (0.00882) (0.00229) 
Age 1  -0.252*** -0.223*** -0.216*** -0.226*** -0.207*** -0.220*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0165) (0.0106) (0.0206) (0.00823) (0.00271) 
Age 2  -0.229*** -0.191*** -0.217*** -0.210*** -0.200*** -0.191*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0197) (0.0119) (0.0174) (0.00776) (0.00265) 
Age 3  -0.213*** -0.174*** -0.195*** -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.172*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0206) (0.0115) (0.0224) (0.0100) (0.00270) 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 20,241 41,466 16,152 61,725 1,145,023 
R-squared 0.071 0.097 0.102 0.102 0.100 0.100 
Employment Rate 65.4% 65.5% 61.9% 70.7% 71.0% 66.6% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes 
(education, race, age); spouse education level and youngest child age indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
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Table 2.6 
Differential policy effects by education level for married women 
(Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New 
Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Currently eligible x  -0.0207 0.0139 -0.0215 -0.0557 -0.0109 -0.0158** 
Less than HS  (0.0457) (0.0597) (0.0375) (0.0621) (0.0355) (0.00718) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.035] [0.001] [0.035] [-0.010] [-0.005] 
Currently eligible x  -0.0480 0.101* 0.0128 0.0479 -0.0182 -0.0121** 
HS Degree  (0.0308) (0.0521) (0.0296) (0.0424) (0.0215) (0.00569) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.149] [-0.061] [-0.096] [-0.030] [-0.036] 
Currently eligible x  0.0613** -0.00416 0.0260 0.00955 0.00593 0.00956** 
Some College (0.0263) (0.0381) (0.0261) (0.0333) (0.0194) (0.00449) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.065*] [0.035] [0.052] [0.055**] [0.052**] 
Currently eligible x  0.0955*** 0.0363** 0.0896*** 0.0505 0.0610*** 0.0631*** 
BA Degree  (0.0184) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0312) (0.0151) (0.00373) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.059**] [0.006] [0.045] [0.035*] [0.032**] 
 
      
Eligible 1-3 years ago x 0.00703 0.0448 0.0459 -0.0855* -0.0658** 0.0168** 
Less than HS  (0.0473) (0.0530) (0.0282) (0.0471) (0.0265) (0.00753) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.038] [-0.039] [0.093] [0.073*] [-0.009] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago x -0.00368 -0.0300 0.0253 0.00939 -0.0404** -0.00294 
HS Degree  (0.0267) (0.0352) (0.0269) (0.0490) (0.0201) (0.00518) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.026] [-0.029] [-0.013] [0.037] [-0.001] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago x 0.00954 0.0386 -0.00122 -0.0615* -0.0180 0.00685** 
Some College (0.0213) (0.0292) (0.0218) (0.0313) (0.0162) (0.00345) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.029] [0.011] [0.071**] [0.028] [0.003] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago x 0.0840*** 0.0323 0.0373** 0.0584* 0.0637*** 0.0327*** 
BA Degree  (0.0137) (0.0227) (0.0151) (0.0306) (0.0117) (0.00296) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.052**] [0.047**] [0.026] [0.020] [0.051***] 
 
      
Post 2009 -0.0467* -0.0249 0.000767 0.00258 -0.0294 0.0067 
 (0.0242) (0.0290) (0.0281) (0.0584) (0.0191) (0.0380) 
Post 2009 x HS Degree -3.97e-05 0.0441 -0.00655 0.0124 0.0129 -0.0023 
 (0.0254) (0.0308) (0.0203) (0.0515) (0.0166) (0.0040) 
Post2009 x Some College 0.00761 0.0275 -0.0247 0.0327 0.0185 0.0109*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0297) (0.0210) (0.0491) (0.0186) (0.0040) 
Post 2009 x BA Degree 0.0182 0.0305 -0.00552 0.0358 0.0327** 0.0327*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0233) (0.0206) (0.0490) (0.0160) (0.0040) 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 18,641 39,343 15,945 65,753 1,145,023 
R-squared 0.073 0.096 0.104 0.100 0.099 0.101 
Employment Rate 65.4% 65.5% 61.9% 70.7% 71.0% 66.6% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes 
(education, race, age); spouse education level and youngest child age indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
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Table 2.7 
Differential policy effects by spouse’s education level for married women 
(Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New 
Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Currently eligible x  0.0436 -0.0687 -6.53e-05 -0.0666 -0.0163 -0.0260*** 
Spouse less than HS  (0.0495) (0.0677) (0.0434) (0.0603) (0.0312) (0.0069) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.112*] [0.044] [0.110] [0.060] [0.070**] 
Currently eligible x  -0.00710 0.0170 0.000503 0.00665 0.0247 0.0110** 
Spouse HS degree  (0.0278) (0.0436) (0.0277) (0.0355) (0.0182) (0.0052) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.024] [-0.008] [-0.014] [-0.032] [-0.018] 
Currently eligible x  0.0671*** 0.110*** 0.0658*** 0.108*** 0.0231 0.0274*** 
Spouse some college (0.0255) (0.0317) (0.0239) (0.0374) (0.0167) (0.0045) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.043] [0.001] [-0.041] [0.044*] [0.040**] 
Currently eligible x  0.0893*** 0.0261 0.0753*** 0.00589 0.0318* 0.0482*** 
Spouse BA degree  (0.0171) (0.0185) (0.0195) (0.0322) (0.0186) (0.0037) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.063**] [0.014] [0.083***] [0.058**] [0.041**] 
 
      
Eligible 1-3 years ago x -0.000905 0.00510 0.0372 -0.109** -0.0185 0.0101 
Spouse less than HS  (0.0485) (0.0511) (0.0321) (0.0474) (0.0280) (0.0062) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.006] [-0.038] [0.11*] [0.018] [-0.011] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago x 0.0173 -0.0180 0.0209 -0.0423 -0.00928 0.0171*** 
Spouse HS degree  (0.0235) (0.0365) (0.0216) (0.0300) (0.0153) (0.0045) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.035] [-0.004] [0.060*] [0.027] [0.002] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago x 0.0357* 0.0205 0.0191 0.00990 -0.00728 0.0154*** 
Spouse some college (0.0195) (0.0277) (0.0186) (0.0323) (0.0158) (0.0036) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.015] [0.017] [0.026] [0.043**] [0.020] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago x 0.0758*** 0.0378 0.0296* 0.0690** 0.0358** 0.0161*** 
Spouse BA degree  (0.0138) (0.0247) (0.0157) (0.0340) (0.0144) (0.0033) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.038*] [0.046**] [0.007] [0.040**] [0.060***] 
 
      
Post 2009 -0.0515** 0.00479 0.0804** 0.0258 -0.0786*** 0.0511*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0367) (0.0322) (0.0471) (0.0184) (0.0060) 
Post 2009 x 0.0145 -0.00862 -0.0147 -0.0121 0.0338** -0.0105*** 
Spouse HS degree  (0.0236) (0.0420) (0.0191) (0.0318) (0.0166) (0.0035) 
Post 2009 x -0.00401 -0.0499 -0.0327* -0.00378 0.0351* 0.0013 
Spouse some college (0.0234) (0.0396) (0.0177) (0.0314) (0.0178) (0.0034) 
Post 2009 x 0.0240 -0.00405 -0.00742 -0.00170 0.0627*** 0.0264*** 
Spouse BA degree  (0.0206) (0.0338) (0.0188) (0.0309) (0.0172) (0.0034) 
      
 
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 18,641 39,343 15,945 65,753 1,145,023 
R-squared 0.073 0.096 0.104 0.100 0.099 0.101 
Employment Rate 65.4% 65.5% 61.9% 70.7% 71.0% 66.6% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes 
(education, race, age); spouse education level and youngest child age indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
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Table 2.8 
Comparison of married women with youngest child born in 2008 versus 2009 
(Standard errors clustered at the PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Policy eligible: 0.0407*** -0.00564 0.0310*** -0.00005 0.0124 0.0117*** 
Post ‘09 x Young child born ‘09 (0.00987) (0.0195) (0.0117) (0.0164) (0.00812) (0.00223) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.046***] [0.010] [0.041**] [0.028**] [0.029***] 
       
Policy ineligible by one year: -0.00749 -0.0216 0.00979 0.0310 0.0117 0.00655** 
Post ‘09 x Young child born ‘08 (0.0125) (0.0186) (0.0123) (0.0227) (0.00996) (0.00237) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.014] [-0.017] [-0.038] [-0.019] [-0.014] 
       
Post 2009  -0.0237*** -0.00598 0.00153 0.0540* -0.0381*** 0.105*** 
 (0.00900) (0.0170) (0.0218) (0.0278) (0.0119) (0.0329) 
       
Age of Youngest Child       
Under Age 1 -0.215*** -0.176*** -0.213*** -0.222*** -0.221*** -0.230*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0117) (0.00977) (0.0219) (0.00647) (0.00181) 
Age 1  -0.232*** -0.201*** -0.214*** -0.226*** -0.211*** -0.216*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.0107) (0.0189) (0.00743) (0.00235) 
Age 2  -0.224*** -0.184*** -0.209*** -0.216*** -0.198*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0171) (0.0125) (0.0168) (0.00798) (0.00242) 
Age 3  -0.211*** -0.173*** -0.197*** -0.183*** -0.172*** -0.172*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0177) (0.0111) (0.0215) (0.00980) (0.00254) 
Age 4 -0.177*** -0.165*** -0.179*** -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0213) (0.0139) (0.0165) (0.00809) (0.00264) 
Age 5 to 10 -0.131*** -0.0976*** -0.120*** -0.0815*** -0.0879*** -0.0852*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0142) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.00532) (0.00233) 
Age 11 to 14 -0.0483*** -0.0106 -0.0175 -0.0280* -0.0235*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0194) (0.0126) (0.0141) (0.00797) (0.00276) 
Age 15 to 18 -0.0203 0.0153 0.0457** 0.0156 -0.00284 -0.0136*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0306) (0.0192) (0.0208) (0.00884) (0.00228) 
       
State by Year Fixed Effects 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 20,241 41,466 16,152 61,725 1,145,023 
R-squared 0.066 0.092 0.098 0.101 0.098 0.100 
Employment Rate 65.4% 65.5% 61.9% 70.7% 71.0% 66.6% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes (education, 
race, age); and spouse education level indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
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Table 2.9 
Analyzing potentially endogenous fertility decision’s impact on policy effects for married women 
(Standard errors clustered at PUMA level in parentheses)a 
 
 
Panel A: Using actual youngest child status 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Youngest Child Under  -0.173*** -0.161*** -0.168*** -0.180*** -0.160*** -0.168*** 
Age 4 (0.00709) (0.0107) (0.00679) (0.0113) (0.00572) (0.00174) 
Post 2009 -0.0400*** -0.0247 -0.00974 0.0367 -0.0424*** 0.114*** 
 (0.00938) (0.0178) (0.0214) (0.0286) (0.0122) (0.0332) 
Post 2009 x Youngest  0.0488*** 0.0327** 0.0417*** 0.0349** 0.0191** 0.0234*** 
Child Under Age 4 (0.00908) (0.0130) (0.00893) (0.0156) (0.00744) (0.00176) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.016] [0.007] [0.014] [0.030***] [0.025***] 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 20,241 41,466 16,152 61,725 1,145,023 
R-squared 0.061 0.087 0.092 0.096 0.092 0.093 
Employment Rate 67.7% 66.1% 63.5% 66.8% 65.9% 67.0% 
 
Panel B: Using predicted youngest child status 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Predicted Youngest  -0.188*** -0.125** -0.126** -0.105** -0.243*** -0.257*** 
Child Under Age 4d (0.0447) (0.0501) (0.0506) (0.0412) (0.0232) (0.00587) 
Post 2009 -0.0552*** -0.0367 0.0348 0.0815** -0.0503*** -0.0172 
 (0.0157) (0.0220) (0.0307) (0.0352) (0.0143) (5.77) 
Post 2009 x Predicted  0.106*** 0.0606 0.0422 -0.0921** 0.0420 0.0408*** 
Young. Child Under Age 4 (0.0317) (0.0440) (0.0305) (0.0443) (0.0275) (0.00579) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.045] [0.064*] [0.20***] [0.064*] [0.065**] 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 41,866 20,241 41,465 16,152 61,725 1,145,021 
R-squared 0.038 0.065 0.071 0.069 0.071 0.071 
Employment Rate 65.4% 65.5% 61.9% 70.7% 71.0% 66.6% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes 
(education, race, age); spouse education level indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
d Predicted youngest child under age 4 is the Year 2000 Census average probability of having a youngest child under the age of 4 for 
individuals of particular age*gender*marital status*education (4 cats.)*white race status combinations. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Neighborhood peer effects have been notoriously difficult to identify despite numerous 
attempts to do so in the literature. This has been true regardless of whether the focus is on crime, 
school performance, employment, or a variety of other important outcomes. Equally challenging 
has been to provide evidence of the mechanisms by which peer effects are transmitted. These 
difficulties arise in part because individuals may endogenously choose their residence so as to be 
close to peers, and also because peers themselves are often difficult to define a priori.18F19
 
This paper 
makes progress on both fronts by drawing on a unique neighborhood cluster file in the 1985-1993 
American Housing Survey (AHS) that follows groups of adjacent homes over time.19F20
 
The 
geographic and panel features of the data enable us to rely on temporal variation in the attributes 
of target individuals and their immediate neighbors that is essential to identification of our 
models. 
Our focus throughout is on whether women age 25 to 60 choose to work, and whether 
proximity to working and non-working peers and non-peers in adjacent homes affects that decision. 
For these purposes, an individual is said to work if they have positive earnings in the previous 
twelve months.20F21 For women, this is an active choice which suggests that peer effects could be 
relevant. For men the decision to work as defined here is highly inelastic and for that reason, we 
expect peer effects to be small or absent. This enables us to use men as a placebo and falsification 
check on our model design. 
                                                          
19 For recent reviews of the neighborhood and peer effects literature see Ioannides and Loury (2004), Granovetter 
(2005), Ioannides (2012), and Topa and Zenou (forthcoming). For a critical review of models and methods that have 
been used to analyze neighborhood effects see Gibbons et al (forthcoming). 
20 Few previous studies have taken advantage of the AHS neighborhood cluster files. Among those that have, 
Ioannides and Zabel (2003, 2008) also use the AHS cluster files to examine evidence of neighborhood effects. In 
their work the focus is on housing demand and home maintenance and relies on a very different identification 
strategy than here.  
21We also perform all of our analysis defining the decision to work based on higher earnings thresholds, select results 
for which are presented in Appendix Table A-1 and are discussed briefly later in the paper.  
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Central to our approach, we assume that role model effects cause women to emulate the 
behavior of nearby peers regardless of whether those peers work or do not work. We also  assume 
that word-of-mouth information about job opportunities is enhanced most by proximity to working 
peers, less so by proximity to working non-peers, and even less by proximity to non- working 
neighbors regardless of peer status.21F22
 
These assumptions imply rank order restrictions on model 
coefficients associated with the impact of adjacent working and non-working peers and non-peers. 
Working peers should have the largest positive effect on a woman’s propensity to work because of 
reinforcing effects of role models and information networks. Non-peers should have smaller 
effects regardless of their work status. Non-working peers should have the largest negative effect 
on a woman’s decision to work because of the assumed dominant influence of role model effects. 
This structure helps us to identify evidence of peer effects and underlying mechanisms while also 
providing guidance for how to choose between alternate peer definitions. 
As a benchmark, random assignment of neighbors as peers and non-peers would make the 
peer distinction meaningless which should cause the coefficients on proximity to peers and non-
peers to be similar. On the other hand, peer classification schemes that effectively capture how 
peers are perceived should support the rank order of coefficients described above while 
maximizing the difference in coefficient values associated with working and non-working peers. 
We draw on these arguments to discriminate between alternative peer classification schemes. In 
all, we experiment with thirteen different peer definitions from broad to very refined. In all cases, 
peers are defined as individuals who share the same demographic traits as the target individual 
based on combinations of gender, age of children, education, and marital status. 
 
                                                          
22 In related work, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) model the impact of a network of contacts on the 
employment outcomes of an individual. In their model agents are randomly presented with job offers which they can 
choose to take or pass them on to other network members. Therefore, the better your network is, in terms of better 
employment matches, the more likely it is information on job offers will be passed on to you. 
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Our most exacting peer definitions allow for up to thirty-six different types of people, 
only one of which is a peer for a given individual. For such refined classifications it seems 
unlikely that an individual would know whether a prospective adjacent neighbor was a peer 
before moving into a home. It is even less likely that an individual would choose a residence in 
anticipatation of a specific change in the peer and work status of adjacent neighbors. This, along 
with inclusion of person fixed effects and other controls, mitigates any possible endogenous 
sorting of individuals into neighborhood clusters. Moreover, the peer and work status of  
adjacent neighbors exhibits considerable temporal variation that is essential for estimation of the 
model. That variation arises from changes in the attributes of the target individual that affect a 
person’s type (e.g. the birth of a child), changes in the attributes of neighbors who remain in the 
community between surveys, and in- and out-migration of neighbors from the cluster. 
In our most robust models, when measuring proximity to working and non-working peers 
and non-peers we proxy for the actual work status of neighbors with peer-specific MSA-level 
employment rates for the survey year in question (in a manner to be clarified later in the paper). 
This eliminates possible effects of unobserved local labor demand shocks that would affect the 
work status of all neighborhood residents, and also simultaneous feedback between the work status 
of adjacent neighbors and the work status of the target individual. It also mitigates attenuation 
bias that would arise if a neighbor’s current work status is misreported or not indicative of their 
usual activity. Importantly, instrumenting as above allows for the possibility that adjacent peers 
may provide valuable connections to a broader geographic community of working and non-
working peers that affect an individual’s work status. 
Results from a variety of model specifications indicate that neighborhood peer effects 
influence a woman’s decision to work and that this occurs at least in part because women emulate 
the work status of nearby role models. In this context, other women with similar age children 
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appear to be most important as peers. Our most reliable estimates indicate that adding one 
additional working peer to a women’s adjacent neighbors increases her tendency to work by 4.5 
percentage points. Adding a non-working peer reduces her tendency to work by 9 percentage 
points. Adding working and non-working non-peers to a women’s adjacent neighbors has little 
influence on her decision to work. 
For men, simply specified models yield estimates of notable positive peer effects, contrary 
to our priors and suggestive of positive local labor demand shocks that affect employment 
throughout an individual’s neighborhood cluster. Evidence of male peer effects disappears, 
however, when we proxy for neighbor work status using MSA-level peer- and non-peer specific 
employment rates. These patterns underscore the need to provide robust controls for localized 
time-varying labor demand shocks and also provide support for our research design. 
Our identification strategy differs markedly from recent state-of-the-art efforts in the 
neighborhood and peer effects literature. One important class of studies, for example, draw on 
survey-based data that explicitly identify the structure of peer-based networks, as with friendship 
networks that document who is friends with who from among a group of individuals. Recent 
papers of this type include Bramoullé et al. (2009); Liu and Lee (2010), Calvó-Armengol et al. 
(2009), Lin (2010), Lee et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2012). These studies typically draw on 
idiosyncratic features of the friendship network to identify peer effects, in conjunction with the use 
of the characteristics of friends of friends as instruments to tackle lurking concerns about 
endogenous membership in the network.22F23 
                                                          
23 Additional studies of this type include Asphjell, Hensvik, and Nilsson (2013) who examine the timing of child 
bearing among women who work for the same employer, Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2010) who consider labor market 
outcomes among close friends, and Cingano and Rosolia (2012) who estimate reemployment rates among individuals 
displaced from the same company. All of these studies report evidence of peer and network effects. 
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A different approach is exemplified by two recent studies by Hellerstein et al (2011, 
2014). These studies rely on confidential versions of the US LEHD employer-employee 
matched panel data that identify the individual as well as the identity of the employer. Residential 
and work place locations are reported at the census tract level. Using these data, Hellerstein et al 
(2014) control for person and employer fixed effects as well as census tract measures of 
proximity to co-workers in the residential community. Their results indicate that the presence of 
a larger number of co-workers in an individual’s residential census tract is associated with 
reduced job turnover. Hellerstein et al (2014) interpret this as evidence of improved word-of-
mouth labor market networks that result in better matches between employers and workers.23F24 
A third recent approach to identification of neighborhood peer effects relies on 
experimental and pseudo experimental data in which individuals are randomly assigned to 
different neighborhoods. An example of the former includes Kling et al (2007) who analyze data 
from the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) experiment conducted in five U.S. cities by the US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).24F25
 
An example of the latter includes 
recent studies by Damm (2009, 2014) who evaluates the impact of random assignment of 
immigrants in Denmark into different neighborhoods around the country. Broadly speaking, a 
series of studies based on the MTO experiments have generally failed to find compelling evidence 
of neighborhood effects for most types of outcome measures (e.g. criminal activity, teen 
pregnancy, school achievement). Damm (2009, 2014), however, does find evidence that 
                                                          
24 In many respects, the Hellerstein et al (2011, 2014) papers build off of recent work by Bayer et al (2008).  Bayer et al 
show that two individuals who live on the same census block are more likely to work together than if they live in the 
same group of roughly ten census blocks and that this pattern is even stronger among individuals of similar race and 
ethnicity. They interpret their results as evidence of word of mouth labor market network effects. Weinberg et al 
(2004) also uses detailed individual-level data from the NLSY to identify evidence of peer and network effects in labor 
markets. 
25 The program issued housing vouchers to participating low-income households, some of whome were issued Section 8 
vouchers as a control group while the target group were randomly assigned to select neighborhoods (see  
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/programdescription/mto for details). 
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proximity to employed individuals of one’s own ethnicity increases the tendency for a recent 
immigrant to be employed. She interprets this as evidence of neighborhood-based word-of- 
mounth job networks that help immigrants secure employment.25F26 
Relative to these and other studies, the data structure in the AHS neighborhood files is 
unique in that it follows hundreds of clusters of 8 to 12 adjacent homes over time. The extreme 
proximity of homes within a cluster along with the panel dimension allows us to achieve many of 
the advantages of random assignment data. On conceptual grounds and also based on diagnostic 
tests reported near the end of the paper, we argue that such temporal variation in proximity to 
peers is exogenous after conditioning on person fixed effects and more traditional controls. 
Two important messages emerge from our study. First, women appear to be sensitive to 
role model effects of nearby peers when deciding whether to work. We believe this evidence is 
new to the literature while echoing recent work on cultural drivers of female labor supply (see 
Alesina et al. (2013) and surveys by Bertrand (2010) and Fernandez (2011)). Collectively, these 
studies draw on behaviorially-based arguments from sociology and psychology to argue that 
gender norms and attitudes are important drivers of heterogenous patterns of female labor supply 
across countries, ethnicities, and generations. An implication of that literature is that women’s 
labor supply decisions are potentially sensitive to role model effects as we find here. 26F27 
                                                          
26 In related work, Beaman (2012) examines the labor market outcomes of political refugees assigned to communities 
across the United States.  She finds that larger numbers of nearby recently assigned refugees hurts refugee labor market 
outcomes which she attributes to a competition effect.  The presence of more established immigrants from the same 
country enhances refugee labor market outcomes, consistent with a positive labor market network effect. 
27 Several papers study the cultural component of trends in women's labor force participation, focusing on 
intergenerational transmission mechanisms (see for example, Fernandez (2011), Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004), 
Fogli and Veldkamp (2011). In particular, in the theoretical model proposed by Fogli and Veldkamp, women learn 
about the effects of maternal employment on children by observing nearby employed women. Their empirical 
investigation is based on county-level U.S. data from 1940-2000. They interpret the evidence of spatial autocorrelation 
in female participation rates as a diffusion of information about the role of nurture. 
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A second important message from our paper is that the AHS neighborhood cluster design 
is unique and valuable. Other data collection agencies should be encouraged to mirror that 
design, the key feature of which is to follow clusters of adjacent homes over time. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 outlines our conceptual 
model and identification strategy. Section 4 discusses summary measures and results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
3.2 Data 
 
Data for the analysis are taken from the national core files and neighborhood supplement 
of the 1985, 1989, and 1993 waves of the American Housing Survey (AHS) panel. Each survey 
contains an extensive array of questions about the house, neighborhood, and occupants. The 
survey is designed to be approximately representative of the United States and yields a panel that 
is unique among major surveys in that it follows homes not people. The national core survey is 
conducted every odd year (e.g. 1985, 1987 ...) and collects data from occupants of roughly 55,000 
homes. The neighborhood supplement survey was only conducted in 1985, 1989, and 1993, and 
targeted the 10 nearest neighbors of 680 AHS core houses, henceforth referred to as 
neighborhood clusters. The exact number of units surveyed varies across years because of 
budgetary and other considerations (see the Codebook for the AHS, April 2011 for details). As 
would be expected, few homes are present throughout the entire panel. Instead, homes enter and 
leave the survey at different times but not in manner that likely biases our results.27F28 
 
                                                          
28 The AHS is designed and implemented by the Department for Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
Conversations with HUD officials confirmed that the composition of the AHS sample is adjusted over time to help 
ensure that it remains roughly representative of the U.S.  For a succinct comparison of the sample design and coverage 
of the American Housing Survey (AHS), the American Community Survey (ACS), and the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) see http://www.census.gov/housing/homeownershipfactsheet.html. Additional details of the AHS sample design 
are provided in the codebook manuals listed in the reference section of this paper. 
Ionannides and Zabel (2003) also provide detailed summary measures on the AHS cluster files. 
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Although the initial 1985 survey included 680 clusters, the overall neighborhood 
supplement sample ends up containing 737 different neighborhood clusters spread across 112 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). We restrict our estimating sample to adults between 25 
and 60 years old which yields a sample of 13,743 individuals (see Table 3.1a). This excludes 
individuals who may not be working because they are either still in school or have retired. 
As noted earlier, our primary estimating sample is further restricted to individuals who are 
present in at least two consecutive surveys and who are between ages 25 and 60 in both survey 
years. This reduces our estimating sample to 4,880 individuals and a total of 11,661 person-year 
observations (see Tables 3.1b and 3.1c). To be clear, it is this sample that is used to define our 
dependent variable. When measuring the average attributes of adjacent neighborhood peers and 
non-peers we use a similarly age-restricted sample but in this case include all individuals who are 
present in a given survey year regardless of whether the neighbor in question is present for one or 
multiple survey years. Our regression models also control for the percentage of adjacent 
neighbors that are over 18 years in age including those beyond age 60. 
We define our dependent variable as 1 if the individual reports positive earned income in 
the previous year and 0 otherwise. We have also run our models using $5,000 (year-2013 dollars) 
as the cutoff to define work status. Results based on that specification are presented in the 
appendix (Table A3-1) for our most robust models and are similar to those in the main tables 
although evidence of peer effects among women is slightly weaker. As the earnings threshold is 
inceased beyond $5,000 results change in ways that are difficult to interpret because of the 
combined effects of three drivers of earnings: the decision to work, hours worked, and hourly 
wage (a proxy for skill). Only when we adopt a zero-earnings threshold do we isolate the 
decision to work. That decision is a meaningful choice for many women while a highly inelastic 
one for prime age men, a difference that we draw upon as discussed earlier. For these reasons we 
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focus on the decision to work throughout the paper and use zero as the income threshold to define 
an individual’s work status. 
Finally, as discussed earlier, for parts of the analysis we replace a neighbor’s actual work 
status with MSA level peer and non-peer employment rates for a given peer definition. In this 
context, individual types are based on a collection of demographic attributes that are used to 
define peer and non-peer neighbors; for example, a female with a high school degree, single, and 
with one child under age 5. MSA-level employment rates for all of the peer types used in the 
study are obtained from the Current Population Survey (CPS), March supplement for the years 
1985, 1989, and 1993. In all cases, we measure employment rates in the CPS based on whether a 
given individual earned positive income in the previous year, mirroring our definition used for  
the AHS data. 
 
 
3.3 Model and identification of peer effects 
 
This section outlines our conceptual model and related testable hypotheses. We also 
describe the econometric specifications and identification strategy. 
 
 
3.3.1 Conceptual framework and testable hypotheses 
 
Consider a community populated with two sets of individuals, type A and type B. 
Individuals within each group view each other as peers and within each group some individuals 
work while others do not. Peers are assumed to share information on job market opportunities 
more readily than do non-peers and peers also serve as role models for each other, emulating 
each other’s behavior. While this can also occur between non-peers we assume it does so to a 
lesser degree. Our goal in the empirical analysis to follow is to confirm whether peers and non- 
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peers within a housing cluster affect individual work decisions, and to shed light on the 
underlying mechanisms by which this may occur. 
Our regression models all contain variants of the following general expression, 
 
worki,n = θ1WPi,n + θ2WNPi,n + θ3NWNPi,n + θ4NWPi,n (3.1)       
where work equals 1 if individual i in neighborhood n works and 0 otherwise, WP is the number of 
nearby working peers, WNP is the number of nearby working non-peers, NWNP is the number of 
non-working non-peers, and NWP is the number of non-working peers. In viewing (3.1), suppose 
initially that individuals are randomly assigned to their neighborhoods and that the only systematic 
determinants of whether an individual works or does not work are the peer and non- peer variables 
in (3.1). Because information spillovers and role model effects both contribute to the positive 
effect of working peers on an individual’s propensity to work, θ1 should be especially large and 
positive. Information spillovers and role model effects may also contribute to a positive influence 
of working non-peers on an individual’s propensity to work, but to a lesser degree. Regardless of 
peer status, non-working neighbors are expected to contribute relatively little information about 
job market opportunities. Proximity to non-working individuals also has a negative role model 
effect that is assumed to be especially strong for non- working peers. Summarizing, these 
modeling assumptions imply that, 
θ1 > θ2 ≥ 0 ≥ θ3 > θ4 (3.2) 
 
The inequalities in (3.2) provide a set of testable relationships that are potentially 
revealing of neighborhood peer effects and of the mechanisms that contribute to those effects. 
Evidence, for example, that θ4 is negative and more so than the other coefficients would be 
indicative of negative role model effects. That is because we assume that non-working peers have 
non-negative effects on an individual’s access to information on job opportunities and that role 
model effects are stronger within as opposed to between peer groups. If θ4 equals zero and θ1 is 
positive and larger than the other coefficients, that would be consistent with the presence of word-
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of-mouth job market networks and related information spillovers as emphasized in Hellerstein et 
al (2014) and Damm (2014). If instead θ4 is strongly negative and θ1 is strongly positive (in the 
sense of the inequalities in (3.2)), then the positive coefficient on θ1 would be consistent with the 
presence of positive peer effects arising from either information spillovers, role model effects, or 
both. To anticipate, estimates from our most robust models support the structure and inequalities 
in (3.2) when considering female labor supply. 
 
 
3.3.2 Empirical model 
 
Our challenge in testing the restrictions implied by (3.2) is to obtain consistent estimates 
of the peer and non-peer coefficients allowing for the influence of other drivers of whether an 
individual works and the possible endogenous sorting of individuals into their housing cluster. 
We begin by drawing on the panel feature of the data. For those homes that do not turn over 
between surveys we follow the individual occupants over time which enables us to include  
person fixed effects, δi. The fixed effects sweep out the influence of time-invariant individual 
and neighborhood cluster attributes. Additional time varying individual and cluster attributes are 
represented by the vectors Xi,t and Xn,t, respectively, where t denotes the time period in question. 
Also included in the model are year fixed effects, δt, and controls for the MSA-level employment 
rate in a given survey year, Et,n, the specific form for which differs depending on other features  
of the model (in a manner to be clarified later). Adding these controls to (3.1), our regression 
models are of the following general form, 
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worki,n,t = θ1WPi,n,t + θ2WNPi,n,t + θ3NWNPi,n,t + θ4NWPi,n,t         (3.3) 
+ b1Xi,t + b2Xn,t + δi + δt + Emsa,t + ei,n,t 
 
where the model error term ei,n,t captures the influence of any remaining unobserved time-
varying, neighborhood-specific factors. 
An important feature of (3.3) is that the peer and non-peer terms are individual level, 
neighborhood specific, time varying variables. Our primary threat to identification, therefore, is 
that time varying unobserved neighborhood specific factors may influence temporal variation in an 
individual’s work status while also being correlated with temporal variation in proximity to 
working and non-working peers and non-peers. This could arise if proximity to nearby peers is 
endogenous, or because of the presence of unobserved local labor demand shocks, or because the 
work status of target and neighboring individuals simultaneously feedback on each other through 
(3.3). To clarify, suppose that peer effects do not exist in the sense that the true values for θ1, θ2, 
θ3, and θ4 are all zero. Suppose also that individuals choose their neighborhood to be close to 
peers and peers have similar unobserved tastes for work. Then this would bias upward the 
magnitude of the coefficients on the peer variables (θ1 and θ4) and would cause us to overstate 
evidence of peer effects. Alternatively, if individuals with a strong attachment to the workforce 
are drawn to neighborhoods with improving access to jobs, this would cause θ1 and θ2 to be 
positive and θ3 and θ4  to be negative. If these effects are more pronounced for peers then this 
would also cause us to mistakenly infer evidence of peer effects. Finally, simultaneous feedback 
between the work status of target individual and neighboring peers would bias upward the 
magnitude of the peer coefficients θ1 and θ4, also causing us to overstate evidence of peer effects. 
It is important, therefore, to control for possible endogenous temporal variation in both the peer 
and work status of neighbors within a given cluster. 
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Three features of our empirical design help to address such concerns. The first is the 
extreme proximity of neighbors in our data along with refined classifications of individuals into 
peer groups. The second is that in some models we rely on differencing to mitigate the influence 
of common unobserved factors. The third is that in our most robust models we proxy for the work 
behavior of adjacent peers and non-peers using MSA-level peer-specific employment rates. We 
comment further on each of these strategies below. 
 
 
3.3.3 Identification 
 
3.3.3.1 Neighbor proximity and classification of peers 
 
If individuals do not choose their residence based on anticipated changes in the peer  status 
of prospective neighbors that will help to ensure that temporal variation in proximity to peers and 
non-peers is exogenous. The manner in which we define peers along with the special features of 
the AHS neighborhood cluster panel help to ensure that is the case. Considering the data first, 
recall that the housing clusters are constructed from groups of adjacent homes in   MSAs across the 
U.S. While individuals may know the demographic attributes of their broader community when 
choosing a residence, it is less likely that they would know whether   prospective neighbors on a 
given block or in the house next door were peers or non-peers before moving into their home. It is 
even less likely that individuals would know of upcoming changes in the peer status of prospective 
neighbors when choosing their residence. This is especially true in our more refined models for 
which neighbors are classified into up to thirty-six different types, only one of which is coded as a 
peer. 
In the empirical work to follow, we experiment with thirteen different definitions of 
peers. In all cases except one, for each target individual i, peers are defined as neighbors that 
share common demographic traits with i where the traits used for these purposes differ across 
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peer definitions. The large number of peer definitions helps to establish robustness but also 
presents a challenge: how to choose a preferred classification scheme. On this we are guided by 
the following argument. At one extreme, suppose that neighborhood peer effects are present in 
the sense that the true model coefficients satisfy the inequalities in (3.2), but neighbors are 
randomly assigned as peers and non-peers. Then the peer and non-peer coefficients should be 
asymptotically similar which would imply an absence of peer effects. We begin with such a 
model as a base of reference. At the other extreme, suppose that we perfectly classify 
individuals as peers and non-peers. Given our strong priors that peers should have larger 
magnitude effects on an individual’s work behavior than non-peers, accurate classification 
should maximize the difference between the peer and non-peer coefficients. 
Regardless of the peer classification being used, recall that our target sample is always 
restricted to individuals between ages 25 and 60 to ensure that the decision of whether or not to 
work is relevant. Our simplest peer definition then classifies all individuals between ages 25 and 
60 as peers and those outside of this group as non-peers. The next level of classifications require 
that peers share one additional trait. The first such model treats individuals of the same gender as 
peers. The second model defines individuals with at least one similar age child at home as peers 
based on three different categories: no children at home under age 18, at least one child at home 
under age 6, and at least one child at home between 6 and 18. Individuals with at least one child 
under age 6 and also at least one child between 6 and 18 are defined as peers for families with 
children in both age categories. The third model treats individuals of similar marital status as 
peers (married versus not married). The fourth model treats individuals as peers if they are of 
similar education status based on three categories, less than high school, high school or some 
college, and college degree or more. More refined definitions of peers interact two, three, and 
eventually all four of these classifications. Accordingly, our most refined classification scheme 
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divides individuals into thirty-six different types: gender (2 groups) by age of children at home (3 
groups) by marital status (2 groups) by education (3 groups). 
It is worth emphasizing that as peer definitions become more refined exposure to peers 
among adjacent neighbors declines. For a broad definition such as age plus gender, for example, 
exposure is 34.4 percent for men and 39.0 percent for women (see Table 3.1c and the summary 
measures in Panels A and B of Table 3.3). For the most refined classification with 36 peer groups 
exposure is just above 8.5 percent for both men and women (see Table 3.4, column 7). Especially 
for these more refined models it is unlikely that an individual would know in advance if a 
prospective adjacent neighbor was a peer let alone whether the peer status of adjacent neighbors 
was about to change. For these reasons, we treat temporal variation in proximity to peers and 
non-peers as exogenous. 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Differencing peer and non-peer effects 
 
As emphasized above, it is also important to address possible unobserved local labor 
demand shocks. For that reason, in some of our models we use a differencing strategy under the 
assumption that this helps to difference away the influence of common unobserved time varying 
unobserved factors as with the arrival of a new nearby employer, for example. Specifically, we 
restrict θ1 = -θ4  and θ2 = -θ3 in expression (3.3). This implicitly assumes that working and non- 
working peers have similar magnitude but opposite signed effects on individual work behavior, 
as similarly for working and non-working non-peers. The regression model then becomes, 
worki,n,t = θp(WPi,n,t - NWPi,n,t) + θnp(WNPi,n,t  - NWNPi,n,t)        (3.4) 
    + b1Xi,t + b2Xn,t + δi + δt + Emsa,t + ei,n,t 
 
where θp and θnp are the influence of peers and non-peers on an individual’s work behavior. 
Under the further assumption that peers have a larger impact on individual work behavior than 
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non-peers, evidence that θp > θnp ≥ 0 is consistent with the presence of peer effects. 
The model in (3.4) has the advantage of differencing away common unobserved local time 
varying factors that might bias evidence of peer effects. A disadvantage of (3.4), however, is that 
it oversimplifies the relationship between peers and non-peers relative to the model in  (3.3) 
causing us to lose our ability to shed light on underlying mechanisms (i.e. role model effects 
versus information spillovers). Differencing as in (3.4) also does not fully address the possible 
influence of local time varying labor demand shocks. As noted above, such shocks have potential 
to bias upward the magnitude of all of the peer and non-peer coefficients in expression (3.3), and 
therefore, the magnitude of θp and θnp in (3.4). For these and other reasons we pursue yet another 
modeling strategy. 
 
 
3.3.3.3 Proxying for neighbor work status 
 
In our final and most robust modeling strategy, we proxy for a neighbor’s actual work 
status using MSA-level peer-specific employment rates in a manner described below. We favor 
this strategy for several reasons. First, it eliminates the possibility that time varying localized 
labor demand shocks might contaminate estimates of the peer effect variables in the manner 
discussed above. Second, it eliminates possible simultaneous feedback between the work status 
of adjacent neighbors and the work status of the target individual. Third, it controls for the 
tendency of an individual to work and for that reason, helps to reduce attenuation bias that would 
arise if an individual neighbor’s work status in a given year is misreported or not indicative of 
that neighbor’s typical behavior. Fourth, and very different, adjacent peers may serve as a 
window into a community that extends well beyond the immediate housing cluster (as with 
school or religious groups, for example). It is plausible that access to that broader group could 
enhance word-of-mouth labor market networks and also further contribute to role model effects. 
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It is worth emphasizing that failing to allow for the first two effects above could result in 
upward biased estimates of peer effects while failing to address the latter two implies the 
opposite. For these reasons, we proxy for the actual work status of adjacent neighbors as follows. 
For a given peer definition, individual i’s neighbors in year t are divided into two groups, peers 
and non-peers. We proxy for the work behavior of neighboring peers using the year-t 
employment rate among individuals in i’s MSA that qualify as peers (Ei,P,msa,t). We proxy for the 
work behavior of neighboring non-peers in an analogous manner using the MSA-level 
employment rate for all non-peers combined (Ei,NP,msa,t). 
Applying this strategy, expression (3.4) becomes, 
 
worki,n,t = θp[(Ei,P,msa,t)Pi,n,t  - (1-Ei,P,msa,t)Pi,n,t ] 
 
     + θnp[(Ei,NP,msa,t)NPi,n,t - (1-Ei,NP,msa,t)NPi,n,t]          (3.5) 
 
       + b1Xi,t + b2Xn,t + δi + δt + Emsa,t + ei,n,t 
 
where the terms Pi,n,t and NPi,n,t are the number of peers and non-peers from among adjacent 
neighbors and it should be emphasized that the overall MSA-level employment rate is retained as 
before. Observe also that identification in this model is based on differences in the expected 
number of adjacent working and non-working neighbors for both peers and non-peers since the 
bracketed terms simplify to 2(Ei,P,msa,t)Pi,n,t  - Pi,n,t and 2(Ei,NP,msa,t)NPi,n,t - NPi,n,t, respectively. 
Proxying for neighbor work behavior in the same fashion in expression (3.3) gives, 
 
worki,n,t = θ1(Ei,P,msa,t)Pi,n,t + θ2(Ei,NP,msa,t)NPi,n,t  
 
     + θ3(1-Ei,NP,msa,t)NPi,n,t + θ4(1-Ei,P,msa,t)Pi,n,t            (3.6)  
 
       + b1Xi,t + b2Xn,t + δi + δt + Emsa,t + ei,n,t 
 
Looking ahead, we favor the specification in (3.6) because it addresses the four concerns 
highlighted above while retaining opportunities to provide evidence of peer effects as well as 
underlying mechanisms. 
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3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Summary statistics 
 
Table 3.1a reports summary statistics for all individuals that are present in at least one 
survey year while Table 3.1b reports analogous measures restricting the sample to individuals 
present in at least two survey years – the same sample as used in our estimation. Both tables 
present measures for individual education, number of children, marital status, and age, and also 
for their adjacent neighbors. An important point to note is that the summary measures are quite 
similar for the two samples although individuals present for two or more consecutive surveys 
(Table 3.1b) are somewhat more likely to be married. 
An essential requirement for our models to be estimable is that there must be sufficient 
temporal variation in individual work status and also in the peer and non-peer variables. Table 
3.1c provides evidence on this point for the sample of individuals present in two or more 
consecutive surveys. Notice that the upper panel in the table reports sample means for the levels 
of the work and peer/non-peer variables based on data pooled across survey years. The lower 
panel presents analogous measures for the change in these variables across adjacent surveys (four 
years apart). 
Focusing first on our dependent variable, on average, 89 percent of men worked in the 
previous year while 69.7 percent of women worked. The standard deviation of the change in the 
work variable between adjacent surveys is 0.36 and 0.46 for men and women, respectively. 
Importantly, in the lower panel, notice that 16.7 percent of men in the estimating sample 
(379 individuals) experience a change in work status between surveys, while for women the 
corresponding value is 26.5 percent (690 individuals). Without such variation it would not be 
possible to estimate our person fixed effect models. 
Also present in Table 3.1c are summary measures based on the broadest peer definition 
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(age between 25 and 60) and narrowest definition (gender by marital status by education by age 
of children at home). For the broad definition, roughly 8.5 neighbors are working peers, 0.95 
neighbors are working non-peers, 2.5 neighbors are non-working non-peers, and 2.3 neighbors 
are non-working peers. Shifting to the narrow definition, exposure to peers declines sharply 
while exposure to non-peers increases by a corresponding amount. For both definitions the 
standard deviation of the change in the peer/non-peer variables between adjacent surveys 
indicates that there is notable temporal variation in these variables. That variation is also 
essential in order estimate the person fixed effect models. 
 
 
3.4.2 Baseline regressions – no peer effects 
 
Table 3.2 presents a baseline set of regressions that include individual and neighborhood 
cluster attributes but which omit the peer variables described earlier. Here and in all of the tables 
to follow the standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood cluster level. Columns 1 and 2 
report results for men and women without person fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 repeat the 
regressions but include the person fixed effects. 
Results in Table 3.2 are consistent with priors and findings in the literature. In the first two 
columns, for example, notice that the tendency to work increases with an individual’s level of 
education but much less so for men than for women. The smaller magnitude effect of education 
for men is consistent with the view that the decision to work for men is more inelastic. As 
anticipated, the presence of children at home has a notably negative influence on a woman’s 
tendency to work as does being married; these attributes do not deter male propensity to work. 
Not surprisingly, most of the individual and neighborhood cluster attribute coefficients 
become small and insignificant upon including person fixed effects in the models in columns 3 
and 4. This is because several of these attributes exhibit little if any change between survey 
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years and are therefore captured by the person fixed effects.28F29
 
The exception is that children and 
marital status continue to have sharp negative effects on female propensity to work as seen in 
column 4 of the table. 
 
 
3.4.3 Peer effects using actual neighbor work status 
 
We next present estimates of the models in expressions (3.3) and (3.4) which allow for 
peer effects based on the actual work status of nearby peers and non-peers. We begin with the 
restricted model in (3.4) for which the influence of working and non-working peers is assumed to 
be of equal magnitude but opposite sign, and similarly so for non-peers. Results from this model 
are presented in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b for thirteen different peer definitions. In both tables, 
estimates for men are in Panel A while estimates for women are in Panel B. 
In Table 3.3a, the first column in both panels is based on a random assignment of neighbors 
as peers and non-peers as a base of reference as described earlier. Notice that in both panels, the 
coefficients on non-peers in column 1 are larger than the coefficients on peers, opposite of what 
should occur in the presence of peer effects. The model in column 2 provides an alternate base of 
reference in that it treats all adjacent neighbors between ages 25 and 60 as peers while all other 
neighbors are non-peers. For men the coefficients on peers and non-peers are nearly identical and 
not significant, once again suggestive of an absence of peer effects. For women, the peer 
coefficient is positive and significant while the non-peer coefficient is essentially zero, indicating a 
possible presence of peer effects. 
The remaining models in Table 3.3a enrich the definition of a peer. Column 3 further 
requires that a peer be of the same gender as the target individual in addition to being between 
                                                          
29 It is for this reason that variables such as individual race and age are not included in the model.  Race is time 
invariant while in the case of age, all individuals advance four years between surveys which is fully captured by the 
person fixed effects. 
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age 25 and 60. Column 4 substitutes marital status (married, not married) for gender when 
defining peers. Column 5 uses education which, as noted earlier, is broken into three categories: 
less than high school, high school or some college, and college degree or more. Column 6 uses 
age of children in the home based on whether there are no children present, at least one child 
under age 6, and at least one child age 6 to 18. 
Several patterns are noteworthy in these later models. First, for both men and women, 
proximity to peers based on gender (column 3) is significantly and positively associated with an 
individual’s tendency to work. Second, proximity to peers based on education (column 5) or the 
presence of similar age children (column 6) is significantly and positively associated with the 
tendency for women to work but not for men. Third, recall that we anticipate that θp > θnp in 
expression (3.4) and that accurate classification of neighbors as peers and non-peers should 
maximize the spread between θp  and θnp. Accordingly, 1-tailed tests of the difference between the 
peer and non-peer coefficients are presented in the middle of each panel for each of the models. 
For men, gender appears to be the most credible way of classifying adjacent neighbors as peers 
while for women, gender and age of children stand out. For women, these patterns will be 
recurring themes as we move to more robust specifications in the tables to follow. 
Table 3.3b further enriches the definition of peers while maintaining the same general 
specification in expression (3.4). Columns 1-3 interact gender with marital status, education, and 
age of children, respectively. Column 4 interacts gender, marital status and education. Column 5 
interacts gender, marital status, and age of children. Column 6 interacts gender, education, and 
age of children. Column 7 is the most refined peer definition and interacts gender, marital status, 
education, and age of children, which yields thirty-six different peer classifications as noted 
earlier. 
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The results in Panel A for men suggest that gender-education (column 2) is the most 
compelling manner in which to classify individuals as peers. For that specification, notice that 
the coefficient on peers indicates that adding 1 additional peer to the adjacent neighbors changes 
an individual’s tendency to work by 1.17 percentage points while adding a non-peer has a much 
smaller effect of just 0.27 percentage points. There is intuitive appeal that men might be more 
likely to view other men of similar education as their primary peers. Nevertheless, it is also 
concerning that the peer effect coefficient is so large given our stong prior that for men the 
decision to work as defined here in this paper is highly inelastic. Moreover, the coefficient for 
men in column 2 is of similar magnitude to the corresponding coefficient for women in Panel B. 
This raises concerns about whether unobserved time varying labor demand shocks might be 
driving the peer effect coefficient for men. We will return to this point shortly. First, however, 
consider the patterns for women. 
In Panel B of Table 3.3b (for women), the specifications in columns 3, 6 and 7 appear to 
maximize the difference between the coefficients for peers and non-peers. This suggests that 
gender, child status, and education together are most effective in defining how women view 
potential peers. Although the further influence of marital status in column 7 does increase the 
difference between θp  and θnp slightly relative to column 6, it is worth noting that in column 4 
the difference between θp  and θnp is notably smaller and not significant when peers are defined 
based on gender, education and marital status. From these patterns we conclude that gender, 
child status, and education are important in defining peers for women but not marital status. 
Focusing on column 6, the estimates imply that adding one additional peer to a woman’s 
housing cluster will affect her work status by 1.4 percentage points. Adding one additional non- 
peer to the women’s cluster affects her work status by only 0.15 percentage points. It is also 
worth noting that for the column 6 classification of peers (gender by child status by education), 
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only 12 percent of a women’s adjacent neighbors are peers as indicated in the summary measures 
at the bottom of Table 3.3b. 
In Table 3.4 we next present estimates based on the model in expression (3.3) which 
continues to use the actual work behavior of neighbors to classify their work status but relaxes the 
coefficient restrictions imposed on (3.4). To conserve space, estimates are reported for just seven 
of the peer classifications and are ordered across columns as follows: (1) gender, (2) child status, 
(3) gender-education, (4) gender-child, (5) gender-education-marital status, (6) gender- 
education-child, and (7) gender-education-child-marital status. As before, estimates for men are 
in Panel A and for women in Panel B. 
As a broad characterization, estimates for men yield limited evidence of peer effects. None 
of the models, for example, yield positive significant coefficients on nearby working peers and in 
some instances the coefficient has the wrong sign. On the other hand, several of the models yield 
sharp negative coefficients on non-working non-peers and peers. In column 5, for instance, the 
addition of one non-working peer to an individual’s housing cluster is associated with a 4.1 
percentage point decline in the likelihood that the individual works. Given previous arguments and 
other patterns in the table, we are concerned that this estimate may be driven primarily by localized 
time-varying labor demand shocks as might occur with the departure of a nearby employer, for 
example. 
For women (Panel B), results are closer to our priors but still inconclusive. All of the 
working peer variables have positive but not significant coefficients. In addition, all of the non- 
working peer coefficients are negative but mostly also not significant. An exception is in column 
2 which defines peers based on the age of children. In that instance, the coefficient suggests that 
the addition of one additional non-working peer to a women’s housing cluster lowers her tendency 
to work by 1.6 percentage points. On the other hand, this estimate is close to the corresponding 
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estimate for men in Panel A and for reasons described above that differs from our priors. We 
remain concerned, therefore, that the models in Table 3.4 (and Tables 3.3a and 3.3b) may not 
adequately allow for the combined effects of unobserved time varying labor demand shocks, 
simultaneous feedback, measurement error and a possible role for peers and non-peers beyond the 
immediate neighborhood cluster. 
 
 
3.4.4 Peer effects using MSA-level peer and non-peer employment rates 
 
We turn now to our most robust models which proxy for actual neighbor work status with 
peer-specific MSA-level employment rates as described earlier. As before, we begin with the 
restricted model, expression (3.5) in this case, and then follow with the unrestricted model based 
on expression (3.6). Estimates are presented in Tables 3.5a and 3.5b for the two specifications, 
respectively, for the same seven peer definitions as in Table 3.4. Once again, estimates for men 
are in Panel A and for women in Panel B. 
Consider Panel A of Tables 3.5a and 3.5b first, for men. It is evident from the pattern of 
estimates that any evidence of peer effects has completely disappeared. In both tables, the 
coefficients are mostly small, always far from significant, and often of the wrong sign. This is 
evident in the negative coefficients on non-peers in the second row of Table 3.5a (WNP – NWNP) 
and the negative coefficients on working peers (WP) in the first row in Table 3.5b. The 
prevalence of small, insignificant coefficients is what should occur given the highly inelastic 
tendency for men to secure positive earnings over the course of a twelve month period. 
A sharply different pattern is evident for women. Consider first Table 3.5a which presents 
estimates based on the restricted specification in expression (3.5). There is compelling evidence 
of peer effects based on the peer definitions in columns 3 and 6, gender-child and gender- 
education-child, respectively, echoing results from Table 3.3b. In column 6, for example, the 
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difference in the peer and non-peer coefficients is 2.66 percentage points and significant. Based 
on this model, adding one additional peer to a woman’s neighborhood cluster affects her 
propensity to work by 3.36 percentage points. Adding one additional non-peer affects work 
propensity by just 0.69 percentage points. Similar values are present in column 4 of Table 3.5a for 
the gender-child peer definition. Other peer definitions in the table yield notably muted evidence 
of peer effects. 
Consider next Table 3.5b which presents estimates based on our more general specification 
in expression (3.6). Once again gender-child (column 4) and gender-child-education (column 6) 
appear to be the most compelling definitions of peers. For both of those specifications, the model 
estimates support the underlying theory described in expression (3.2) that θ1 > θ2 ≥ 0 ≥ θ3 > θ4. 
The negative and significant coefficient on non-working peers in these columns is especially 
informative. As argued earlier, while such individuals may not be a valuable source of 
information on job market opportunities, it seems unlikely that proximity to such individuals 
would impede access to information on potential jobs. On the other hand, the presence of such 
individuals would contribute to role model effects that would discourage a woman from choosing 
to work. For these reasons, we believe that the patterns in columns 4 and 6 provide unambiguous 
evidence that role model effects of nearby peers influence a woman’s decision to work. Given 
this evidence, it is likely that role model effects also contribute to the positive coefficient on 
working peers in columns 4 and 6 but in that instance we cannot rule out a further effect arising 
from information spillovers that would contribute to word-of-mouth job market networks as 
emphasized in Hellerstein et al (2014) and Bayer et al (2008). 
Table 3.6 presents a final extension in which we stratify the samples used in Panel B of 
Table 3.5b into single and married women, presented in Panels A and B of Table 3.6, 
respectively. It is worth noting that the point estimates in columns 4 and 6 for single women 
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(Panel A) and married women (Panel B) are similar both to each other and also to the estimates 
for the corresponding models in Table 3.5b. The estimates in Panels A and B of Table 3.6 are 
also noisier and less significant than in the corresponding models from Table 3.5b, but we 
believe that is primarily a result of having split the sample in half which reduces power. On 
balance, a close read of the patterns in Table 3.6 suggests that the evidence for peer effects 
based on proximity to women with similar age children and also of similar education status is 
similar for single and married women. For that reason, we view estimates from Table 3.5b, 
Panel B as most reliable given the combined and larger sample size. 
 
 
3.4.5 Residual diagnostics and exogeneity 
 
As emphasized throughout the paper, our ability to identify peer effects requires that 
temporal variation in the peer and non-peer variables is exogenous conditional on the various 
model controls. We provide here a set of residual-based diagnostic tests that help to reveal 
whether our models may violate such exogeneity conditions.29F30
 
The intuition behind the test is to 
evaluate whether differences in unobserved factors that drive temporal variation in the work 
behavior of two individuals helps to explain whether those individuals live in the same 
neighborhood cluster. Evidence of correlation would be suggestive that unobserved location 
specific factors may affect neighborhood choice as well as the decision to work which could 
point to a potential violation of exogeneity. 
To implement this test, all unique pairs of individuals used in a given work regression are 
first determined. Each pair is then classified as neighbors if the two individuals live in the same 
neighborhood cluster in the same survey year.  This is coded by setting Neighbori,j  to 1 for 
                                                          
30 Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) suggest the use of a similar diagnostic procedure to investigate possible 
endogenous formation of networks in the context of a network model with peer effects. Patacchini and Venanzoni 
(2014) use a similar strategy to demonstrate the importance of network fixed effects in identifying peer effects in the 
demand for housing quality. 
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neighbors and 0 otherwise. For each pair we also calculate the absolute value of the difference in 
the observed attributes of the two individuals, denoted as Dif_Xi,j , and the absolute value of the 
difference in their residuals from the work regression which we refer to as Dif_ei,j . Having 
formed these variables, we estimate a linear probability model with Neighbori,j as the dependent 
variable and Dif_Xi,j  and Dif_ei,j  as controls, 
Neighbori,j   = aO  + a1Dif_Xi,j  + a2Dif_ei,j  +  ci,j           (4.1)  
where the coefficient of interest is a2. 
Estimates of expression (4.1) are presented in the appendix Tables A3-2a and A3-2b for 
each model in Tables 3.5a and 3.5b, respectively.  Coefficients on Dif_ei,j  are also presented in 
Table 3.7 where they are normalized by dividing by the unconditional mean probability that two 
individuals live in the same neighborhood cluster (which equals 0.16 percent for men and 0.15 
percent for women). The normalized coefficients in Table 3.7 should be interpreted as indicating 
the impact of a 1.0 unit difference in the work regression residuals for two individuals, 
equivalent to a 100 percentage point difference in their probability of working. It should also be 
noted that because there are several million individual-pair observations in a given regression, 
the power to detect small departures from zero is quite high. 
Focusing on Table 3.7, notice that for men, regardless of the peer definition being used, a 
1-unit increase in the difference in residuals is associated with a roughly 13 percent decrease in 
the probability that two individuals live in the same neighborhood cluster relative to the 
unconditional mean probability. This effect is small in economic terms but statistically 
significant as indicated by summary measures in the appendix tables (Tables A3-2a and A3-2b). 
For women the test statistics are even smaller and not significant. The normalized 
coefficients in Table 3.7 suggest that a 1-unit increase in the difference in the residuals is 
associated with a roughly 3.5 percent decrease in the probability that two individuals live in the 
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same cluster relative to the unconditional mean. 
Along with the conceptual arguments and results described earlier, our inability to 
document notable significant correlation between differences in unobserved individual 
characteristics and neighborhood formation provides further support for the view that temporal 
variation in the peer and non-peer variables is exogenous conditional on person fixed effects and 
other model controls. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
A host of policy and household decisions are based on belief that neighborhood peer 
effects are important. Nevertheless, peer effects have been notoriously difficult to identify as 
have the mechanisms by which they are transmitted. This paper makes progress on both fronts 
by drawing on a unique neighborhood cluster file in the 1985-1993 American Housing Survey 
(AHS) that follows groups of adjacent homes over time. The panel and refined geographic 
attributes of the data along with other features of our modelling design enable us to address 
difficult identification issues that have plagued this literature. 
Our focus throughout has been on whether women work – defined as having positive 
earnings in the previous twelve months – and whether the work behavior of adjacent peers and 
non-peers affects that decision. Alternate model specifications indicate that for women, the 
combination of gender, age of children at home, and to a lesser degree education, are most 
important in defining peers. Results from our most robust specifications indicate that adding one 
additional working peer to a women’s adjacent neighbors increases her tendency to work by 4.5 
percentage points. Adding a non-working peer reduces her tendency to work by 9 percentage 
points. Adding non-peers to a women’s adjacent neighbors has little influence on her decision to 
work. Importantly, our estimates also suggest that these effects arise at least in part because 
women emulate the work behavior of nearby peers. Placebo tests based on men yield little 
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evidence of peer effects which is consistent with the view that for men the decision to work, and 
especially as defined here, is highly inelastic. 
Our finding that peer definitions for women depend on the presence and age of children 
is consistent with recent work by Graves (2013), Compton and Pollak (2014) and Black et al 
(2014). Graves (2013) shows that school calendars affect female labor supply. Compton and 
Pollack (2014) show that women are more likely to work if they live near to the children’s 
grandparents. Black et al (2014) show that women are more likely to work if they live in less 
congested metropolitan areas with shorter commute times. All three studies suggest the need for 
women to have viable child care if they are to work, either by relying on others (e.g. grandparents 
or schools) or because they can readily drive from work to home or a child’s school if        
needed. 
Our paper also reinforces an extensive literature on the importance of cultural norms as 
drivers of economic decisions and for the persistence of beliefs, norms, and socio-economic 
status across generations (Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Bisin and Verdier (2011)). While some 
studies argue that stagnation in women's labor force participation in the United States can be 
attributed at least in part to limited adoption of “family-friendly” policies (e.g. Blau and Kahn 
(2013)) our study confirms the importance of neighborhood-based cultural factors in shaping 
female labor market participation. 
Finally, our results and modelling strategy highlight the value of refined geographically 
concentrated panel data when attempting to identify peer effects. Data collection agencies 
should be encouraged to adopt such sampling designs.
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Table 3.1a: Summary statistics stratified by gender and marital status 
(Samples include only adults aged 25 to 60 present in at least 1 survey) 
 
 
All Men 
Sample 
All Women 
Sample 
Married Women 
Sample 
Single Women 
Sample 
Person-Specific Attributes         
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Education         
- Less than high school 0.137 0.343 0.155 0.362 0.142 0.349 0.184 0.388 
- HS and some college 0.527 0.499 0.593 0.491 0.606 0.489 0.565 0.496 
- BA degree or more 0.337 0.473 0.252 0.434 0.253 0.435 0.251 0.433 
Child in HH 0.518 0.500 0.556 0.497 0.599 0.490 0.458 0.498 
Married  0.762 0.426 0.693 0.461 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 41.2 9.8 41.0 9.9 41.2 10.0 40.6 9.9 
         
Average Attributes of 
Neighboring Adults Aged 25 to 60 
Not Including Target Person a         
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Education         
- Less than high school 0.141 0.209 0.151 0.216 0.138 0.210 0.182 0.225 
- HS and some college 0.562 0.250 0.562 0.246 0.562 0.246 0.561 0.245 
- BA degree or more 0.298 0.268 0.287 0.266 0.300 0.265 0.257 0.267 
Child in HH 0.510 0.277 0.527 0.276 0.548 0.257 0.481 0.309 
Married 0.710 0.275 0.704 0.274 0.770 0.226 0.554 0.312 
Age 41.1 5.3 41.2 5.4 41.8 5.3 39.9 5.4 
Aged between 25 and 60 b 0.725 0.187 0.722 0.189 0.725 0.187 0.714 0.193 
 
MSA level Attributes 
Employment Rate c 76.32% 3.57% 76.36% 3.57% 76.24% 3.54% 76.63% 3.62% 
         
Number of neighborhoods 725 728 704 658 
Number of neigh*year clusters 1,988 2,019 1,845 1,525 
Number of adults in sample 6,470 7,273 4,901 2,569 
Number of observations 9,607 10,917 7,570 3,347 
a Average attributes of neighbors are calculated on a person level basis per year and are the average attributes of all the adults aged 25to 
60 in the target person’s neighborhood cluster that were surveyed in a particular year, not including the target person. The mean and std. 
dev. reported in the table above are the mean and standard deviation of these person-level “average attributes of neighbors” values for all 
the people belonging to a particular sample: (All Men, All Women, Single Women, and Married Women). 
b Calculated for all adults aged 18 and over in the neighborhood in the particular year. 
c Calculated using the Current Population Survey (CPS) which was obtained from www.ipums.org (King et al, 2010). 
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Table 3.1b: Summary statistics stratified by gender and marital status 
(Samples include only adults present in 2 or more surveys age 25-60 in both surveys) 
 
 
All Men 
Sample 
All Women 
Sample 
Married Women 
Sample 
Single Women 
Sample 
Person-Specific Attributes     
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Education         
- Less than high school 0.120 0.325 0.134 0.340 0.125 0.331 0.169 0.375 
- HS and some college 0.528 0.499 0.614 0.487 0.622 0.485 0.568 0.496 
- BA degree or more 0.351 0.477 0.253 0.435 0.253 0.435 0.264 0.441 
Child in HH 0.555 0.497 0.559 0.497 0.599 0.490 0.413 0.493 
Married  0.819 0.385 0.755 0.430 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 43.4 8.8 43.1 9.0 43.1 8.9 43.7 8.9 
         
Average Attributes of 
Neighboring Adults Aged 25 to 60 
Not Including Target Person a 
        
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Education         
- Less than high school 0.124 0.196 0.138 0.205 0.123 0.199 0.181 0.217 
- HS and some college 0.567 0.248 0.567 0.242 0.568 0.243 0.558 0.235 
- BA degree or more 0.310 0.266 0.296 0.263 0.308 0.263 0.261 0.264 
Child in HH 0.534 0.260 0.544 0.260 0.557 0.245 0.501 0.301 
Married 0.765 0.241 0.750 0.248 0.802 0.202 0.585 0.304 
Age 41.9 5.1 42.0 5.2 42.5 5.0 40.6 5.4 
Aged between 25 and 60 b 0.725 0.184 0.722 0.184 0.724 0.183 0.716 0.189 
 
MSA level Attributes 
Employment Rate c 76.47% 3.59% 76.49% 3.60% 76.40% 3.54% 76.80% 3.73% 
         
Number of neighborhoods 630 653 557 371 
Number of neigh*year clusters 1,696 1,792 1,505 913 
Number of adults 2,272 2,608 1,908 603 
Number of observations 5,409 6,252 4,577 1,381 
a Average attributes of neighbors are calculated on a person level basis per year and are the average attributes of all the adults aged 25to 60 in 
the target person’s neighborhood cluster that were surveyed in a particular year, not including the target person. The mean and std. dev. 
reported in the table above are the mean and standard deviation of these person-level “average attributes of neighbors” values for all the 
people belonging to a particular sample: (All Men, All Women, Single Women, and Married Women). 
b Calculated for all adults aged 18 and over in the neighborhood in the particular year. 
c Calculated using the Current Population Survey (CPS) which was obtained from www.ipums.org (King et al, 2010). 
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Table 3.1c: Summary statistics stratified by gender and marital status 
for employment and peer variables 
(Samples include only adults present in 2 or more surveys age 25-60 in both surveys) 
 
 
All Men 
Sample 
All Women 
Sample 
Married Women 
Sample 
Single Women 
Sample 
Level based on pooled surveys Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Work Last Yeara 0.891 0.311 0.697 0.460 0.672 0.470 0.764 0.425 
         
Peer Definition: Aged 25 to 60       
- Working Peers (WP) 8.671 3.421 8.438 3.455 8.817 3.355 7.180 3.508 
- Working Non-Peers (WNP) 0.946 1.427 0.941 1.400 0.969 1.399 0.848 1.378 
- Non-Working Non-Peers (NWNP) 2.677 2.295 2.674 2.317 2.775 2.350 2.400 2.232 
- Non-Working Peers (WNP) 2.308 1.881 2.320 1.905 2.395 1.866 2.146 2.067 
         
Peer Definition: Gender*Mar*Educ*Child Status       
- Working Peers (WP) 1.199 1.373 0.861 1.041 0.963 1.066 0.570 0.893 
- Working Non-Peers (WNP) 8.335 3.169 8.454 3.224 8.763 2.985 7.374 3.704 
- Non-Working Non-Peers (NWNP) 4.692 2.512 4.349 2.497 4.437 2.467 4.132 2.598 
- Non-Working Peers (WNP) 0.134 0.406 0.431 0.796 0.508 0.846 0.215 0.597 
         
Change between adjacent surveys Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Work Last Yeara -0.024 0.364 0.002 0.456 0.001 0.479 -0.004 0.355 
Percent that change work status 16.7% - 26.5% - 29.6% - 15.9% - 
Number that change work status 379 - 690 - 565 - 96 - 
        
Peer Definition: Aged 25 to 60        
- Working Peers (WP) -0.249 2.549 -0.282 2.512 -0.332 2.522 -0.225 2.485 
- Working Non-Peers (WNP) 0.018 1.716 -0.006 1.674 0.026 1.691 -0.113 1.626 
- Non-Working Non-Peers (NWNP) 0.190 1.809 0.168 1.834 0.237 1.860 0.013 1.764 
- Non-Working Peers (WNP) -0.238 2.014 -0.231 1.998 -0.262 2.015 -0.101 1.971 
         
Peer Definition: Gender*Mar*Educ*Child Status        
- Working Peers (WP) -0.141 1.365 -0.069 1.099 -0.064 1.114 -0.032 0.928 
- Working Non-Peers (WNP) -0.108 2.711 -0.226 2.557 -0.242 2.528 -0.333 2.597 
- Non-Working Non-Peers (NWNP) -0.092 2.296 -0.045 2.326 0.003 2.313 -0.160 2.420 
- Non-Working Peers (WNP) -0.003 0.497 -0.094 0.844 -0.107 0.908 -0.023 0.548 
a An individual is considered employed if they had any wage earnings in the previous year. 
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Table 3.2: Employment regressions – no peer effectsa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
Estimation Sample 
 
Men 
(1) 
Women 
(2) 
Men 
(3) 
Women 
(4) 
Individual Characteristics     
High school degree or some college 0.0735*** 0.173*** 0.00653 -0.0880 
 (0.0199) (0.0263) (0.0723) (0.0905) 
College degree or more 0.0873*** 0.291*** -0.0136 0.0190 
 (0.0212) (0.0283) (0.0923) (0.101) 
At least one child < age 18 present at home 0.0259*** -0.0325** -0.0109 -0.0450* 
 (0.00990) (0.0144) (0.0199) (0.0255) 
Married 0.00248 -0.113*** 0.0433 -0.121*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0178) (0.0314) (0.0397) 
Neighbor and MSA Characteristicsb     
Percent High school degree or some college 0.0107 0.153*** -0.0910 0.0374 
 (0.0338) (0.0528) (0.0766) (0.0748) 
Percent College degree or more 0.0198 0.0960* -0.0964 -0.0124 
 (0.0330) (0.0520) (0.0818) (0.0952) 
Percent age 25 to 60 0.0317 -0.0578 0.0267 -0.0148 
 (0.0306) (0.0428) (0.0618) (0.0723) 
Percent with at least one child < 18 at home 0.0346 -0.0139 0.0345 0.0372 
 (0.0218) (0.0317) (0.0410) (0.0423) 
Percent Married -0.00474 0.0564 -0.0596 0.00868 
 (0.0293) (0.0384) (0.0531) (0.0513) 
MSA employment rate c 0.197 0.0442 0.347 0.371 
 (0.1600) (0.2150) (0.2890) (0.3010) 
Person Fixed Effects - - 2,272 2,608 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,409 6,252 5,409 6,252 
R-squared 0.013 0.058 0.587 0.700 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60.  Individuals are defined as working if they have positive earned 
income in the previous year.  All models are estimated using the American Housing Survey neighborhood cluster 
file panel (1985-1993). \One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two stars at the 5 percent level; and 
three stars at the 1 percent level.   
b Calculated based on all working age (25 to 60 years old) neighbors, except for “Percent age 25 to 60” which is 
calculated based on all neighbors. 
c Calculated using the Current Population Survey (CPS) which was obtained from www.ipums.org. 
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Table 3.3a: Restricted peer effect model with actual neighbor work statusa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A – MEN 
Peer Group Definition Random 
All Ages 
25-60 Gender Married Education Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
N working peer – 0.00257 0.00403 0.00964* 0.00486* 0.00462 0.00380 
  N non-wrk peer (WP - NWP) (0.00255) (0.00263) (0.00502) (0.00276) (0.00340) (0.00329) 
N working non-peer - 0.00456* 0.00480 0.00167 0.00462 0.00354 0.00333 
  N non-wrk non-peer (WNP - NWNP) (0.00276) (0.00326) (0.00253) (0.00356) (0.00286) (0.00245) 
[WP – NWP] – [WNP – NWNP] -0.0020 0.0008 0.0080* 0.0002 0.0011 0.0005 
(1-tail P-value) (0.727) (0.576) (0.081) (0.476) (0.396) (0.447) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
% Neighbors that are Peers 50.0% 72.5% 34.4% 53.3% 38.9% 40.3% 
Mean Peer Env 2.11 6.36 4.11 4.65 3.56 3.47 
Mean Non-Peer Env 2.11 -1.73 1.13 1.11 1.74 1.99 
R-square 0.587 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.587 0.587 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 
 
PANEL B – WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Random 
All Ages 
25-60 Gender Married Education Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
N working peer – 0.00127 0.00637** 0.00887** 0.00523 0.00720* 0.00633* 
  N non-wrk peer (WP - NWP) (0.00292) (0.00305) (0.00383) (0.00338) (0.00399) (0.00349) 
N working non-peer - 0.00515 -0.000943 0.000744 0.00557 0.00146 -0.000416 
  N non-wrk non-peer (WNP - NWNP) (0.00313) (0.00381) (0.00373) (0.00373) (0.00334) (0.00339) 
[WP – NWP] – [WNP – NWNP] -0.0039 0.0073* 0.0081* -0.0003 0.0057 0.0067* 
(1-tail P-value) (0.848) (0.066) (0.065) (0.530) (0.120) (0.052) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
% Neighbors that are Peers 50.0% 72.2% 39.0% 51.2% 39.1% 40.2% 
Mean Peer Env 2.00 6.12 2.19 4.31 3.37 3.33 
Mean Non-Peer Env 1.99 -1.73 3.34 1.19 1.73 1.91 
R-square 0.700 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 
Observations 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two 
at 5 % level; three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less 
than HS; HS and some col.; and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors 
aged 25 to 60 and their average: education (same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table 3.3b: Restricted peer effect model with actual neighbor work statusa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A – MEN 
Peer Group Definition Gen-Mar Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Educ 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer – 0.00833 0.0117** 0.00730 0.00929* 0.00902 0.00861 0.00931 
  N non-wrk peer (WP - NWP) (0.00523) (0.00527) (0.00556) (0.00546) (0.00584) (0.00623) (0.00666) 
N working non-peer - 0.00315 0.00273 0.00329 0.00367* 0.00342* 0.00351* 0.00373* 
  N non-wrk non-peer (WNP - 
NWNP) 
(0.00238) (0.00225) (0.00208) (0.00222) (0.00205) (0.00211) (0.00209) 
[WP – NWP] – [WNP – NWNP] 0.0052 0.0090** 0.0040 0.0056 0.0056 0.0051 0.0056 
(1-tail P-value) (0.179) (0.046) (0.228) (0.150) (0.160) (0.198) (0.192) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
% Neighbors that are Peers 26.1% 18.9% 19.2% 14.5% 15.2% 10.8% 8.7% 
Mean Peer Env 3.17 2.30 2.26 1.81 1.82 1.30 1.06 
Mean Non-Peer Env 1.92 2.54 2.66 2.99 3.01 3.44 3.64 
R-square 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 0.588 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 
 
PANEL B – WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gen-Mar Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Educ 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer – 0.00843* 0.0111** 0.0105** 0.0101 0.0104* 0.0143** 0.0157** 
  N non-wrk peer (WP - NWP) (0.00472) (0.00521) (0.00482) (0.00623) (0.00594) (0.00652) (0.00777) 
N working non-peer - 0.00213 0.00200 0.000429 0.00234 0.00169 0.00156 0.00176 
  N non-wrk non-peer (WNP - 
NWNP) 
(0.00302) (0.00278) (0.00291) (0.00266) (0.00270) (0.00258) (0.00254) 
[WP – NWP] – [WNP – NWNP] 0.0063 0.0091* 0.0101** 0.0078 0.0087* 0.0127** 0.0139** 
(1-tail P-value) (0.130) (0.057) (0.032) (0.123) (0.085) (0.029) (0.041) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
% Neighbors that are Peers 27.2% 21.3% 21.8% 15.1% 15.3% 12.0% 8.6% 
Mean Peer Env 1.41 1.23 1.19 0.80 0.76 0.65 0.43 
Mean Non-Peer Env 3.66 3.65 3.77 3.89 3.95 3.99 4.10 
R-square 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 
Observations 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 
5 % level; three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less than 
HS; HS and some col.; and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors aged 25 
to 60 and their average: education (same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table 3.4: Unrestricted peer effect model with actual neighbor work statusa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A –MEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) 0.00250 -0.00166 0.00626 -0.00270 -0.00205 0.00175 0.00104 
 (0.00611) (0.00408) (0.00641) (0.00535) (0.00553) (0.00639) (0.00679) 
N working non-peer (WNP) -0.00500 -0.000848 -0.00425 -0.00172 -0.00161 -0.00162 -0.000860 
 (0.00493) (0.00378) (0.00397) (0.00354) (0.00341) (0.00360) (0.00345) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.00854 -0.00557 -0.0106** -0.00667 -0.00631 -0.00870** -0.00781* 
 (0.00635) (0.00413) (0.00504) (0.00444) (0.00426) (0.00436) (0.00421) 
N non-working peer (NWP) -0.0205* -0.0133* -0.0195 -0.0325* -0.0414** -0.0259 -0.0369 
 (0.0119) (0.00777) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0188) (0.0220) (0.0249) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
% Neighbors that are Peers 34.4% 40.3% 18.9% 19.2% 15.2% 10.8% 8.7% 
Mean WP 4.7 4.8 2.6 2.6 2.1 1.5 1.2 
Mean WNP 4.4 4.4 6.8 6.8 7.4 8.0 8.3 
Mean NWNP 3.3 2.4 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.7 
Mean NWP 0.6 1.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
R-square 0.589 0.588 0.589 0.589 0.590 0.588 0.589 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 
 
PANEL B –WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) 0.00925 0.00353 0.00784 0.00758 0.00309 0.0139 0.0116 
 (0.00795) (0.00576) (0.00766) (0.00744) (0.00845) (0.00922) (0.0103) 
N working non-peer (WNP) -0.00429 -6.63e-05 0.000922 0.00141 0.00123 0.00239 0.00189 
 (0.00774) (0.00556) (0.00555) (0.00537) (0.00524) (0.00521) (0.00528) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.00723 0.00476 -0.00300 0.00109 -0.00162 -0.000557 -0.00142 
 (0.00860) (0.00596) (0.00612) (0.00579) (0.00571) (0.00561) (0.00564) 
N non-working peer (NWP) -0.00790 -0.0164* -0.0154 -0.0158 -0.0216* -0.0155 -0.0222 
 (0.00956) (0.00876) (0.0105) (0.0103) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0138) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
% Neighbors that are Peers 39.0% 40.2% 21.3% 21.8% 15.3% 12.0% 8.6% 
Mean WP 4.0 4.6 2.2 2.2 1.5 1.2 0.9 
Mean WNP 5.0 4.3 7.0 7.0 7.7 8.1 8.5 
Mean NWNP 1.6 2.4 3.3 3.2 3.8 4.1 4.3 
Mean NWP 1.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 
R-square 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 0.701 
Observations 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 
% level; three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less than HS; 
HS and some col.; and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors aged 25 to 60 
and their average: education (same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table 3.5a: Restricted peer effect model proxying for 
neighbor work status with MSA-level employment ratesa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A – MEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer – -0.00556 -0.00743 0.00307 -0.00839 -0.00904 -0.00321 -0.00260 
  N non-wrk peer (WP - NWP) (0.00875) (0.00656) (0.00921) (0.00797) (0.00821) (0.00877) (0.00895) 
N working non-peer - -0.00502 -0.00640 -0.0129 -0.00890 -0.00807 -0.00854 -0.00602 
  N non-wrk non-peer (WNP - 
NWNP) 
(0.0152) (0.00715) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.00894) (0.00955) (0.00872) 
[WP – NWP] – [WNP – NWNP] 0.0065 0.0006 0.0017 0.0022 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0002 
(1-tail P-value) (0.513) (0.568) (0.108) (0.479) (0.542) (0.303) (0.367) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
% Neighbors that are Peers 34.4% 40.3% 18.9% 19.2% 15.2% 10.8% 8.7% 
Mean Peer Env 3.49 3.12 2.02 1.95 1.61 1.15 0.97 
Mean Non-Peer Env 1.34 2.28 2.77 3.01 3.35 3.64 3.84 
R-square 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.588 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 
 
PANEL B – WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer – 0.0197 -0.000806 0.0160 0.0254* 0.0141 0.0336** 0.0218 
  N non-wrk peer (WP - NWP) (0.0168) (0.0102) (0.0133) (0.0152) (0.0167) (0.0159) (0.0172) 
N working non-peer - -0.00478 -0.00270 0.00285 0.00761 0.00470 0.00696 0.00523 
  N non-wrk non-peer (WNP - 
NWNP) 
(0.0137) (0.0114) (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0120) (0.0116) 
[WP – NWP] – [WNP – NWNP] 0.0245 0.0019 0.0132 0.0178* 0.0094 0.0266** 0.0166 
(1-tail P-value) (0.105) (0.402) (0.196) (0.090) (0.267) (0.040) (0.174) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
% Neighbors that are Peers 39.0% 40.2% 21.3% 21.8% 15.3% 12.0% 8.6% 
Mean Peer Env 2.28 3.06 1.35 1.19 0.79 0.71 0.48 
Mean Non-Peer Env 3.14 2.24 3.36 3.63 3.80 3.85 4.01 
R-square 0.700 0.700 0.700 0.701 0.700 0.701 0.700 
Observations 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two 
at 5 % level; three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less 
than HS; HS and some col.; and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors 
aged 2s5 to 60 and their average: education (same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table 3.5b: Unrestricted peer effect model proxying for 
neighbor work status with MSA-level employment ratesa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A –MEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) -0.00655 -0.00288 0.000507 -0.00381 -0.00586 -0.00645 -0.00152 
 (0.0121) (0.0105) (0.00921) (0.0103) (0.00988) (0.0100) (0.0106) 
N working non-peer (WNP) -0.00553 -0.00817 -0.0107 -0.00775 -0.00788 -0.00721 -0.00568 
 (0.0158) (0.00826) (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.00937) (0.0103) (0.00935) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) 0.000392 0.0116 0.00281 0.00607 0.00699 0.00395 0.00378 
 (0.0212) (0.0158) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0148) (0.0170) (0.0152) 
N non-working peer (NWP) 0.0154 -0.00742 0.00884 -0.0215 -0.0147 0.0252 -0.0114 
 (0.0564) (0.0319) (0.0409) (0.0458) (0.0439) (0.0473) (0.0587) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
% Neighbors that are Peers 34.4% 40.3% 18.9% 19.2% 15.2% 10.8% 8.7% 
Mean WP 4.4 4.6 2.5 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.2 
Mean WNP 4.7 4.8 7.1 7.2 7.8 8.3 8.6 
Mean NWNP 3.4 2.5 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.7 4.8 
Mean NWP 0.9 1.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 
R-square 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.587 0.588 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,400 
 
PANEL B –WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) 0.0311 0.0163 0.0238* 0.0444*** 0.0256 0.0447*** 0.0279 
 (0.0209) (0.0152) (0.0141) (0.0170) (0.0176) (0.0169) (0.0183) 
N working non-peer (WNP) -0.000450 -0.0120 0.00231 -0.000490 -0.00459 0.000766 0.000203 
 (0.0160) (0.0127) (0.0157) (0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.0122) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.00325 0.0328 -0.00138 0.00949 0.0140 0.00709 0.00651 
 (0.0368) (0.0226) (0.0281) (0.0236) (0.0227) (0.0224) (0.0212) 
N non-working peer (NWP) -0.0591 -0.0496 -0.0551* -0.0948*** -0.0650* -0.0894*** -0.0590* 
 (0.0450) (0.0415) (0.0308) (0.0350) (0.0339) (0.0335) (0.0356) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
% Neighbors that are Peers 39.0% 40.2% 21.3% 21.8% 15.3% 12.0% 8.6% 
Mean WP 4.0 4.5 2.2 2.2 1.5 1.2 0.9 
Mean WNP 5.1 4.7 7.0 7.1 7.9 8.2 8.6 
Mean NWNP 1.9 2.4 3.6 3.5 4.1 4.3 4.6 
Mean NWP 1.7 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.4 
R-square 0.700 0.701 0.701 0.702 0.701 0.702 0.701 
Observations 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 % 
level; three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less than HS; HS and 
some col.; and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors aged 25 to 60 and their 
average: education (same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table 3.6: Unrestricted peer effect model proxying for 
neighbor work status with MSA-level employment ratesa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A –SINGLE WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) 0.0130 -0.00162 0.0211 0.0217 0.0319 0.0292 0.0210 
 (0.0337) (0.0281) (0.0203) (0.0251) (0.0310) (0.0242) (0.0286) 
N working non-peer (WNP) 0.00155 -0.0291 -0.0179 -0.0157 -0.00884 -0.0134 -0.00457 
 (0.0221) (0.0229) (0.0239) (0.0214) (0.0189) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.0188 0.0769* 0.0190 0.0485 0.0176 0.0196 -0.00219 
 (0.0632) (0.0451) (0.0440) (0.0461) (0.0378) (0.0370) (0.0348) 
N non-working peer (NWP) -0.0459 -0.0276 -0.0513 -0.0890* -0.164* -0.0722 -0.0871 
 (0.0745) (0.0748) (0.0511) (0.0516) (0.0909) (0.0505) (0.0875) 
Person Fixed Effects 603 603 603 603 603 603 603 
% Neighbors that are Peers 41.2% 42.6% 22.0% 24.5% 12.9% 13.2% 7.1% 
Mean WP 3.7 4.1 2.0 2.2 1.1 1.2 0.6 
Mean WNP 4.2 3.7 6.2 5.9 7.2 7.1 7.8 
Mean NWNP 1.6 1.8 3.1 2.8 3.7 3.7 4.1 
Mean NWP 1.6 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.2 
R-square 0.805 0.807 0.805 0.807 0.808 0.806 0.805 
Observations 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 
 
PANEL B – MARRIED WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) 0.0381 0.0161 0.0199 0.0469** 0.0337 0.0385* 0.0280 
 (0.0256) (0.0189) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0223) (0.0218) (0.0224) 
N working non-peer (WNP) 0.00267 -0.0122 0.0127 0.00144 -0.00227 0.00579 0.00591 
 (0.0198) (0.0157) (0.0192) (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0155) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.00886 0.0332 -0.0119 0.00605 0.0135 0.00391 0.00344 
 (0.0423) (0.0272) (0.0337) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
N non-working peer (NWP) -0.0597 -0.0401 -0.0431 -0.0824* -0.0567 -0.0630 -0.0406 
 (0.0548) (0.0519) (0.0377) (0.0467) (0.0395) (0.0449) (0.0411) 
Person Fixed Effects 1,908 1,908 1,908 1,908 1,908 1,908 1,908 
% Neighbors that are Peers 38.3% 39.3% 21.1% 20.9% 16.3% 11.6% 9.2% 
Mean WP 4.1 4.6 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.2 1.0 
Mean WNP 5.3 5.0 7.3 7.5 8.1 8.5 8.9 
Mean NWNP 2.0 2.6 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.5 4.7 
Mean NWP 1.8 1.5 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 
R-square 0.679 0.680 0.679 0.680 0.679 0.680 0.679 
Observations 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577 4,577 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 % level; 
three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less than HS; HS and some col.; 
and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors aged 25 to 60 and their average: education 
(same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table 3.7: Percent change in the probability that two individuals live in the same 
neighborhood cluster (relative to the unconditional probability) in response to a 
1-unit (100 percentage point) difference in their Work regression residuals  
 
 Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
MEN        
Table 3.5a Modelsa -13.17%** -12.47%** -12.98%** -13.10%** -13.04%** -12.85%** -13.04%** 
Table 3.5b Modelsa -13.17%** -12.54%** -13.17%** -13.29%** -13.23%** -12.79%** -13.17%** 
        
WOMEN        
Table 3.5a Modelsa -4.57% -3.32% -3.58% -3.98% -3.58% -3.70% -3.41% 
Table 3.5b Modelsa -4.92% -4.22% -3.93% -5.33% -4.41% -4.73% -3.83% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 % level; three at 1 % level.  The reported coefficients are equal 
to the raw coefficients reported in Appendix Tables A3-2a (for the Table 3.5a models) and A3-2b (for the Table 3.5b models) 
normalized by the unconditional sample probability that two individuals are in the same neighborhood cluster.  For men the 
unconditional probability is 0.0016 (0.16 percent).  For women the unconditional probability is 0.0015 (0.15 percent). 
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4.1 Introduction 
This paper analyzes how the frequency and predictability of facing spells of 
unemployment impacts households’ demand for home equity loans or lines of credit (HELOC). 
Using American Community Survey 2003-2013 data, I find household heads under age 60 whose 
occupational unemployment rates are significantly impacted by quarter-on-quarter changes in 
GDP, or business cycle effects, are more likely to secure a HELOC. Results also indicate 
household heads under age 40 facing seasonality in occupational employment, as measured by 
the difference between the highest and lowest unemployment monthly factors, tend to hold such 
home equity withdrawal devices. Overall, results point towards consumption smoothing motives 
influencing the decision to secure a HELOC. 
For younger households, evidence of the demand for securing a HELOC being influenced 
by seasonality or business cycle driven fluctuations in occupational employment is strongest 
when coupled with house price appreciation. The literature has shown us that younger 
households are more likely to be credit constrained (see Haurin, Herbert and Rosenthal, 2007). 
Accordingly, for younger households house price increases are larger drivers of home equity 
withdrawal behavior (e.g. Mian and Sufi, 2011; Yamashita, 2007). Under the assumption that 
house price appreciation more significantly impacts the supply of HELOCs than demand, such 
shifts in supply allow one to trace out the demand curves for workers with different employment 
characteristics. This enables a cleaner identification of how the various measures of 
unemployment risk and seasonality impact younger households’ demand for HELOCs.  
Authors have cautioned against the use of occupation-specific measures of employment 
risk due biases resulting from the fact that people’s level of risk aversion (Lusardi, 1997) or 
access to credit (Bernhardt and Backus, 1990) may factor into occupational choice. To address 
93 
 
 
 
such concerns this paper uses the idea borne in Shore and Sinai (2010) that same-occupation 
couples face a higher correlation in unemployment shocks than do different-occupation ones. 
Specifically, the estimated spousal correlation in occupation-specific unemployment rates is used 
to split two-worker households into three groups: those with negative or zero correlation; those 
with a weakly positive correlation; and those with a strong positive correlation.  
Results show households with a strong positive spousal correlation are more likely to 
secure access to HELOCs when facing seasonality and business cycle induced fluctuations in 
employment. This reflects their lesser ability to use spousal income as an alternative method for 
smoothing consumption relative to lower spousal unemployment correlation couples. Under the 
assumption that spouse choice is not influenced by risk aversion and access to credit, this method 
shows how couples with an arguably exogenously higher risk of facing joint spells of 
unemployment respond more to employment variance in their decision to hold a HELOC. 
To my knowledge, looking specifically at the use of home equity loans and lines of credit 
as devices for tapping into stored home equity when facing unemployment risk is novel in the 
literature. 30F31 My prior is that these devices may be particularly useful in smoothing out small 
shocks to consumption resulting from breaks in employment due to them being a relatively low-
cost manner for drawing upon stored home equity. This is likely to be the case when compared to 
alternatives such as cash-out mortgage refinancing or selling the home to extract stored equity. 
Once set up, a HELOC may be repeatedly drawn upon as needs arise so individuals facing 
frequent and predictable shocks to employment are more likely to favor this option for tapping 
into stored home equity. The conceptual model laid out in Section III details why this may be the 
case. HELOCs may also be favored over alternative short-term credit solutions such as credit 
                                                          
31 Duca and Kumar (2014) use Health and Retirement Study data to assess how financial literacy impacts people’s 
likelihood of extracting home equity via home equity loans, in a permanent income hypothesis framework. They 
show that the financially literate are more likely to withdraw equity via home equity loans. 
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cards and personal loans because they tend to charge lower interest rates since the home serves 
as collateral for the lender. 
Figure 4.1 displays the age profile of households’ probability of holding a first mortgage 
as well as the probability of holding second-lien loans for those also holding primary mortgages. 
In the ACS only individuals who hold a primary mortgage are asked questions regarding their 
holdings of secondary mortgages and home equity loans of lines of credit. It is also important to 
note the data does not enable one to distinguish whether households hold a home equity loan or a 
home equity line of credit. Figure 4.1 shows the probability of holding a HELOC peaks around 
age 50, significantly later than that of holding primary or secondary mortgages. 31F32 This is 
consistent with mortgages being paid off as age increases, and with older households generally 
having more home equity which they can access using HELOCs.  
The data restriction pertaining to being unable to know HELOC status for non-primary 
mortgage holding households is likely to be least taxing for households between the ages of 22 to 
52, for whom at least 80% of homeowners hold a primary mortgage. Since results regarding the 
responsiveness of HELOC demand to employment seasonality and business cycle driven 
fluctuations are strongest for these younger homeowner groups, this further supports the validity 
of the findings. 
Given that this paper is analyzing home equity withdrawals during a period of 
particularly striking developments in the housing market, namely the lead up to and period after 
the hosing bubble burst in 2007. It is important to understand what the role of home equity loans 
and lines of credit may have been in these events.  
                                                          
32 This is consistent with Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2007); who find annual percentage rates (APRs) 
charged on HEL and HELOCs are U-shaped with respect to age, with a minimum value around age 50. 
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Bernstein (2008) shows that between 2001 and 2007, home equity lines of credit were 
increasingly used by new mortgagees in order to reduce their loan-to-value ratios on their first 
mortgage and therefore avoid having to take out primary mortgage insurance. Lee, Mayer, and 
Tracy (2012) similarly report the use of home equity lines of credit to avoid large down 
payments at mortgage origination. LaCour-Little, Yu, and Sun (2014) show that home equity 
lines of credit during this period were commonly used to finance the purchase of non-owner-
occupied properties. Eriksen, Kau, and Keenan (2013) estimate that from 2004 to 2008 12.6% of 
newly originated mortgages included second-lien loans. They find that borrowers with second-
lien loans were significantly more likely to default on their loans. Similar results regarding 
higher default probabilities among mortgagees with second-lien loans are found by LaCour-
Little, Calhoun, and Yu (2011).  
The work in the preceding paragraph shows the probability of securing home equity loans 
in this period increased dramatically for reasons unrelated to any consumption smoothing 
motives. This is why the inclusion of state by year fixed effects is vital for the identification of 
how the frequency and predictability of unemployment spells may influence the demand for 
HELOCs.  
The idea that individuals will make use of savings to hedge against income shocks has 
long been a topic of interest in the economics literature, dating back to the permanent income 
hypothesis of Friedman (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg’s (1954) life-cycle hypothesis. 
Several authors have looked at evidence of households using home equity as a consumption 
smoothing tool.  
Carroll, Dynan and Krane (2003) look at variation in a household’s wealth holdings in 
the Survey of Consumer Finances as a function of uncertainty regarding employment. 
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Employment uncertainty is estimated by the probability of being unemployed for households of 
similar characteristics in the Current Population Survey. The authors find evidence that increased 
job loss risk increases wealth holdings, consistent with a precautionary savings motive. No such 
results are found if excluding home equity from wealth calculations, indicative of the fact that 
home equity can be an important tool for consumption smoothing. They do not specifically 
address whether home equity loans and lines of credit are the mechanisms used to tap into that 
stored home equity; unlike the analysis herein. 
This same idea is borne out in the work of Davidoff (2006), Shore and Sinai (2010), and 
Benjamin and Chinloy (2008). Davidoff (2006) shows there is evidence of precautionary savings 
in home purchasing decisions. He does so by finding that households whose income is highly 
correlated with house prices are less likely to own a home and that, when they do own, they on 
average have lower levels of home investment than other households. Benjamin and Chinloy 
(2008) develop a theoretical model where representative households have two “piggybanks” to 
accumulate wealth in, housing and retirement accounts. Their model shows that individuals will 
tap into these stores of wealth when facing shocks to income by borrowing on their home equity 
through: increasing mortgage debt; re-financing; or drawing on home equity lines of credit. 
Shore and Sinai (2010) analyze how consumption of housing is affected by employment 
risk by comparing housing consumption for two-worker households where both workers have the 
same occupation versus ones with different occupations. They find evidence that among workers 
who face high housing adjustment costs (owners), same occupation couples spend 2.1% more on 
housing than other couples; no such difference is evident when workers face low housing 
adjustment costs (renters).  
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The precautionary savings motivation for housing consumption has also been 
investigated for other countries. Evidence of such behavior has been found for homeowners in 
Germany and Spain (Diaz-Serrano, 2005) and Japan (Moriizumi and Naoi, 2011). Other authors 
have looked at consumption smoothing motives driving overall levels of home equity 
withdrawals in other countries (e.g. Ebner, 2013; Shwartz et al, 2008; and Wood et al, 2003). 
Consumption smoothing motives impacting the decision to carry out a mortgage refinancing 
behavior (e.g. Angelini and Simmons, 2005; Benito, 2009; and Hurst and Stafford, 2004) or take 
out a second mortgage (Manchester and Poterba, 1989) has also been addressed in the literature.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the data used in the 
analysis; Section III details the conceptual model and identification strategy; Section IV 
discusses the empirical results; and Section V provides a conclusion. 
 
4.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
Data for the analysis is obtained from the American Community Survey (ACS), from 
2003 to 2013, and from the 1993 to 2002 monthly Current Population Surveys (CPS) obtained 
via the IPUMS-USA website (Ruggles et al, 2010). The ACS dataset contains information on a 
series of socio-demographic characteristics of surveyed individuals as well as providing 
information regarding their home ownership status and mortgaging activity. Table 4.1 presents 
the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis for each of the five different 
household head 10-year age range samples. The CPS data is used to obtain measures of 
occupation-specific unemployment rates and their responsiveness to monthly seasonality and 
business cycle effects. 
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The summary statistics for the mortgage variables are in line with the trends displayed in 
Figure 4.1, described earlier. We can observe that 1st and 2nd mortgage take-up is most common 
in the 30 to 39 year old age range and both uniformly decrease as sample age increases. In a 
contrasting manner, the probability of securing a home equity loan or line of credit (HELOC) 
increases with age up to age 50, tailing off thereafter. As indicated earlier this pattern is 
consistent with two priors. The first being that as individuals get older the amount of equity they 
own in their home increases, therefore increasing the likelihood of tapping into that stored equity 
via home equity withdrawal tools. The second prior is that individuals outside of working age 
will not make use of home equity withdrawals in order to engage in consumption smoothing 
resulting from shocks to employment; thus older individuals are less likely to hold HELOCs. 
The next set of summary statistics presented in Table 4.1 pertains to the key control 
variables in explaining the probability of securing a HELOC. These include three variables 
related to unemployment risk and variability: the 1993 to 2002 average occupation- and age 
group-specific unemployment rate; the seasonality in occupation-specific unemployment rate; 
and the business cycle effect on occupation-specific unemployment rate. All these measures are 
calculated using monthly CPS data. As expected, Table 4.1 shows average unemployment rates 
are highest for the youngest age cohort decreasing steadily as age increases and increasing 
slightly for the oldest age group. 
In order to obtain the measures of seasonality and business cycle effects on occupation-
specific unemployment rate, for each occupation a linear probability model of whether someone 
is unemployed is run using the following explanatory variables: monthly fixed effects; quarter-
on-quarter percentage change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP); education level (less than HS, 
HS degree, or some college and higher levels); age; age squared; and gender. The seasonality 
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measure is obtained by calculating the difference between the largest and smallest monthly fixed 
effect estimate. Business cycle effect on occupation-specific unemployment rate is the absolute 
value of the estimated coefficient on quarterly percent change in GDP. The absolute value is 
used since both a positive or negative correlation with GDP changes imply business cycle driven 
variability in occupation-specific unemployment rate. Both these measures are evenly distributed 
across age-group samples, although younger household heads tend to be employed in 
occupations that are slightly more responsive to business cycle effects. 
The remaining key control variable for assessing the probability of someone securing a 
HELOC is the estimated maximum increase in the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) 
metropolitan area all transactions house price index. 32F33 This is obtained by matching the 
metropolitan areas in the FHFA dataset with those identified for individuals in the ACS and 
making use of the variable in the ACS that identifies how long ago people moved into their 
home. With these two variables one can estimate the maximum house price index (HPI) 
appreciation since someone moved in. 33F34  
One concern with this measure pertains to the variable indicating how many years have 
elapsed since someone moved into their home being coded in intervals that become wider as the 
number of years increases. Concretely, if someone moved in to their home 15 years ago, they 
will be coded as having moved in between 11 and 20 years ago; conversely someone who moved 
in within the last year is accurately coded as having moved in within the last year. In calculating 
the maximum HPI increase for the person who moved in 15 years ago, I track the changes in the 
HPI since 20 years before they are surveyed and identify what the maximum increase is in the 
index. This could mean that the person in the example would never have experienced the 
                                                          
33 Available at http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index.aspx . 
34 When matching cannot be done based on the metropolitan area, the state level HPI is matched instead. 
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calculated maximum HPI increase if this occurred between 16 and 20 years ago, since they 
hadn’t moved into their home yet. Therefore this measure will be noisiest for older individuals, 
who have typically lived in their homes for longer periods. Given the way this measure is 
calculated it is unsurprising Table 4.1 shows the mean value of house price index appreciation 
increases with age. 
One expects this house price appreciation estimate to strongly influence the probability of 
securing a HELOC.  The larger the house price appreciation, the higher the house equity growth 
a homeowner likely experiences. This therefore increases the ability to tap into that equity via a 
HELOC. Conversely, homeowners who have not experienced such house price appreciation are 
less likely to have positive net equity in the home and therefore are unable to tap into it. 
Other household head variables included in the analysis are socio-demographic attributes 
with a similar distribution across age groups. The obvious exceptions being: age; number of 
children; years since moved into their homes; marriage rates; and yearly pre-tax income. 
 The remaining variables are household attributes pertaining to family formation. The 
variables indicating number of children under 18 and number within college age (18 to 22 years 
old) serve may indicate that someone will make use of home equity withdrawals to deal with 
expenses associated with having children within these age ranges. Unsurprisingly no 20 to 29 
year olds have a child of college age and only about 4% of 30 to 39 year olds have one. The 
married couple indicator is likely to be positively correlated with the ability to secure a loan 
since couples will typically have greater earnings than single people. 
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4.3 Conceptual Model and Identification Strategy 
4.3.1 Conceptual Model  
The conceptual model presented in this paper analyzes households’ decision to carry out 
a home equity withdrawal when facing a stochastic future-period income. Although this decision 
can be thought of in a lifecycle utility maximization framework, the decision can be simplified 
into a series of decisions in a two-period model. This paper’s model has a similar setup to that of 
Shore and Sinai (2010) and assumes that individuals maximize a two-period utility function with 
only one argument: consumption (c). Individuals earn a certain first-period income (𝑦1) and a 
stochastic second-period income (?̃?2). In the first period, individuals choose their level of 
consumption (𝑐1) and whether to secure a home equity line of credit (H). In the second period 
they choose whether to: draw upon the HELOC, if they had set one up; carry out a cash-out 
mortgage refinancing (R); or do neither. Note that the model assumes individuals currently hold 
a primary mortgage. This is done in order to match up with the data in this analysis which only 
identifies whether households hold a HELOC if they also hold a primary mortgage. However, the 
model can be generalized to thinking of the cash-out mortgage refinancing decision as a decision 
of whether or not to sell one’s home.  
Securing a HELOC will incur a first period fixed cost kH and a variable cost in the second 
period equal to the interest rate rH multiplied by the amount withdrawn. This is consistent with 
the fact that once set up and thus having incurred the fixed cost, HELOCs can be drawn upon as 
needed to face consumption shocks, only incurring the interest rate associated with that 
withdrawal amount. Since credit issuers are unlikely to give individuals with low or no income 
the option of securing a HELOC, the model assumes that the decision to secure a HELOC is 
carried out in the first period, where income is certain. Since income in the second period is 
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stochastic, a strong negative realization may prevent individuals from having access to a HELOC 
thus the decision is made in the first period.  
Carrying out a cash-out mortgage refinancing will incur fixed cost kR. Unlike the decision 
to secure a HELOC, the model assumes the refinancing decision is made in the second period 
once the realization of income (?̃?2) is known. This assumption is due to the fact that when cash-
out mortgage refinancing occurs, the amount of cash or equity extracted is decided at that time; 
conversely, a HELOC can be drawn upon as needed. The difference in the cost associated with 
these two alternate methods of carrying out home equity withdrawals arises both through 
differences in the fixed cost and variable cost. Securing a HELOC has a lower fixed cost (kH < 
kR) but incurs a variable cost (rH > 0) dependent on the amount drawn; whereas the cash-out 
refinance option only incurs the fixed cost.  
The two-period utility function that is maximized is: 
𝑈(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 𝑈(𝑐1) +  𝑈(𝑐2) 
The maximization is subject to the following inter-temporal budget constraints, 
depending on whether or not individuals choose to carry out home equity withdrawals, and 
whether they do so by securing a HELOC or carrying out a cash-out mortgage refinancing: 
Constraint with no home equity withdrawal:          𝑦1 + ?̃?2 = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2  
Constraint with HELOC secured:  𝑦1 + ?̃?2 + (𝑦1 − ?̃?2) = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 + 𝑘𝐻 + 𝑟𝐻(𝑦1 − ?̃?2) 
Constraint with cash-out refinancing:  𝑦1 + ?̃?2 + (𝑦1 − ?̃?2) = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 + 𝑘𝑅  
For simplicity, the budget constraints with home equity extraction assume that in the 
second period individuals will extract home equity in such a way that they make second-period 
income equal to first-period income, therefore extracting an amount equal to 𝑦1 − ?̃?2. Obviously, 
if the realized value of stochastic second-period income (?̃?2) is greater than or equal to first-
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period income (𝑦1) no equity is withdrawn. The rationale behind this is that they will use home 
equity withdrawals in order to suffer no income losses from one period to the next. Whenever a 
home equity withdrawal is carried out, a further constraint is imposed. The constraint is that you 
can only extract equity up to the value of home equity that you own, i.e. home equity ≥ 𝑦1 − ?̃?2. 
Individuals who experience appreciation in house prices are likely to see an increase in their 
level of home equity. This therefore increases their likelihood of being able to extract some of 
that home equity by either carrying out a cash-out refinancing or securing a HELOC. This 
situation probably impacts young homeowners the most since they are likely to be credit-
constrained at the time of home purchase. Therefore appreciation in house prices will likely 
mean they get into a positive net home equity position, giving them the possibility of carrying 
out a home equity withdrawal.  
Given this setup, second period consumption (𝑐2) is either: 
𝑐2 with no home equity withdrawal: 𝑐2 = 𝑦1 + ?̃?2 − 𝑐1 
𝑐2 with HELOC secured:  𝑐2 = 𝑦1 + ?̃?2 − 𝑐1 − 𝑘𝐻 + (1 − 𝑟𝐻)(𝑦1 − ?̃?2) 
    𝑐2 = 2𝑦1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑘𝐻 − 𝑟𝐻(𝑦1 − ?̃?2) 
𝑐2 with cash-out refinancing:  𝑐2 = 𝑦1 + ?̃?2 − 𝑐1 − 𝑘𝑅 + (𝑦1 − ?̃?2) 
    𝑐2 = 2𝑦1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑘𝑅 
Knowing second-period levels associated with each option enables one to write down the 
inter-temporal utility maximization problem that individuals face, shown below: 
max
𝑐1,𝐻,𝑅
{
𝑈(𝑐1) + (1 − 𝐻) ∗ (1 − 𝑅) ∗ E[𝑈(𝑦1 + ?̃?2 − 𝑐1)]
+ 𝐻 ∗ E[𝑈(2𝑦1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑘𝐻 − 𝑟𝐻(𝑦1 − ?̃?2))] + 𝑅 ∗  𝑈(2𝑦1 − 𝑐1 − 𝑘𝑅)
} 
Where E[U(…)] is the expectation of second-period utility, H is an indicator of securing 
a HELOC, and R indicates a cash-out mortgage refinancing is carried out. While this paper does 
not attempt to fully solve the maximization problem shown above, it will assess how different 
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realizations of second-period income (?̃?2) impact optimal choices.  
Figure 4.2 displays how the second-period shock to consumption (𝑦1 − ?̃?2) varies with 
different realizations of second-period income (?̃?2) and the choices of whether to secure a 
HELOC or perform a cash-out mortgage refinancing. From the figure we can observe that for 
any realized value of second-period income (?̃?2) smaller than 𝑦1 + (𝑘𝐻 − 𝑘𝑅)/𝑟𝐻, performing a 
cash-out mortgage refinancing is optimal since it minimizes the shock to second-period 
consumption. A realization such that 𝑦1 + (𝑘𝐻 − 𝑘𝑅)/𝑟𝐻 ≤ ?̃?2 ≤ 𝑦1 − 𝑘𝐻/(1 − 𝑟𝐻), makes 
taking out a HELOC in the first-period and drawing upon it in the second-period optimal. While 
any realization larger than 𝑦1 − 𝑘𝐻/(1 − 𝑟𝐻) implies no home equity withdrawal is optimal. 
This framework identifies how small shocks to consumption such as the ones resulting 
from temporary breaks to employment can make it optimal for households to secure access to a 
home equity line of credit in order to smooth consumption during these periods. Note that the 
model doesn’t explicitly account for the fact that once a HELOC has been secured, it can be used 
for an extended period of time. This likely makes securing a HELOC an even more attractive 
proposition for households who experience frequent and predictable shocks to consumption 
through temporary spells of unemployment. Such spells may be driven by occupation-specific 
employment’s seasonality or reactiveness to business cycle effects. These ideas drive the 
identification strategy presented in the next section. 
 
4.3.2 Identification Strategy  
Having presented the conceptual model that underpins the analysis to be carried out, this 
section details the empirical identification strategy. The first thing to note is that estimating 
equations are run separately for five different samples of household head ten-year age ranges. 
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This is done because there are important differences in the housing equity, mortgage holdings, 
and home equity withdrawal behavior across age groups that this analysis will highlight. 
For all the equations presented in this section, the variable 𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 identifies whether 
household i in metropolitan area m and state s in year t has secured a home equity loan or line of 
credit. Ideally one would look at both the intensive (amount of equity withdrawn) and extensive 
(securing a HELOC) margin. However, due to data limitations only the latter is possible. 
Ordinary least squares linear probability models are estimated throughout the paper. 34 F35 The 
baseline model has the following estimating equation: 
𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑚,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑥. % 𝐻𝑃𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑈. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑅 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 
 +𝛽4𝑈𝑅 𝐵𝑢𝑠. 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝜕𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                 (1) 
As previously indicated, the variable 𝑀𝑎𝑥. % 𝐻𝑃𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑚,𝑡 is likely to have a 
significant impact on the probability of households securing a HELOC. An increase in housing 
prices will be correlated with net home equity increases. For example, say a takes out a $200,000 
mortgage to buy a $300,000 home and housing prices increase in such a way that the home is 
worth $330,000 in a year. This means that this household now has a $30,000 increase in home 
equity which they can tap into using a HELOC. Having experienced an increase in home equity 
is also makes it more likely that credit issuers will be willing allow these households to secure a 
HELOC. Therefore the overall effect of house price appreciation on the probability of securing a 
HELOC is expected to be positive. 
The variables 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑈. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖, 𝑈𝑅 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖, and 𝑈𝑅 𝐵𝑢𝑠. 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 are 
measures of unemployment risk and variance. These measures are calculated using CPS 1993-
2002 data using the methods described in the Data section of this paper. All three of these 
                                                          
35 The baseline model (eqn. 1) is also estimated using Probit regressions. Estimated marginal effects are comparable 
to the ones obtained from the linear probability model and are available upon request. 
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variables are expected to positively influence demand for home equity withdrawals if 
consumption smoothing motives exist. However, as pointed out by Duca and Kumar (2014), 
when assessing the equilibrium level of home equity withdrawal one needs to also factor in how 
these same attributes affect the supply of home equity withdrawal options. All three of these 
measures are likely to have a negative effect on the supply of HELOCs since they indicate to 
credit suppliers that these people are riskier borrowers. The overall effect on the equilibrium 
probability of holding a HELOC may therefore be negative. When from a strictly consumption 
smoothing perspective we expect the opposite. 
All three of the variables pertaining to unemployment risk and variance may also be 
negative due to the influence of unobserved wealth. Wealth is positively correlated with people’s 
ability to secure a HELOC and is likely to be negatively correlated with some of these 
occupation-specific measures of unemployment risk and variance. This may again lead to 
negative estimated coefficients for these variables independently of consumption smoothing 
motives. On the other hand, finding positive coefficients indicates consumption smoothing 
motives are probably behind the decision to secure a HELOC. 
The vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 contains the household head attributes described in Section II and detailed 
in Table 4.1. The remaining variables are a series of fixed effects that aid in identification. 𝛾𝑖are 
household head occupation group fixed effects. In total there are 336 occupations in the 1990 
Census Bureau occupational classification scheme. For most of the empirical specifications 
occupations are broken into 17 broader groups and fixed effects for these broad groups are 
included (see Table A4-1 for details). However models are also run where the full 336 
occupation fixed effects are included. As previously mentioned occupational standing is likely to 
be correlated with unobserved wealth so including these fixed effects will aid in diminishing the 
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bias occurring through this channel. In all estimating equations state by year fixed effects (𝜆𝑠,𝑡) 
are also included. Given that in the period of time of the analysis there are significant differences 
in credit issuing standards across years and states, omission of these fixed effects would likely 
bias results. 
Having highlighted the important role house price appreciation may have on the ability to 
secure a HELOC, the model detailed in equation (2) interacts estimated house price increase with 
the various unemployment risk and variance measures. Figure 4.3 displays how the market for 
HELOCs is impacted by house price appreciation which aid in explaining the rationale behind 
the inclusion of such interaction terms in the model.  
𝐻𝐸𝐿𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑚,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑥. % 𝐻𝑃𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑈. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑈𝑅 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 
+𝛽4𝑈𝑅 𝐵𝑢𝑠. 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑃𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑔. 𝑈. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 
+𝛽6𝐻𝑃𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝑈𝑅 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 
+𝛽7𝐻𝑃𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 ∗ 𝑈𝑅 𝐵𝑢𝑠. 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜕𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        (2) 
Figure 4.3 presents two separate demand functions; one for low unemployment risk 
occupations and one for high. Higher unemployment risk in this case can be expressed in higher 
seasonality; business cycle driven fluctuations; or higher overall unemployment rate. Low 
unemployment risk occupations will have a smaller demand for HELOCs for consumptions 
smoothing motives than high risk occupations. The demand for low risk occupations is therefore 
less elastic; highlighting how changes in the interest rate charges on HELOCs will have little 
influence on quantity demanded. Conversely, high risk occupations will be more responsive to 
changes in interest rate in their demand for HELOCs since they have a higher latent demand for 
such home equity withdrawal devices driven by consumption smoothing motives. 
Assuming that the increase in home equity driven by house price appreciation 
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predominantly increases the supply of HELOCs, Figure 4.3 displays how this shift in supply 
enables one to trace out the demand for HELOCs of low and high unemployment risk 
occupations. The figure shows how the expected increase in the equilibrium level of HELOC 
holdings in response to a supply shift is larger for high risk occupations than low risk ones. 
Therefore the coefficients on the interaction terms are expected to be positive. Especially so for 
younger households who absent the house price appreciation are unlikely to be offered the option 
of securing a HELOC. 
In all estimating equations, reported standard errors are clustered at the state level in 
order to account for within state correlation across observations. The models presented in 
equations (1) and (2) are also run separately household heads with low or high occupation- and 
age-specific unemployment rates. The cutoff used for this split is an unemployment rate of 5%. 
This is done in order to assess how individuals with differing baseline levels of unemployment 
differentially react to unemployment risk and variance measures in their decision to secure a 
HELOC. 
Authors have cautioned that the use of occupation-specific unemployment risk and 
variance measures may be unadvisable due to the correlation between occupation choice and 
people’s risk aversion (Lusardi, 1997) or access to credit (Berhardt and Backus, 1990). As a 
robustness check in order to address this issue, the models in equations (1) and (2) are also run 
separately for two-worker households with differing degrees of spousal correlation in 
unemployment rate. Higher spousal correlation in unemployment rates diminishes the likelihood 
that individuals will be able to use spouse’s income to compensate for breaks in consumption 
resulting from unemployment spells. This builds on the identification strategy used by Shore and 
Sinai (2010) who used the fact that same occupation couples will face a higher correlation in 
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unemployment shocks than different occupation couples to assess their differential consumption 
of housing.  
Spousal correlation in unemployment rate is obtained by estimating occupation-specific 
unemployment rates for the years 1993 to 2002 using CPS data and calculating the correlation 
coefficient in the unemployment rates for different occupation pairs. Having obtained these 
correlation coefficients, two-worker households are split into three groups: those with negative 
or zero correlation (coefficient between -1 and 0); those with weak positive correlation 
(coefficient between 0 and 0.5); and those with strong positive correlation (coefficient between 
0.5 and 1). These cutoffs are chosen to reflect differing likelihoods of being able to use spousal 
income to substitute for own income during unemployment spells. In all the models for two-
worker households both household head and spouse attributes and broad occupation group fixed 
effects are included in the regressions in order to capture differential probabilities of holding a 
HELOC driven by differences in the characteristics of the second worker in the household. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Baseline Model  
 Table 4.2 presents the results for the baseline model. This is the only table that reports the 
coefficients associated with the full set of explanatory variables. The remaining tables only 
report coefficients on the key explanatory variables since the remaining ones do not change 
significantly across specifications. 
 The coefficient for maximum percentage house price index (HPI) increase since moved 
in is seen to be consistently positive across age groups. The magnitude of the coefficient also 
decreases slightly with age. This reflects the fact that older individuals are likely to have more 
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equity even without an appreciation in their house’s valuation. It may also reflect how this 
measure is likely to suffer from attenuation bias for individuals who have been in their house 
longer, typically older individuals, due to the greater margin for error in estimating house price 
appreciation for people who’ve lived in their homes longer. The positive coefficient being larger 
for younger households is also consistent with these households being most likely to be credit 
constrained and therefore requiring an increase in home equity to be able to secure a HELOC. 
 The variable indicating the age- and occupation-specific unemployment rate shows a 
consistently negative impact on the probability of securing a HELOC. As previously mentioned, 
occupational unemployment rate is likely to be correlated with unobserved wealth. The negative 
coefficient is therefore unsurprising since the negative unobserved wealth effect is likely to 
dominate any positive effects occurring through consumption smoothing desires. Similarly, the 
coefficient on the measure of seasonality in unemployment rate is also likely to suffer from 
unobserved wealth bias. Accordingly, significantly negative coefficients on this variable are 
evident for the two oldest age cohorts. For these groups the average unemployment rate no 
longer has such a strong negative effect and instead unemployment seasonality may be picking 
up the unobserved wealth effect. For younger age cohorts the positive impact on the coefficient 
driven by consumption smoothing motives outweighs any negative unobserved wealth effects, 
but the coefficient is only significant positive coefficient for household heads aged 30 to 39.  
 The strongest evidence of consumption smoothing motives potentially driving the 
probability of households securing a HELOC in this baseline model is seen in the coefficients for 
the business cycle effect on occupation-specific unemployment rate. The coefficient is positive 
for all age groups and significantly so for all but the oldest cohort. For individuals under age 40 
the coefficient has the largest magnitude implying an effect of approximately a 0.2 percentage 
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point increase in the probability of securing a HELOC, when evaluated at the mean. Although 
this is a small effect, given the low baseline probabilities of holding a HELOC the estimated 
impacts represent a 2.7 and 1.3 % increase, for those aged 20 to 29 and 30 to 39, respectively. 
 It is important at this point to remind ourselves of a key limitation in the data: the fact 
that we do not observe whether or not an individual holds a HEL or HELOC unless they also 
hold a primary mortgage. This restriction is unlikely to be very taxing on the credibility of 
estimates for people between the ages of 22 and 52 since these groups have primary mortgage 
holding rates above 80%. However, for very young and older cohorts there may be something 
different about households who hold a mortgage relative to the general population. This leads to 
a selection bias that can impact the credibility of estimated coefficients. Therefore estimates for 
the samples of household heads aged 30 to 50 are probably cleanest from this selection bias. 
Conversely, estimates for the oldest age cohort are most likely to be biased for this reason. 
 The remaining coefficients generally have the expected influence on the probability of 
securing a HELOC. Being a household where the household head is female consistently 
decreases the probability of securing a HELOC. This occurs even after controlling for the 
positive impacts of being married and of total household yearly pre-tax income on that same 
probability. The coefficients on age an age squared match up with the trends in the probability of 
holding a HELOC shown in Figure 4.1. 
 Education variables’ coefficients show higher levels of education are positively 
correlated with securing a HELOC. This is consistent with the fact that education is a proxy for 
unobserved wealth; therefore higher education likely means higher wealth thus greater access to 
credit. These findings are also consistent with the work of Duca and Kumar (2014) who show 
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that financially literate individuals are less likely to withdraw equity from their homes via non-
home equity loans. 
 The breakdown of coefficients by race shows evidence of racial attributes likely being 
correlated with wealth thus affecting the credit access of different individuals. The non-white and 
Hispanic coefficients are both consistently negative and significant across age groups. Similarly 
US citizenship has a consistently positive correlation with securing a HELOC. This likely 
reflects both the higher earnings and wealth of these individuals relative to non-citizens, but also 
the fact that non-citizens are likely to have a smaller credit history, leading to lower credit rating 
and lower likelihood of securing a HELOC. 
 Years since someone moved in is shown to have a non-linear relationship with the 
probability of securing a HELOC; years since moved in has a positive coefficient and the square 
of this variable has a negative coefficient. Years since moved in are a proxy for mobility. The 
longer someone has been in a home, the more likely they will remain in that home. A positive 
relationship is therefore expected since people who are more likely to move elsewhere are less 
likely to take out credit using their home as collateral. This measure is also likely to be correlated 
with owning a greater share of equity in the home, therefore increasing the ability to draw upon it 
by securing a HELOC. House age is also included as a control to account for the fact that 
homeowners may want to secure a HELOC in order to carry out maintenance. Since an older 
home is expected to require more maintenance, one would expect the coefficient to be positive. 
The significantly negative coefficient may however once again reveal unobserved wealth effects 
because wealthier individuals are more likely to own newer homes. 
The variables indicating the number of college age children (18 to 22 years old) and 
number of children under age 18 generally show a positive correlation with securing a HELOC. 
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This is consistent with the fact that households may wish to take out credit to deal with expenses 
associated with having children within these age ranges. The exception to this occurs for younger 
age groups. One explanation for the negative coefficient observed for people within the 30 to 39 
age range having a child of college age, is that these are outliers in the data. It is not common for 
someone within this age group to have a child of this age and when they do, it probably reflects 
the fact that these individuals have a smaller attachment to the labor force thus decreased 
earnings leading to lower ability to obtain credit. 
Overall the results from this baseline model begin to shed light on how unemployment 
risk and variance can drive demand for securing a HELOC, consistent with consumption 
smoothing motives. In the next section results from the model which interacts house price 
appreciation with the various measures of unemployment risk and variance will provide clearer 
evidence of how frequent and predictable shocks to employment can drive the decision to secure 
a HELOC; particularly so for younger age groups. 
 
4.4.2 Interacted Model  
 Table 4.3 presents the results obtained using the model specification which interacts the 
estimated maximum house price appreciation with the various unemployment risk and variance 
measures using the specification detailed in equation (2). The interaction of house price increase 
and the occupation- and age-specific average unemployment rate reveals that the positive effect 
of house price appreciation on the probability of securing a HELOC is diminished if household 
heads belong to high average unemployment rate occupations. This mirrors the effect of average 
unemployment rate found in the model with no interactions which was significantly negative for 
all but the oldest cohort. As mentioned earlier, this average unemployment rate is probably 
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captured an unobserved wealth effect. Therefore when facing a similar increase in house prices, 
individuals in high unemployment rate occupations are still less likely to be able to secure a 
HELOC than those in lower unemployment rate occupations. 
 The effects of seasonality and business cycle induced fluctuations in occupational 
unemployment rate on the probability of securing a HELOC are seen to be larger when younger 
individuals experience growth in house prices since the interaction terms are positive. Young 
individuals are most likely to be credit-constrained when they move into their homes, i.e. they 
are likely to have “maxed out” the amount of credit they can obtain in order to finance their 
home purchase through taking out a mortgage. Therefore for younger households increases in 
house prices will have a greater impact on their ability to secure a HELOC than older 
individuals. Given this, the evidence in Table 4.3 shows that it is workers in occupations with 
greater variance in unemployment rate that are most likely to take advantage of house price 
appreciation and corresponding increases in home equity in order to secure a HELOC. 
 Table 4.4 shows the results of carrying out the same interacted model from equation (3) 
as in Table 4.3 but with the inclusion of the full 338 occupation fixed effects instead of the 17 
broader occupation groups. All the occupation specific measures drop out of the estimating 
equation because they are collinear with the occupation fixed effect. The interacted terms 
however remain, and we can see that the estimated coefficients on the interactions are very 
similar to the ones obtained in the model with only 17 broad occupation categories fixed effects. 
This indicates the results in Table 4.3 indeed reflect the impact of differing degrees of 
occupational unemployment rate seasonality and business cycle induced fluctuations on the 
probability of securing a HELOC instead of some other occupation-specific potentially biasing 
the results. 
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4.4.3 Comparison of household heads in low and high unemployment rate occupations 
 Tables 4.5 through 6B present the results from an analysis that divides household heads 
into those in low or high unemployment rate occupations. As detailed in Section III, this split is 
based on a 5% unemployment rate cutoff. Breaking the sample up in such a manner reveals 
important differences in the degree to which frequent and predictable breaks to employment 
impact the decisions of securing a HELOC across groups. 
 Table 4.5 reveals that workers in lower unemployment rate occupations, or in 
occupations with lower risk of unemployment, still exhibit an increased likelihood of securing a 
HELOC when facing business cycle induced fluctuations in unemployment rate. This is 
consistent with the idea of HELOCs providing a mechanism through which households can tap 
into stored home equity to smooth out shocks to consumption. On the other hand, seasonality in 
employment is seen to have a negative influence on the probability of securing a HELOC. This 
may reflect the fact that for these workers any consumption smoothing motives for securing a 
HELOC are not strong enough to outweigh negative unobserved wealth effects. The results may 
also indicate that for low unemployment rate occupations seasonality in employment is less of a 
factor since the probability of becoming unemployed is small anyway.  
 By contrast to those in the lower unemployment risk sample, household heads in high 
unemployment rate occupations are seen to react more to seasonality in employment than to 
business cycle effects in their decision to secure a HELOC. Interestingly, whereas in the whole 
sample analysis only those under age 40 exhibited an increased tendency to secure a HELOC 
when facing seasonality in employment, all samples under age 50 in this split of the data display 
such a tendency. Interacted model results in Table 4.6B further reveal that for the youngest age 
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cohort house price appreciation is still needed in order for workers with high unemployment 
seasonality to be able to secure a HELOC.  
 
4.4.4 Comparison of two-worker households by degree of spousal unemployment rate correlation 
 Table 4.7 shows that splitting up the two-worker household sample by the degree of 
spousal occupation-specific unemployment rate correlation reveals important differences in the 
extent to which such households react to employment variability. 35F36 Recall that individuals in 
two-worker household with higher correlation in spousal unemployment rates are less able to use 
spousal income in order to insure against shocks to their own income. Therefore one expects 
such households are more likely to protect against frequent and predictable shocks to 
employment by securing access to a HELOC. Results expose that indeed this is the case. 
 The impact of seasonality in employment on the probability of securing a HELOC is 
positive and significant for household heads under age 40 with a strong positive correlation in 
spousal unemployment. No such significant effects of seasonality are seen for other samples. 
Similarly, the impact of business cycle driven fluctuations to employment on the probability of 
securing a HELOC is also strongest for two-worker households with a strongly positive spousal 
unemployment rate correlation.  
 The interacted model results for households with a strong spousal unemployment rate 
correlation are presented in Table 4.8. These confirm that for younger people the impacts of both 
seasonality and business cycle driven fluctuations to employment on the probability of securing a 
HELOC are stronger when paired with house price appreciation. 
                                                          
36 Results for the whole sample of two-worker households are similar to those for all households presented in Tables 
3 and 4 therefore are not included in the paper tables but are available upon request. 
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 Results from this model specification are particularly appealing because identification of 
differential effects occurs through the influence of a variable that is less likely to be correlated 
with individuals risk aversion. As mentioned earlier, people’s occupation choice is likely to be 
correlated with their degree of risk aversion. Therefore more risk averse people will likely select 
into occupations with less unemployment risk. On the other hand, it is unlikely individuals 
choose their spouses on the basis of their aversion to unemployment risk. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper finds evidence that facing frequent and predictable spells of unemployment 
can induce households to increase their demand for home equity loans or lines of credit 
(HELOC). Household heads under age 60 with occupational unemployment rates that are 
significantly impacted by business cycle effects are more likely to secure a HELOC. Results also 
indicate household heads under age 40 facing occupational seasonality in unemployment tend to 
secure such home equity withdrawal devices. For this younger group evidence is strongest when 
also experiencing an increase in their level of home equity via house price appreciation. This 
enables them to overcome credit supply restrictions and gain access to these home equity 
withdrawal devices. 
Addressing concerns pertaining to the correlation between occupational choice and 
individual’s risk aversion, a robustness check is carried out which compares outcomes for two-
worker households by the degree of spousal correlation in unemployment rates. Results indicate 
households with a strong positive correlation in unemployment rates are more likely to secure 
access to HELOCs when facing seasonality and business cycle induced fluctuations in 
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employment. This reflects their lesser ability to use spousal income as an alternative method for 
smoothing consumption relative to lower spousal unemployment correlation couples 
The findings here confirm the importance of home equity as a buffer stock of income that 
can be used to smooth out temporary shocks to consumption, consistent with the literature (e.g. 
Benjamin and Chinloy, 2008; Carroll, Dynan and Krane, 2003; Davidoff, 2006; Schwartz et al, 
2008; Shore and Sinai, 2010; and Wood et al, 2013). This paper highlights the previously 
unexplored and important role that home equity lines of credit may play in this context. 
Future research would benefit from identifying to what extent households draw upon 
home equity lines of credit when facing shocks to employment; i.e. analyzing what the dollar 
amount of equity extraction is. This is something that cannot be done with the ACS data used in 
this analysis but would provide important information regarding the extent to which such 
HELOC drawings can be used for consumption smoothing purposes in the context of 
unemployment spells. Another fruitful avenue for future research would be to analyze how such 
unemployment risk factors identified in this paper contribute to the decision of carrying out 
home equity withdrawals for households without a primary mortgage.
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Figure 4.1 
Probability of holding a 1st mortgage for all households and probabilities of also holding a 2nd mortgage 
and home equity loan (HEL) or line of credit (HELOC) for those holding a 1st mortgage (2003-2013) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Conceptual Model: Second-period consumption shock as a function of the  
decision to execute a home equity withdrawal 
 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
P
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
1
st
 M
o
rt
g
a
g
e 
H
o
ld
in
g
 H
o
m
eo
w
n
er
s
P
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
H
o
m
eo
w
n
er
 H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
Age of Household Head
1st Mortgage holders
1st Mortgage holders who also hold a HEL or HELOC
1st Mortgage holders who also hold a 2nd mortgage
2nd Period Consumption  
Shock (𝑦
1
 – ?̃?
2
) 
𝑦
1
+ (𝑘𝐻 − 𝑘𝑅)/𝑟𝐻 
y
1
 
k
R
  
k
H
 + r
H
* y
1
 
k
H
 
Second-period consumption shock 
with no home equity withdrawal 
Second-period consumption shock 
having secured a HELOC 
Second-period consumption shock having 
carried out a cash-out mortgage refinancing 
y
1
 
2nd Period  
Income (?̃?
2
) 𝑦
1
− 𝑘𝐻/(1 − 𝑟𝐻) 
 
123 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 
Equilibrium outcomes in the home equity line of credit (HELOC) market when experiencing  
house price appreciation for low and high unemployment risk occupations  
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Table 4.1 
Summary statistics 
(Standard deviation shown in parentheses) 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Mortgage Variables           
% Hold a Home Equity Loan or Line of Credit a 8.4 (27.7) 15.2 (35.9) 17.8 (38.3) 16.5 (37.1) 11.8 (32.3) 
% Hold a Mortgage 89.1 (31.1) 91.4 (28.1) 86.7 (34.0) 76.6 (42.3) 60.8 (48.8) 
% Hold a Second Mortgage a 6.4 (24.5) 6.8 (25.2) 5.3 (22.3) 3.9 (19.4) 2.6 (16.0) 
Key Control Variables           
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In  0.207 (0.276) 0.365 (0.338) 0.602 (0.432) 0.814 (0.528) 0.936 (0.568) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 0.051 (0.036) 0.036 (0.028) 0.032 (0.022) 0.031 (0.021) 0.034 (0.022) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR b 0.023 (0.027) 0.021 (0.025) 0.021 (0.026) 0.021 (0.026) 0.022 (0.026) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  b 0.400 (0.396) 0.407 (0.392) 0.402 (0.389) 0.388 (0.385) 0.369 (0.375) 
Remaining Household Head Variables           
Female 0.46 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 
Married 0.55 (0.50) 0.69 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 0.65 (0.48) 0.64 (0.48) 
Education- Less than High School 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.24) 0.08 (0.27) 
Education- High School Graduate 0.21 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 
Education- Some College or Higher 0.74 (0.44) 0.76 (0.43) 0.71 (0.45) 0.71 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 
Age 26.4 (2.2) 34.9 (2.8) 44.7 (2.9) 54.3 (2.9) 63.6 (2.7) 
Non-White 0.16 (0.37) 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39) 0.16 (0.36) 0.13 (0.34) 
Hispanic 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.33) 0.10 (0.30) 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.22) 
US Citizen 0.95 (0.21) 0.93 (0.25) 0.95 (0.21) 0.97 (0.16) 0.98 (0.13) 
Veteran 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.21) 0.10 (0.30) 
Household Yearly Pre-Tax Income (1,000 $) 50.1 (36.8) 74.2 (61.4) 81.2 (72.3) 79.7 (74.1) 69.8 (70.9) 
Number of Children Under Age 18 0.00 0.00  0.04 (0.20) 0.22 (0.49) 0.18 (0.45) 0.04 (0.20) 
Number of College Age Children (aged 18-22) 0.72 (0.99) 1.40 (1.22) 1.08 (1.14) 0.27 (0.65) 0.03 (0.24) 
Years Since Moved In 4.4 (4.7) 7.4 (6.0) 12.3 (8.0) 16.9 (9.6) 19.6 (10.2) 
House Age (current year – year built) 32.0 (23.0) 31.0 (22.8) 32.6 (21.8) 35.2 (21.0) 36.9 (20.5) 
      
Observations 311,226 980,508 1,505,778 1,666,668 1,037,849 
a Second mortgage and home equity loan or line of credit status only observed for individuals that hold a primary mortgage. 
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, age squared,  
and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest monthly fixed effect 
estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
 
125 
 
 
 
Table 4.2  
Linear probability model of securing a HEL/HELOC for all households (2003-2013)a 
 (standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
      
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 8.500*** 8.209*** 5.688*** 3.904*** 2.985*** 
 (1.601) (1.684) (1.481) (1.172) (1.073) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -9.213*** -28.62*** -25.55*** -9.247*** -2.166 
 (2.143) (3.121) (2.837) (2.256) (2.067) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b 1.979 7.730*** -0.612 -7.637*** -8.053*** 
High – Low Monthly Factor (2.510) (2.565) (1.481) (1.402) (1.659) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.567*** 0.474*** 0.217** 0.273** 0.0412 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.178) (0.137) (0.0867) (0.105) (0.102) 
Household Head Attributes      
Female -0.387*** -0.915*** -1.013*** -0.810*** -0.949*** 
 (0.102) (0.137) (0.144) (0.115) (0.114) 
Married 1.449*** 3.401*** 3.879*** 3.428*** 1.678*** 
 (0.173) (0.314) (0.315) (0.301) (0.197) 
Education- High-School Degree 1.127*** 1.673*** 2.283*** 2.323*** 1.193*** 
 (0.341) (0.503) (0.455) (0.514) (0.273) 
Education- Some College or Higher 1.963*** 4.474*** 5.094*** 4.830*** 3.775*** 
 (0.400) (0.662) (0.546) (0.608) (0.373) 
Age -2.155*** 1.435*** 0.922** 1.684*** -1.308** 
 (0.448) (0.324) (0.346) (0.373) (0.639) 
Age Squared 0.0501*** -0.0158*** -0.00992** -0.0174*** 0.00679 
 (0.00892) (0.00467) (0.00388) (0.00336) (0.00499) 
Non-White -1.407*** -3.756*** -4.650*** -3.052*** -0.221 
 (0.260) (0.436) (0.413) (0.305) (0.197) 
Hispanic -1.406*** -1.112** -1.546** -1.116* 0.0380 
 (0.521) (0.474) (0.677) (0.648) (0.467) 
US Citizen 0.452 1.721*** 2.237*** 2.207*** 1.868*** 
 (0.310) (0.435) (0.347) (0.312) (0.491) 
Veteran -0.428 -1.854*** -1.904*** -1.056*** 0.0478 
 (0.370) (0.267) (0.249) (0.180) (0.0972) 
Household Yearly Pre-Tax Income (1,000 $) 0.0414*** 0.0330*** 0.0227*** 0.0174*** 0.0151*** 
 (0.00428) (0.00312) (0.00231) (0.00176) (0.00150) 
Number of Children Under Age 18 0.00876 0.366*** 0.812*** 0.784*** 1.539*** 
 (0.0776) (0.0767) (0.0827) (0.0628) (0.217) 
Number of College Age Children (18 to 22 yrs. old)   -1.611*** 0.629*** 1.696*** 2.300*** 
  (0.211) (0.112) (0.157) (0.164) 
Years Since Moved In 0.925*** 1.285*** 1.181*** 1.169*** 0.982*** 
 (0.124) (0.153) (0.0917) (0.0700) (0.0594) 
Years Since Moved In Squared -0.0414*** -0.0544*** -0.0439*** -0.0387*** -0.0319*** 
 (0.00366) (0.00400) (0.00191) (0.00186) (0.00178) 
(Continues on next page…) 
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Table 4.2 (Cont.) 
Linear probability model of securing a HEL/HELOC for all households (2003-2013)a 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
     
House Age: -0.0244*** -0.0456*** -0.0455*** -0.0435*** -0.0292*** 
Current Year – Year Built (0.00322) (0.00636) (0.00662) (0.00409) (0.00313) 
Constant 22.10*** -30.85*** -20.86*** -40.46*** 55.12** 
 (5.688) (6.038) (7.749) (10.37) (20.80) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Broad Occupation Group FE 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 311,226 980,508 1,505,778 1,666,668 1,037,849 
R-squared 0.060 0.067 0.054 0.045 0.035 
Mean HEL/HELOC 8.39% 15.20% 17.83% 16.45% 11.82% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.207 0.365 0.602 0.814 0.936 
Mean UR 0.051 0.036 0.032 0.031 0.034 
Mean S 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Mean BC 0.400 0.407 0.402 0.388 0.369 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, 
age squared,  and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest 
monthly fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly % change in GDP. 
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Table 4.3 
Interacting unemployment risk measures with house price index appreciationa 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
     
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 10.01*** 9.898*** 6.449*** 4.204*** 3.438*** 
 (1.696) (1.714) (1.522) (1.187) (1.120) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) 0.207 -5.554 -10.42 -3.890 7.034 
 (2.448) (4.215) (7.061) (3.296) (4.410) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b -1.186 4.275* -2.206 -3.933 -2.128 
High – Low Monthly Factor (2.784) (2.387) (2.406) (2.639) (2.994) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.372** 0.291* 0.303* 0.319** 0.0666 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.164) (0.156) (0.161) (0.153) (0.158) 
Interactions      
HPI   x   UR -43.14*** -59.46*** -24.03** -6.389 -9.533** 
 (5.075) (7.868) (9.099) (4.661) (3.590) 
HPI   x   S 13.99** 9.196** 2.698 -4.210* -6.058** 
 (6.792) (3.991) (2.843) (2.475) (2.937) 
HPI   x   BC 0.981** 0.478 -0.151 -0.0562 -0.0307 
 (0.379) (0.317) (0.261) (0.141) (0.168) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Broad Occupation Group FE 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 311,226 980,508 1,505,778 1,666,668 1,037,849 
R-squared 0.061 0.067 0.054 0.045 0.035 
Mean HEL/HELOC 8.39% 15.20% 17.83% 16.45% 11.82% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.207 0.365 0.602 0.814 0.936 
Mean UR 0.051 0.036 0.032 0.031 0.034 
Mean S 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Mean BC 0.400 0.407 0.402 0.388 0.369 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head attributes.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, age 
squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest monthly 
fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
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Table 4.4 
Interacting unemployment risk measures with house price index appreciation 
including a full set of occupation fixed effectsa 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
      
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 10.03*** 9.783*** 6.309*** 4.117*** 3.372*** 
 (1.687) (1.690) (1.514) (1.184) (1.124) 
Interactions      
HPI   x   UR -43.17*** -58.75*** -23.14** -5.964 -9.390** 
 (5.049) (7.948) (9.014) (4.807) (3.701) 
HPI   x   S b 11.94* 6.957* 1.608 -4.624* -6.280** 
 (6.985) (3.889) (2.674) (2.519) (2.971) 
HPI   x   BC b 1.069*** 0.649* -0.0960 -0.0355 -0.0512 
 (0.391) (0.346) (0.271) (0.144) (0.180) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Occupation FE 338 338 338 338 338 
Observations 311,226 980,508 1,505,778 1,666,668 1,037,849 
R-squared 0.063 0.069 0.056 0.047 0.037 
Mean HEL/HELOC 8.39% 15.20% 17.83% 16.45% 11.82% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.207 0.365 0.602 0.814 0.936 
Mean UR 0.051 0.036 0.032 0.031 0.034 
Mean S 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Mean BC 0.400 0.407 0.402 0.388 0.369 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head attributes.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, 
age squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest 
monthly fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
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Table 4.5 
Comparison of household heads in low versus high unemployment rate occupations a 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel A – Low Unemployment Rate Occupations (UR ≤ 5%) 
 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 10.28*** 9.119*** 6.042*** 3.979*** 3.107*** 
 (1.933) (1.836) (1.513) (1.181) (1.089) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -15.14* -54.55*** -44.79*** -26.85*** -13.93*** 
 (7.650) (8.435) (5.121) (4.889) (3.052) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b -24.42*** -11.62** -14.08*** -20.48*** -12.20*** 
High – Low Monthly Factor (7.526) (5.136) (2.041) (2.609) (3.639) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.838*** 0.871*** 0.599*** 0.915*** 0.316*** 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.241) (0.177) (0.0976) (0.116) (0.115) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Broad Occupation Group FE 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 191,487 769,599 1,311,183 1,467,149 887,611 
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.052 0.044 0.035 
Mean HEL/HELOC 9.30% 16.40% 18.61% 16.92% 12.04% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.193 0.355 0.599 0.812 0.934 
Mean UR 0.028 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.028 
Mean S 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.017 
Mean BC 0.402 0.404 0.399 0.368 0.322 
 
Panel B – High Unemployment Rate Occupations (UR > 5%) 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 6.301*** 5.084*** 3.607*** 3.282*** 2.122** 
 (1.162) (1.154) (1.270) (1.139) (1.004) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -4.775 -6.392** -1.871 -4.106 2.176 
 (3.313) (3.170) (4.377) (3.494) (3.641) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b 7.340** 8.974*** 6.007** 6.188** 0.750 
High – Low Monthly Factor (3.040) (3.275) (2.746) (2.812) (3.285) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.168 -0.0809 -0.283 -0.251* -0.226 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.207) (0.186) (0.170) (0.145) (0.136) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Broad Occupation Group FE 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 119,739 210,909 194,595 199,519 150,238 
R-squared 0.051 0.058 0.054 0.045 0.038 
Mean HEL/HELOC 6.98% 11.01% 12.67% 12.92% 10.49% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.229 0.398 0.628 0.826 0.948 
Mean UR 0.087 0.079 0.078 0.074 0.073 
Mean S 0.036 0.043 0.056 0.061 0.050 
Mean BC 0.397 0.418 0.425 0.542 0.651 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head attributes.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, 
age squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest 
monthly fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
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Table 4.6A 
Interacted model for household heads in low unemployment rate occupations (UR ≤ 5%)a 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
     
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 11.41*** 9.933*** 6.720*** 4.290*** 3.642*** 
 (2.476) (1.904) (1.626) (1.269) (1.161) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -4.839 -34.83*** -27.61** -18.27** 1.744 
 (7.949) (11.03) (11.34) (7.505) (5.501) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b -24.71*** -15.44** -14.35*** -14.30*** -6.922* 
High – Low Monthly Factor (7.740) (6.153) (4.642) (5.068) (3.928) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.633*** 0.593*** 0.564*** 0.769*** 0.278 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.220) (0.196) (0.182) (0.249) (0.236) 
Interactions      
HPI   x   UR -55.64*** -54.47*** -28.15* -10.44 -16.83*** 
 (20.39) (18.68) (15.87) (10.75) (5.112) 
HPI   x   S 0.866 9.383 0.384 -7.212 -5.564 
 (24.67) (10.26) (6.035) (4.785) (5.407) 
HPI   x   BC 1.112** 0.784* 0.0475 0.176 0.0380 
 (0.546) (0.403) (0.282) (0.245) (0.233) 
 
     
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Broad Occupation Group FE 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 191,487 769,599 1,311,183 1,467,149 887,611 
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.052 0.044 0.035 
Mean HEL/HELOC 9.30% 16.40% 18.61% 16.92% 12.04% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.193 0.355 0.599 0.812 0.934 
Mean UR 0.028 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.028 
Mean S 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.017 
Mean BC 0.402 0.404 0.399 0.368 0.322 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head attributes.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, 
age squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest 
monthly fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
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Table 4.6B 
Interacted model for household heads in high unemployment rate occupations (UR > 5%)a 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
     
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 8.454*** 6.727*** 3.906** 3.394*** 2.838*** 
 (1.246) (1.372) (1.541) (1.147) (1.057) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) 3.008 2.106 -3.028 -6.612 4.997 
 (3.632) (5.633) (6.766) (5.336) (6.602) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b 4.277 8.486** 7.979** 8.184** 8.693** 
High – Low Monthly Factor (3.098) (3.486) (3.201) (3.633) (3.855) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b -0.0513 -0.0444 0.197 0.0842 -0.0486 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.214) (0.239) (0.335) (0.231) (0.277) 
Interactions      
HPI   x   UR -34.33*** -21.16* 1.929 3.002 -2.927 
 (8.602) (10.68) (9.000) (5.067) (4.863) 
HPI   x   S 13.06* 1.247 -3.068 -2.295 -8.037** 
 (7.683) (5.684) (4.382) (3.438) (3.513) 
HPI   x   BC 1.047* -0.0785 -0.738* -0.393* -0.175 
 (0.578) (0.431) (0.423) (0.232) (0.243) 
 
     
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head Broad Occupation Group FE 17 17 17 17 17 
Observations 119,739 210,909 194,595 199,519 150,238 
R-squared 0.051 0.058 0.054 0.045 0.038 
Mean HEL/HELOC 6.98% 11.01% 12.67% 12.92% 10.49% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.229 0.398 0.628 0.826 0.948 
Mean UR 0.087 0.079 0.078 0.074 0.073 
Mean S 0.036 0.043 0.056 0.061 0.050 
Mean BC 0.397 0.418 0.425 0.542 0.651 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head attributes.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, 
age squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest 
monthly fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
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Table 4.7 
Comparison of two-worker households by degree of spousal correlation in unemployment rate a 
 (standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel A – Negative or Zero Correlation 
(-1.0 ≤ Spousal UR Correlation Coefficient ≤ 0) c 
 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 16.16*** 9.726*** 7.363*** 3.901*** 4.185*** 
 (2.794) (1.805) (1.737) (1.062) (1.488) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -15.66 -26.33*** -1.924 12.26 8.302 
 (9.512) (8.602) (9.452) (9.412) (6.315) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b -15.84 6.276 -7.499 -11.97* -20.49*** 
High – Low Monthly Factor (10.30) (6.557) (7.078) (6.204) (5.926) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 1.126** -0.325 0.0555 -0.210 -0.0786 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.537) (0.281) (0.331) (0.268) (0.310) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head & Spouse Broad Occ. Group FE 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 21,055 79,858 102,973 102,248 50,968 
R-squared 0.101 0.073 0.054 0.047 0.051 
Mean HEL/HELOC 10.31% 17.65% 21.01% 19.79% 14.58% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.179 0.343 0.603 0.843 0.961 
Mean UR 0.040 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.033 
Mean S 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.024 
Mean BC 0.463 0.469 0.480 0.467 0.462 
 
Panel B – Moderate Positive Correlation 
(0 < Spousal UR Correlation Coefficient ≤ 0.5) c 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 12.50*** 9.851*** 7.203*** 4.795*** 3.887*** 
 (1.886) (2.044) (1.726) (1.459) (1.342) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -8.366 -24.71*** -23.96*** -4.350 0.0648 
 (5.782) (4.617) (5.085) (4.323) (4.870) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b -0.963 0.531 -6.295 -14.39*** -12.65*** 
High – Low Monthly Factor (6.785) (4.700) (3.891) (3.619) (3.432) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.365 0.365 0.131 0.315 -0.188 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.298) (0.219) (0.194) (0.232) (0.187) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head & Spouse Broad Occ. Group FE 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 64,062 239,868 345,652 362,650 183,678 
R-squared 0.076 0.070 0.053 0.047 0.042 
Mean HEL/HELOC 9.87% 17.43% 20.92% 19.62% 14.43% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.185 0.360 0.615 0.844 0.952 
Mean UR 0.045 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.033 
Mean S 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.023 
Mean BC 0.390 0.396 0.405 0.397 0.385 
(Continues on next page…) 
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Table 4.7 (Cont.) 
Comparison of two-worker households by degree of spousal correlation in unemployment rate a 
 (standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel C – Strong Positive Correlation 
(0.5 < Spousal UR Correlation Coefficient ≤ 1.0) c 
 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 11.18*** 9.506*** 6.030*** 4.410*** 3.456*** 
 (2.673) (1.860) (1.659) (1.224) (1.099) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) -11.49* -27.66*** -23.34*** -16.10*** -8.186* 
 (5.776) (5.502) (5.209) (4.924) (4.623) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b 8.356** 10.11** 2.217 -3.179 -4.490* 
High – Low Monthly Factor (3.700) (4.340) (3.601) (2.785) (2.560) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b 0.187 0.333 0.347 0.590*** 0.644** 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.307) (0.238) (0.217) (0.199) (0.253) 
      
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head & Spouse Broad Occ. Group FE 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 82,576 316,796 476,376 493,905 256,590 
R-squared 0.074 0.069 0.054 0.046 0.041 
Mean HEL/HELOC 9.98% 17.22% 19.99% 18.76% 13.93% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.196 0.366 0.615 0.831 0.945 
Mean UR 0.054 0.038 0.034 0.033 0.035 
Mean S 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Mean BC 0.381 0.394 0.382 0.368 0.345 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head and spouse attributes.  
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, age 
squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest monthly 
fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
c Correlation coefficient calculated using yearly occupation-specific unemployment rates estimated with CPS 1993-2002 data. 
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Table 4.8 
Interacted model for two-worker households with a  
strong positive spousal correlation in unemployment rate  
(0.5 < Spousal UR Correlation Coefficient ≤ 1.0) a 
(standard errors clustered at state level in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent variable = 100 if hold a HEL or HELOC; 0 otherwise. 
 
Age group year range (by Household Head Age) 
 
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 
     
Estimated Max. % HPI Increase Since Moved In (HPI) 13.32*** 11.90*** 6.845*** 4.955*** 4.175*** 
 (2.500) (1.869) (1.777) (1.266) (1.159) 
Avg. UR for Age and Occ. Group 1993-2002 (UR) 2.542 -0.117 -4.482 -2.093 4.713 
 (6.167) (6.716) (10.16) (8.879) (8.034) 
Seasonality in Occupation-Specific UR (S): b 3.269 4.511 -3.872 0.663 2.707 
High – Low Monthly Factor (4.137) (4.810) (5.858) (5.409) (5.324) 
Business Cycle Effect on Occ.-Specific UR  (BC): b -0.443 0.375 0.356 0.438 0.961** 
Impact of Quarterly % Change in GDP (0.320) (0.288) (0.347) (0.386) (0.376) 
Interactions      
HPI   x   UR -73.11*** -71.00*** -29.44** -16.29* -13.20 
 (18.35) (10.77) (13.47) (9.242) (8.177) 
HPI   x   S 25.89 14.68** 9.575 -4.221 -7.404 
 (18.75) (6.371) (7.140) (5.928) (4.900) 
HPI   x   BC 3.236*** -0.168 -0.0294 0.175 -0.340 
 (1.201) (0.590) (0.584) (0.307) (0.324) 
 
     
State by Year FE 561 561 561 561 561 
Household Head & Spouse Broad Occ. Group FE 34 34 34 34 34 
Observations 82,576 316,796 476,376 493,905 256,590 
R-squared 0.074 0.070 0.054 0.046 0.041 
Mean HEL/HELOC 9.98% 17.22% 19.99% 18.76% 13.93% 
Mean Percent HPI Increase  0.196 0.366 0.615 0.831 0.945 
Mean UR 0.054 0.038 0.034 0.033 0.035 
Mean S 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022 
Mean BC 0.381 0.394 0.382 0.368 0.345 
a One * indicates significant at 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. All models also include household head and spouse attributes. Correlation 
coefficient calculated using yearly occupation-specific unemployment rates estimated with CPS 1993-2002 data. 
b Measures are calculated by regressing unemployment status on month fixed effects, quarterly percent change in GDP, education, age, 
age squared, and gender using CPS 1993-2002 data for each occupation. Seasonality is the difference between the largest and smallest 
monthly fixed effect estimate. Business cycle effect is the absolute value of the coefficient estimate for quarterly percent change in GDP. 
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Table A2-1 
Policy effect for married women who moved into their current residence 5 or more years ago 
 (Standard errors clustered at the state by year level in parentheses)a 
 
Panel A: Baseline Model 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New 
Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Currently Eligible:  0.0538** 0.0572 0.0869*** 0.0447 0.0251 0.0364*** 
 Post 2009 x child under age1 (0.0255) (0.0372) (0.0267) (0.0474) (0.0217) (0.00553) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [-0.003] [-0.033] [0.009] [0.029] [0.017] 
Eligible 1-3 years ago: 0.0534*** 0.0256 0.0416** 0.0120 0.0196 0.0193*** 
 Post 2009 x qualifying aged (0.0194) (0.0223) (0.0176) (0.0296) (0.0149) (0.00361) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef. c - [0.028] [0.012] [0.041] [0.034*] [0.034**] 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 16,210 7,448 16,386 7,198 28,718 417,536 
R-squared 0.055 0.093 0.105 0.089 0.078 0.084 
Employment Rate 66.9% 66.4% 60.9% 72.2% 74.1% 71.5% 
Panel B: Persistence of Effects 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New 
Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post 2009 x  0.0541** 0.0575 0.0868*** 0.0449 0.0248 0.0365*** 
Child under age 1 (0.0255) (0.0372) (0.0267) (0.0474) (0.0217) (0.00552) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [-0.003] [-0.033] [0.009] [0.029] [0.018] 
Post 2010 x  0.0551** 0.0326 0.0378 0.0341 -0.00115 0.0239*** 
Youngest child age 1 (0.0262) (0.0341) (0.0252) (0.0428) (0.0212) (0.00521) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.023] [0.017] [0.021] [0.056*] [0.031] 
Post 2011 x  0.0764** 0.0458 0.0388 -0.0287 0.0277 0.0207*** 
Youngest child age 2 (0.0312) (0.0370) (0.0262) (0.0446) (0.0211) (0.00577) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.031] [0.038] [0.105**] [0.049*] [0.056**] 
Post 2012 x 0.00673 -0.0352 0.0550 0.0430 0.0566** 0.0055 
Youngest child age 3 (0.0333) (0.0545) (0.0358) (0.0586) (0.0259) (0.00783) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.042] [-0.048] [-0.036] [-0.050] [0.001] 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 16,210 7,448 16,386 7,198 28,718 417,536 
R-squared 0.055 0.093 0.105 0.089 0.078 0.084 
Employment Rate 66.9% 66.4% 60.9% 72.2% 74.1% 71.5% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes 
(education, race, age); spouse education level and youngest child age indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets].  
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Table A2-2 
Comparison of employment outcomes by age group for women aged 18 to 60 
(Standard errors clustered at the state by year level in parentheses)a 
 
 
Panel A: Married women  
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  
NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Young (Aged 18 to 40) -0.0660*** -0.0380*** -0.0530*** -0.0748*** -0.0585*** -0.0563*** 
 (0.00720) (0.0113) (0.00699) (0.00852) (0.00528) (0.00142) 
Post 2009 0.0110 0.0114 0.0383*** 0.0235 -0.0111 -0.0336*** 
 (0.00773) (0.0103) (0.00449) (0.0362) (0.00796) (0.01152) 
Post 2009 x Young  0.0117* 0.00425 0.00424 0.0112 -0.00871* -0.0043*** 
 (0.00605) (0.00815) (0.00585) (0.00776) (0.00479) (0.00127) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.007] [0.007] [-0.001] [0.020***] [0.016***] 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 114,969 111,510 102,244 46,263 193,574 2,950,041 
R-squared 0.034 0.045 0.058 0.052 0.058 0.061 
Employment Rates:        
Young (aged 18 to 40 ) 65.4% 66.3% 61.4% 69.8% 70.6% 66.6% 
Old (aged 41 to 60) 70.2% 68.9% 67.8% 72.5% 72.4% 69.1% 
 
Panel B: Women married to spouses with BA degree or higher education level 
 
  Closest to NJ………..>….....…>….….….>……….Furthest from NJ 
  NYC and PHL MSAs DE, NY, and PAb  
 
New Jersey 
NJ Border 
PUMAs 
Non-NJ Border 
PUMAs 
< 60 miles 
from NJ 
> 60 miles 
from NJ 
All Other 
States 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Young (Aged 18 to 40) -0.0853*** -0.0536*** -0.0617*** -0.0957*** -0.0946*** -0.0940*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0154) (0.00947) (0.0178) (0.00969) (0.00234) 
Post 2009 -0.00749 0.0359*** 0.0639** 0.0637* -0.00376 0.000131 
 (0.0106) (0.0131) (0.0296) (0.0357) (0.0116) (21.4) 
Post 2009 x Young  0.0340*** 0.0125 0.0202** 0.00397 0.0260*** 0.0192*** 
 (0.00813) (0.0132) (0.00863) (0.0158) (0.00904) (0.00196) 
Col(1) - Col(X) Coef.c - [0.022*] [0.014] [0.030**] [0.008] [0.015**] 
       
State by Year F.E. 8 16 16 24 16 368 
Observations 51,093 49,960 39,439 46,263 54,921 945,789 
R-squared 0.020 0.026 0.032 0.052 0.024 0.027 
Employment Rates:        
Young (aged 18 to 40 ) 63.9% 68.3% 65.4% 70.6% 72.4% 68.8% 
Old (aged 41 to 60) 70.0% 71.1% 69.2% 73.5% 72.3% 69.7% 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; ** at 5 % level; *** at 1 % level. All models also include own attributes 
(education, race, age); spouse education level indicators. 
b Does not include individuals in these three states residing in the New York and Philadelphia MSAs. 
c One-sided test of NJ coefficient larger than coefficient from other sample shown in [square brackets]. 
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Table A3-1: $5,000 Income cutoff (2013 dollars) when defining work 
Unrestricted peer effect model instrumenting for neighbor work status with MSA-level employment ratesa 
(standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A –MEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) -0.00977 0.00340 0.00508 -0.00442 -0.00481 -0.00128 0.00148 
 (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0118) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0125) 
N working non-peer (WNP) 0.00293 -0.00353 -0.00498 -0.00452 -0.00716 -0.00213 -0.00404 
 (0.0212) (0.00964) (0.0147) (0.0133) (0.0118) (0.0130) (0.0117) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.00976 0.00298 -0.00784 -0.00117 0.00285 -0.00652 -0.00225 
 (0.0208) (0.0138) (0.0168) (0.0152) (0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0141) 
N non-working peer (NWP) 0.00960 -0.0165 -0.0136 -0.0151 -0.0196 0.00352 -0.0211 
 (0.0446) (0.0234) (0.0477) (0.0341) (0.0388) (0.0468) (0.0587) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 2,272 
% Neighbors that are Peers 34.4% 40.3% 18.9% 19.2% 15.2% 10.8% 8.7% 
Mean WP 4.2 4.2 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.1 
Mean WNP 4.0 4.2 6.2 6.3 6.8 7.3 7.6 
Mean NWNP 4.1 3.1 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.7 5.8 
Mean NWP 1.0 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 
R-square 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.586 0.587 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,409 5,400 
 
PANEL B –WOMEN 
Peer Group Definition Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
N working peer (WP) 0.0378 0.0217 0.0138 0.0410** 0.0226 0.0298 0.0101 
 (0.0244) (0.0141) (0.0154) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0208) 
N working non-peer (WNP) 0.000245 0.00389 0.00449 0.00670 -0.00741 -0.00115 -0.00905 
 (0.0182) (0.0136) (0.0171) (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0145) (0.0133) 
N non-working non-peer (NWNP) -0.0220 0.000829 -0.0103 -0.00559 0.0116 0.00343 0.0131 
 (0.0317) (0.0178) (0.0227) (0.0207) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0163) 
N non-working peer (NWP) -0.0487 -0.0524* -0.0287 -0.0667** -0.0519** -0.0507* -0.0303 
 (0.0376) (0.0294) (0.0259) (0.0270) (0.0241) (0.0283) (0.0298) 
Person Fixed Effects 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608 
% Neighbors that are Peers 39.0% 40.2% 21.3% 21.8% 15.3% 12.0% 8.6% 
Mean WP 3.6 4.2 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.8 
Mean WNP 4.7 4.1 6.3 6.4 7.0 7.3 7.6 
Mean NWNP 2.2 1.8 1.1 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5 
Mean NWP 2.3 3.0 4.4 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.6 
R-square 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.709 
Observations 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 6,252 
a Sample includes only individuals age 25-60 in two consecutive surveys. One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 % 
level; three at 1 % level.  All models also include: year fixed effects; MSA employment rate; individual education (less than HS; HS and 
some col.; and BA degree or more); child presence in HH; and marital status. As well as percent of neighbors aged 25 to 60 and their 
average: education (same 3 categories); marital status; and child in HH. 
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Table A3-2a: Linear probability model of locating in the same neighborhood cluster 
controlling for person attributes and residuals from Table 5aa 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A – MEN 
 Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dif_HS degree/some college  -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** 
 (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.05e-05) 
Dif_BA degree or more -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000722*** 
 (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.95e-05) 
Dif_Married -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000822*** 
 (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.76e-05) 
Dif_Child under age 18 -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000187*** 
 (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.82e-05) 
Dif_1st Stage Residuals  -0.000209** -0.000198** -0.000206** -0.000208** -0.000207** -0.000204** -0.000207** 
 (8.29e-05) (8.29e-05) (8.30e-05) (8.29e-05) (8.30e-05) (8.28e-05) (8.31e-05) 
Constant 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 
 (4.22e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.23e-05) 
Observations 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,016,312 
 
PANEL B – WOMEN 
 Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dif_HS degree/some college  -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** 
 (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) 
Dif_BA degree or more -0.000360*** -0.000359*** -0.000359*** -0.000359*** -0.000359*** -0.000359*** -0.000359*** 
 (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) 
Dif_Married -0.000853*** -0.000852*** -0.000852*** -0.000852*** -0.000852*** -0.000852*** -0.000852*** 
 (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) 
Dif_Child under age 18 -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** 
 (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) 
Dif_1st Stage Residuals  -0.000070 -0.000051 -0.000055 -0.000061 -0.000055 -0.000057 -0.000052 
 (6.10e-05) (6.06e-05) (6.07e-05) (6.09e-05) (6.07e-05) (6.10e-05) (6.07e-05) 
Constant 0.00239*** 0.00238*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00238*** 
 (3.68e-05) (3.68e-05) (3.68e-05) (3.69e-05) (3.68e-05) (3.69e-05) (3.68e-05) 
Observations 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 % level; three at 1 % level. 
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Table A3-2b: Linear probability model of locating in the same neighborhood cluster 
controlling for person attributes and residuals from Table 5ba 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 
PANEL A – MEN 
 Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dif_HS degree/some college  -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** -0.000228*** 
 (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.05e-05) 
Dif_BA degree or more -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000724*** -0.000722*** 
 (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.94e-05) (3.95e-05) 
Dif_Married -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000817*** -0.000823*** 
 (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.75e-05) (3.76e-05) 
Dif_Child under age 18 -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000190*** -0.000187*** 
 (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.81e-05) (3.82e-05) 
Dif_1st Stage Residuals  -0.000209** -0.000199** -0.000209** -0.000211** -0.000210** -0.000203** -0.000209** 
 (8.29e-05) (8.29e-05) (8.31e-05) (8.30e-05) (8.30e-05) (8.29e-05) (8.32e-05) 
Constant 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 0.00262*** 
 (4.22e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.23e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.23e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.23e-05) 
Observations 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,033,350 5,016,312 
 
PANEL B – WOMEN 
 Gender Child Gen-Educ Gen-Child 
Gen 
Mar-Child 
Gen 
Ed-Child 
Gen-Mar 
Ed-Child 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dif_HS degree/some college  -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** -0.000191*** 
 (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) (3.34e-05) 
Dif_BA degree or more -0.000360*** -0.000359*** -0.000359*** -0.000360*** -0.000360*** -0.000360*** -0.000359*** 
 (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) (3.32e-05) 
Dif_Married -0.000853*** -0.000852*** -0.000852*** -0.000853*** -0.000853*** -0.000853*** -0.000852*** 
 (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) (3.09e-05) 
Dif_Child under age 18 -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** -0.000243*** 
 (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) (3.19e-05) 
Dif_1st Stage Residuals  -0.000075 -0.000065 -0.000060 -0.000082 -0.000068 -0.000073 -0.000059 
 (6.11e-05) (6.12e-05) (6.10e-05) (6.16e-05) (6.11e-05) (6.15e-05) (6.10e-05) 
Constant 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 0.00239*** 
 (3.69e-05) (3.69e-05) (3.69e-05) (3.70e-05) (3.69e-05) (3.70e-05) (3.69e-05) 
Observations 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 6,692,941 
a One * indicates significant at the 10 percent level; two at 5 % level; three at 1 % level. 
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Table A4-1 
Average unemployment risk measures for broad occupation groups 
 
Broad Occupation Group Occ. Codes a U. Rate 
High – low monthly 
seasonal factor 
Impact of 
Quarterly % 
Change in GDP 
Managerial & Professional Specialty     
Executive, Administrative, and Managerial 003 to 022 2.13% 0.016 -0.185 
Management Related 023 to 037 2.87% 0.024 -0.283 
Professional Specialty 043 to 200 2.42% 0.033 -0.032 
Technical, Sales, & Administrative Support     
Technicians, and Related Support 203 to 235 2.78% 0.026 -0.323 
Sales 243 to 290 4.66% 0.022 0.037 
Administrative Support, and Clerical 303 to 391 4.54% 0.030 -0.191 
Service     
Private Household 405 to 408 7.85% 0.023 0.437 
Protective Service 415 to 427 3.93% 0.060 0.254 
Other Service 434 to 469 6.07% 0.035 0.050 
Farming, Forestry, & Fishing     
Farm Operators and Managers 473 to 476 1.77% 0.025 0.391 
Other Agricultural and Related 479 to 498 10.90% 0.114 0.198 
Precision Production, Craft, & Repair     
Mechanics and Repairers 503 to 549 3.57% 0.030 -0.376 
Construction Trades 558 to 599 8.34% 0.080 -0.429 
Extractive 614 to 617 7.56% 0.079 -0.941 
Precision Production 628 to 699 4.75% 0.055 -0.062 
Operators, Fabricators, & Laborers     
Machine Operators, Assemblers, and Inspectors 703 to 799 6.98% 0.058 -1.644 
Transportation, Material Moving 803 to 890 7.71% 0.062 0.066 
a Based on 1990  census occupational classification system. 
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